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RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY

**A Contribution to the History of Sociological
Thought and Theory**

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RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE
HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT AND THEORY

BY

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To

ELIZABETH JUNKER HECKER

THIS WORK IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED

BY HER HUSBAND

PREFACE

THIS study has been made in the hope that it would fill a gap which exists in the history of sociological thought and theory. A history which as yet has not appeared in English, Dr. Paul Barth's "*Die Geschichte der Philosophie als Soziologie*", is perhaps the best work on the subject in German. A more recent work on the subject is by Faustus Squillace, "*La classification des doctrines sociologiques*". Neither of these writers, however, does more than merely mention Russian sociology nor says anything of the place it holds in the social-political history of Russia.

To keep this study of Russian Sociology within certain fixed limitations it became necessary to exclude the Russian belletristic literature which contains a good deal of sociological thought, as for example, the novels of Turgeniev, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and others. It also seemed expedient not to present the work of authors who only re-interpret the theories of others and who have had no influence in directing the general trend of Russian Sociology. Such authors are, for example, Smolikovsky, who expounded Comte's system to the Russians, and Stronin, who wrote on sociological analogies.

Of the three parts in this study the first may be regarded as introductory to the latter two. Part II is an analysis of the principal Russian sociological schools, and Part III contains the miscellaneous theories which have entered into the province of Russian sociology.

There is no uniform system of spelling Russian names in English. An attempt was made to transliterate all Russian

words based upon the English pronunciation of the alphabet. The Russianized name of the Russian capital "Petrograd" has been used (instead of St. Petersburg) throughout with the exception of quotations.

In conclusion, it is a pleasure to state that I owe my interest in sociology to the inspiring teaching of Professor Franklin Henry Giddings, who also spent much of his valuable time in the correction of the manuscript.

J. F. H.

NEW YORK, MAY, 1915.

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PART I

THE BEGINNINGS OF RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY

RUSSIAN sociology is truly Russian since most of it has been called into existence by the problems confronting the social-political life of that nation. To understand Russian sociology and to appreciate it, one must necessarily study it in the light of the history of Russia's social and political movements.

Russia has been called the land of extremes. Here a despot and autocratic bureaucracy has been continually opposed by groups which championed the cause of the common people, but in their demands were just as uncompromising and rigid as the dominant autocracy they opposed. Is autocracy inevitable to Russia? Or is it an outgrown institution which maintains itself artificially by the use of brute force? These questions have been variously answered. The bulk of opinion, however, is quite unanimous that Russian autocracy has established itself under peculiar historical conditions and that it will pass away when these conditions shall have changed. There are others who consider Russian autocracy the resultant of ethnic composition, and of the psychology of the Slav as well as a product of geographical location and topographical peculiarities.

There are some sixty-five different racial and linguistic groups within the boundaries of the Russian Empire. Forty-six of these ethnic groups are found within European Russia and the Caucasus alone. Some of these peoples are still in the savage state and most of them are just emerging out of barbarism. In spite of this apparent ethnic hetero-

geneity the bulk of the population is Slavic,¹ and of these the Great Russians are the most numerous, representing in themselves, a highly homogeneous mass, about two-thirds of the whole population of Russia. The Russian Slav who inhabits the great plains of European Russia reflects in his psychology the geographic and climatic environment in which he lives. A certain apathy, plasticity and pacific quality are the characteristics of his nature. He is long suffering and forgiving, much rather bearing wrong than inflicting it. Being mystically inclined, he is non-political and sentimentally communistic.²

¹ The principal Slavic peoples of Russia besides the Great Russians are the Little Russians of the South, the White Russians of the West and the Poles. The Little Russians and White Russians, although speaking separate dialects are in religion and sympathy one with the Great Russians.

² Brückner in his *Geschichte der Russischen Literatur*, p. 1, calls the Russian Slav a born anarchist. Masaryk, in his *Sociologische Skizzen*, thinks that the Russians are not more anarchistic than other races but that their democracy is negative and preferably non-political. Our own observation favors in general Masaryk's view, with the difference that we believe that the passive non-political man may be aroused and become extremely active and dangerous. The occasional Jewish persecutions (pogroms), the vandalisms of the Russian revolution, and the deeds of the nihilists and terrorists may be cited as examples of this direct action. The sentimental communism of the Russian, whatever its cause, shows itself everywhere. The peasant has a tenacious hold upon the institution called the land commune or community ownership which, although by law (1906) now allowed to be broken up, nevertheless survives in a large degree. Recent statistics show that after the enactment of the law permitting withdrawal of land from the commune, out of 90,099,000 communal members 17,874,000, or only about 19 per cent, withdrew by May 1, 1906. The area of land held by the communes was, in 1906, 997,242,000 desyatines; by 1913, of this land was withdrawn 127,698,000 desyatines, or only about 11 per cent. These figures show that the communes which have little land are compelled to break up, whereas those which have more land prefer the communal way of life. This communal interest shows itself also among the many religious sects as the Dukhobors in Canada, the Tolstovsy and many others.

Russian autocracy is not a direct product of the Russian people; rather it is a foreign importation which developed, being favored not only by the psychological characteristics of the Slavs but invited by the geographic location of Russia, and consummated under unfortunate historical conditions.

The great open plain which constitutes most of European Russia is unprotected by any great mountain barriers and is easily accessible from the northwest and from the south-east. Through these open and by nature unprotected doors entered those elements which were to make up Russian autocracy. From the northwest came the Varyags or Norsemen, who established themselves as the first dynasties of the Russian Slavs; from the south came the Byzantine Missionary, who introduced the Greek-orthodox religion; and from the east came the Asiatic Conquerors, who crushed every institution of liberty,¹ and established their despotic rule, which, when adopted by the Muscovite princes, presented in itself a peculiar synthesis of Teuton militancy, Tartar despotism, and Byzantine sanctimoniousness. These three elements, whether organically united or not, were the dominant forces of Russian autocracy, maintaining themselves and predominating to the present day, although modified by Western culture, and at the present day represented by rulers of dominantly Germanic blood.

¹ When in the ninth century the Norsemen invaded the territory of the Russian Slavic tribes these had institutions of tribal democracy and city republics which governed themselves by the *Vecha*, an institution similar to the Roman assembly and by a kind of senate consisting of the wealthier classes, who were on their way to become the feudal aristocrats and plutocrats of the free city-states. The crushing of the free institutions of the Russian Slavs went on gradually. Thus the city republic Novgorod was finally destroyed by Ivan the Great, who also cast off the Mongolian yoke but maintained its despotic policies of centralization and autocratic control. Another city republic, Pskov, lingered till 1509 and was the last one to lose its independence.

Russian autocracy has had but two principal policies throughout its history, an internal policy of political, ecclesiastical and partly economic control and centralization, and an external policy of expansion towards the four seas: from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. This policy if momentarily changed has been so under strong outside pressure. All attempts to better the lot of the common people and to give them greater liberties were carried out in times of national trouble and under threat of revolution.¹

Although long-suffering and slow to wrath, the people of Russia have risen from time to time, demanding the rights and possessions of which they had been robbed by the predatory interests which always, directly or indirectly, have associated themselves with Russian autocracy. In these struggles certain classes of the population have furnished the leaders and have given initiative to movements which have had for their purpose the abolition of autocratic control and the betterment of social and economic conditions for the common people. The leaders of these movements have sought to develop their programs of action and give to them rational justification by the aid of philosophy and of the social sciences.²

¹ For example, the emancipation of the serfs and other great reforms of the sixties were made possible after the disasters of the Crimean war. Fifty years later the government had to yield to the demand for a representative parliament when again disastrously humiliated during the Russo-Japanese war and the revolution which followed it. The present war (1914) freed Russia from the vodka curse and thus it goes throughout Russian history. The cost of its progress has been borne vicariously.

² This is true of all liberal movements from the days of Catherine II. Before this the leaders of the opposition were the Cossacks.

Stenka Razhin was one of the principal leaders of the popular uprisings in the seventeenth century, and Yemilyan Pugatchev in the eighteenth century. The philosophy of these early uprisings is cen-

This tendency has been directly responsible for the rise and development of most of Russian sociology. We will briefly indicate the nature of these movements and introduce their scholarly representatives before entering upon an analysis of the sociological systems of thought held by these men.

Peter the Great, says a Russian poet,¹ cut a window through into Europe. But Peter did not permit any liberal and philosophic currents to pass this window into Russia from the European atmosphere. His interests were throughout practical. The schools which he established had no use for philosophy nor for theology. They limited instruction to the practical arts and sciences. Catherine II of Russia widened this window and permitted French and English liberal thought to reach the newly-developing intellectual class. She loved to pose as an enlightened despot and imported Diderot in person to instruct her in the liberalism of the French encyclopedists. Montesquieu was her favorite philosopher.²

Her *Nakazy* (*Instructions*), a little book containing an outline of principles by which she intended to reform and

tered around the conception of the Messianic mission of the czars, who are sent by God to liberate the common people from the exploitation of the nobility and bureaucracy. Thus Pugatchev, although well known as the son of a Cossack, was believed to be the reincarnation of Peter III, aspiring to the throne, usurped by the wife of Peter III, Catherine II. This myth of something similar to a Messianic function of the czars has been believed by the common people for generations, and it explains the loyalty of the people to the crown in spite of their common hatred of the bureaucracy and of the nobility. We need not add that the Russian autocrats have done their utmost to perpetuate this belief among the masses and to persecute everything which tended to undermine the credulity of the people in this regard.

¹ Alexander Pushkin in his poem on Peter the Great.

² Speaking of him in a letter to D'Alembert (1765), she says: "Son livre est mon bréviaire." *Sbornik of the Russian Imperial Historical Society*, vol. x, p. 31.

govern Russia, reflects the *Spirit of the Laws* of Montesquieu.¹

Following the example of their sovereign, the young Russian intellectuals absorbed like sponges the ideas brought to them from the west. Voltaire, Adam Smith and the French Encyclopaedists were beginning to mould the plastic minds of many young Russians eager for knowledge. Beside French and English liberal thought another current of mystic German idealism found a ready soil among the Russian nobility. It expressed itself in the early Russian Masonic movement. In Moscow, Nicolai Novicov was leader of the Masons. He developed the first popular literature in Russia and organized schools to teach the illiterate masses, also aiding them through his philanthropic agencies. This period gave rise to journalistic activities which soon expressed more definite and opposing views, and which were really the beginning of public opinion in Russia. This golden age of intellectual activity in which Catherine II took intense interest, came to an abrupt and tragic close, occasioned by the rumors of the French revolution and by popular uprisings in Russia under the leadership of Pugatchev.² Catherine adopted a rigid censorship, suppressing many periodical publications and books, putting even her own "Nakazy" under the ban of the censor. She went further and persecuted the leaders who sided with the people. Novicov was thrown into prison, and the Masons and other voluntary societies had to disband. Radischev, who had taken seriously the liberal ideas which were permitted to be disseminated by Catherine, wrote a

¹ The "Nakazy" is a curious little book. It has been translated into English under the title *The Grand Instructions*, by Michael Tatischeff, who was a contemporary of Catherine II, and praises her as the wisest and most liberal of all sovereigns.

² Cf. *supra*, footnote, pp. 22-23.

book entitled, *A Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*,¹ in which he depicted the misery and oppression suffered by the common people, and rebuked their oppressors and exploiters. He was arrested, tried and banished to Siberia, thus becoming the first Russian martyr for the offense of attempting to shape public opinion.

Catherine tried to justify her reaction to arbitrary despotism by theorizing over the psychic characteristics of the Russian people, who, under the influence of Russia's peculiar geographic and climatic environment she claimed were unfit for self-government and can only prosper under an absolute autocracy. Already in her *Nakazy* we read this, her fundamental rule: "That the government which most resembles that of nature is that whose particular disposition answers best to the disposition of the people for which it is instituted".² And in the case of Russia, she adds in the opening of the *Nakazy* that it is autocracy. This theory, strange as it may seem, is still the principal philosophical justification of the apologists of Russian autocracy. It is curious, however, that these thinkers do not realize that the genius of the Russian people, whether attributable to geographic environment or to something else, continually produces personages and groups that think the opposite of that which is advocated by the minority in power, and that there are many historic facts to show that the Slavs once lived in the same environment under democratic organizations.³

¹ This book, suppressed by Catherine (in 1790), was not permitted to be published in Russia till after the revolution in 1905.

² Catherine II, *The Grand Instructions*, etc., translated by Michael Tatitscheff, section 262.

³ Catherine II was not ignorant of these facts. In a letter to a certain Count Sch., dated August 15, 1784, she says: "Quand vous viendrez chez moi, je vous dirai bien d'autres choses encore comme par exemple que les lois des Saxons ou Slavons étaient remplies de l'esprit

The next movement in the struggle with Russian autocracy which stimulated sociological and political thinking is known as the *Decembrist movement*, named after the military insurrection which took place in Petrograd during December, 1825, at the time of the death of Emperor Alexander I, and the accession of Nicholas I. With the failure of the insurrection the movement was crushed, its leaders were executed or banished, and throughout the reign of Nicholas, autocracy, more severe perhaps than before in Russia, continued its iron rule.

The adherents of the Decembrists were of the military class, mostly army officers. Many of these became acquainted with French liberal ideas during the Napoleonic wars, and on their return home organized societies for the study of the political and social sciences. In the south, Colonel Pestel was the intellectual leader. He devised a constitution for Russia after the model of the French constitution of 1793. In the north, Colonel Muraviev wrote on the subject, favoring the constitutions of the United States and of Spain. Their theory of society in accordance with the time was the contractual, reflecting the English and French individualistic social philosophies. The greatest intellect of the Decembrists was Nicolai Turgeniev. During his long years of exile he wrote his great three-volume work, "La Russie et les Russes".¹

de liberté, que cette liberté, se voit partout dans la seconde époque de notre histoire." *Sbornik of the Russian Imperial Historical Society*, vol. xv, p. 615.

¹ "Russia and the Russians," says the author, "consist of three rather different parts: the first part acquaints the reader with my public life; these are my personal reminiscences: the second represents the moral, political and social life of Russia; but in the third part I expound my views of the future of this Empire and also of the institutions and reforms which are necessary." *Russia and the Russians*, vol. i, p. 14. Russian ed., Moscow, 1907.

His views of society and social organizations were strongly influenced by the ideas of Montesquieu and of Adam Smith. He, however, was not a doctrinaire; his political program was evolutionary and practical. His insight into the future social and political development of Russia was prophetic. It followed almost literally the stages he predicted. First, he claimed, it was necessary to abolish serfdom; he advocated the reform of the institutions of justice, education, and representative local government, and finally a national constitution. He was a champion of private property and emphasized individual rights and freedom of conscience.

The Decembrists created no independent system of their own. They stimulated the intellectual class to study the social sciences as a means towards intelligent understanding of the existing social order. The liberalism advocated by the Decembrists was not confined within the secret societies of the Russian military caste. It seems to have permeated even before their time all the intellectual classes, and the masses, although understanding nothing about constitutional government, were nevertheless conscious of the heavy hand of the oppressors and were willing to join any movement which promised relief. Speransky, one of the more farsighted of Russian statesmen, who was able to read the "signs of the time", already in 1809, foresaw the rising storm which discharged itself in the Decembrists' insurrection. In the introduction to his draft of the "Constitution" which he hoped Alexander I would adopt, he says:

The Russian state is now passing through the second stage of the feudal system, namely, the epoch of autocracy. Undoubtedly, it is tending directly towards freedom. In part this tendency is even more straightforward in Russia than in other countries. The unfailing signs of it are: (1) That

people lose all esteem for the former objects of their veneration, e. g., for rank and honor. (2) The action of power is so weakened that no measure of government can be put into operation which calls only for moral, and not also for physical constraint. The true reason of this is that at present public opinion is in entire contradiction to the form of government. (3) No partial reform is possible, because no law can exist, if it may any day be overthrown by a gust of arbitrary power. (4) A general discontent is observed, such as can only be explained by a complete change of ideas, and by a repressed but strong desire for a new order of things. For all these reasons we may surely conclude that the actual form of government does not correspond to the state of popular feeling, and that the time has come to change this form and to found a new order of things.¹

Alexander I's plans for giving Russia a constitutional government failed of realization and were entirely abandoned after the Napoleonic wars and the reactionary "Holy Alliance", which aroused the Decembrists to plan the forceful overthrow of the autocracy. Nicholas I, who crushed the insurrection, was determined to eradicate liberalism from the Russian Empire. He established a rigid press censorship,² and a brutal iron discipline in the army, which was also extended to all the ranks of bureaucracy, and even imposed upon scholars of the Universities.

The intellectual class, forced out of the political life and hence from practical thinking, took either to literature or to abstract thinking and the spinning of schemes for the liberation and regeneration of the Russian nation. The

¹ Quoted by Paul Milyoukov in *Russia and Its Crisis*, Chicago, 1906, p. 175.

² This censorship crippled the press to such an extent that during the last ten years of Nicholas I's reign (1845-1854) only six newspapers and nineteen (for the most part special) monthlies were permitted to appear in the whole empire.

center of this new intellectual activity became the University of Moscow. In its academic atmosphere the study of German romantic philosophy was diligently pursued and attempts were made to apply it to Russia's national problems.

Since Peter the Great, the Russian autocrats had not suspected that the Russian people had an individuality of their own. There was seemingly no national consciousness, no literature, no philosophy, to reflect the mind of the people. Russian authors wrote in imitation of the West. It was thought bad taste to find subject-matter in the life and work of their own people. This tendency changed after the Napoleonic wars. The emotions aroused by bitter conflict which finally was crowned by success, stimulated and strengthened the national consciousness. Poets and novelists were now proud to be Russians and turned their face from the west, which they had aped so long. Moscow became the center of the newly-born nationalism, to which its university sought to give an adequate philosophy. This new Moscovite philosophy became known as Slavophilism, and although emanating from German romanticism, it strove to become exclusive of everything foreign and to develop only strictly national ideas. This exclusiveness against Western culture was, however, not shared by all the Moscovite philosophers, and gradually another trend of thought appeared which wanted to enrich Russian culture by the achievements of Western Europe. It was called Westernism. Like Slavophilism it was at first non-political but in time it became influential in the affairs of the nation, rivaling the Slavophil Nationalists.

The Slavophiles were close students of German idealism, especially of Shelling and of the Hegelian philosophy of history. They accepted Hegel's dialectic method, and his *a priori* concept of an Absolute Reason, which it was believed

incarnated itself in the life of nations. They naturally could not follow Hegel in his conclusion that the "Weltgeist" by way of Greece and Rome had made its final appearance in the Germanic race and with it is completing the cycle of the mystical metempsychosis of the absolute. For this meant that the numerous Slavic races were left out of the historical process with no other mission than slavishly to imitate their fortunate German neighbors and intellectual masters. We may readily understand that the Moscovite philosophers, who gloried in the consciousness that their race had freed Western Europe from the Napoleonic yoke, were not willing that the Slav should play no rôle in the future development of the races. They, therefore, asserted that the people of the west are in a state of decay, and that the Weltgeist has to make another step to complete the cycle of evolution. They also asserted that the Slavic, preëminently the Russian people, are predestined to be the final bearers of the torch of enlightenment for the human race. One of the Slavophiles writes:

Western Europe presents a strange, saddening spectacle. Opinion struggles against opinion, power against power, throne against throne. Science, art and religion, the three motors of social life, have lost their force. We venture to make the assertion which to many at present may seem strange, but which will be in a few years only too evident: Western Europe is on the high road to ruin! We Russians, on the contrary, are young and fresh and have taken no part in the crimes of Europe. We have a great mission to fulfill. Our name is already inscribed on the tablets of victory; the victories of science, art and faith await us on the ruins of tottering Europe! ¹

¹ Prince Odoevsky. Quoted by Wallace, *Russia*, new ed., New York, 1912, p. 410.

The Slavophiles searched diligently for something peculiarly Russian upon which they could establish the new type of civilization which was to redeem humanity. They claimed to have found this in the Russian Greek Orthodox Church, the Autocratic Government, and the Parish Land-Commune of the Russian peasantry.

The *Greek Church*, they maintained, is a living organism of life and truth. It consists not in the number of believers, nor in the visible congregation, but in the spiritual tie which binds them together. Roman Catholicism curtails individual liberty for the sake of unity. Protestantism takes the alternative and loses its unity in its individualism. Greek orthodoxy assumes to be the only religion which remains true to the spirit of primitive Christianity, having harmoniously wedded unity and liberty by the principal of Christian love.

Autocracy, as its second peculiar institution, is not a product of conflict and brutal force, to which present parliamentary rule is but a natural reaction, as are the governments of the West. Russian autocracy was created by the free will of its citizens. The legend of the call of Rurik, the first dynast of Russia may not be true historically but it certainly is true temperamentally, reflecting the mind of the people. Thus autocracy is the "Holy Ark" of the Russian nation. The sovereign wishes but the good of the people and this makes parliamentary rule superfluous.

The *Parish Land-Commune* was called the cornerstone of all Russian institutions and was highly prized as a realization of the Utopian dreams of Western socialists, who hoped to attain to it by way of capitalism and a proletariat. The socialist ideal of communal ownership of land and of the tools of production, it was said, needed not to be attained in Russia by force. There it is a natural product having grown from the very heart of the people.

The creation of a proletariat is hence unnecessary and impossible in Russia. The spirit of Christian resignation and self-sacrifice has achieved there, what selfish Western Europe is trying to get by a bitter class-struggle. This shows, they concluded, that Russian society is based upon the principle of justice and voluntary self-abasement—immeasurably higher than the struggle principle of the “Rotten West”.¹

The Slavophiles were voluminous writers and were often brilliant. They contributed not a little to the autocratic idea, although their theories have helped to stimulate Russia's national consciousness and have aided in emancipating the Russian serf by a peaceful method. Besides this they have gathered much valuable historical and ethnographic material, which, apart from interpretation, is some of the best that exists. They have shown what are the peculiarities of Russian Orthodoxy in comparison with other Christian Confessions.² Better than any other authors they have pointed out the peculiar characteristics of the Russian people.³ They also have shown what there is in common among the various Slavic peoples.⁴ Finally they

¹ It is hardly necessary to say that these “fundamentals” of the Slavophiles are based upon imaginary premises which do not stand historical scrutiny. Autocracy in Russia has been severely shaken and will have to yield to the will of the people. The much eulogized parish-commune is in a state of decay and has since (1906) been abolished by law. In the nineties of the last century Russia entered her industrial era of capitalistic production on a large scale and her proletariat is growing daily.

² Especially A. S. Khomyakov, *Works*, vol. v-vii (Russian).

³ The best author in this field is K. S. Aksakov, *Works*, vol. i-iii (Russian).

⁴ On this subject, see Valuev, *Almanach for Historical and Statistical Information about Russia and Peoples Akin to Her in Faith and Race* (1845) (Russian).

attempted to state the differences which exist between the Romano-Germanic and the Graeco-Slavic world.¹

The Slavophiles of the period covered by the reign of Nicholas I were metaphysical in their presuppositions and their premises were untenable after the decline of the Hegelian school. The newer Slavophiles realized this and sought to re-establish their principles by the aid of sociology and of the natural sciences. Danilevsky is the most important writer of this group.

Even more exclusive than the Slavophiles were the extreme Nationalists or Russophiles who saw danger for Russian Autocracy in a mingling with other Slavs already influenced by Western liberalism. The creed of the Russophiles was expressed by Nicholas I's faithful servant, Count Uvarov, who held the portfolio of the ministry of education from 1833 to 1849. Uvarov, when entering upon his position, outlined his program to all Russian educators in these words: "Our general task consists in establishing such an education for the nation as will unify in itself the spirit of Orthodoxy, of Autocracy and of Nationalism." This formulation has since remained the Holy Trinity of Russian Autocracy; it is its alpha and its omega. Katkov, a former liberal Slavophile, advanced it through the press (in "The Moscow Vedomosty" and other periodicals), and Leontiev attempted to give it a philosophical and sociological justification. The most famous of Russian reactionaries, however, was Pobyedonoszev (1827-1907). Under two czars he dictated the policies of the government. He was the teacher and advisor of Alexander III and he wrote

¹ This subject has been exhaustively studied by V. I. Lamansky, see his doctor's dissertation, *The Historical Study of the Graeco-Slavic World in Europe* (1870). There are also some two hundred printed books, articles, etc., dealing with the Slavic world, all by the same author (Russian).

the reactionary manifesto of Nicholas II upon his accession to the throne.¹

His social and political views are the exact antithesis of Russian Progressive Westernism. He hated Western philosophy, science and civilization and dogmatically postulated Uvarov's theocratic Trinity: Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationalism as the only institutions which can preserve Russia in continuous safety and happiness. He fought for the preservation of ignorance among the common people, being convinced that the peasant would gain nothing from learning to read, except the consciousness of his own poverty.

The nationalistic trend had fortunately also other intellectual representatives besides the extremists Katkov, Leontiev and Pobyedonoszev. Vladimir Soloviev, although not an Orthodox Slavophil nor Russophil, is still akin to them and tries to make Russian nationalism more inclusive and synthetic.²

The oppressive policies of the rule of Nicholas I had eradicated every remnant of the Decembrist movement. However, new protests were ripening from among the intellectual classes. These protests were variously expressed in the writings of a group of thinkers who, when discriminated from the Slavophiles were generally called Westernists. Chaadaev³ was among the first to raise a voice against the sterile, deadening Russian Theocracy, ad-

¹ This document, which was pronounced personally by the czar before the representatives of the nobility, the military classes and the Zemstvos (local governments), censures the latter's ambition to participate in matters of internal government as "senseless dreams" and concludes with the significant words, "Let all know that, in devoting all my strength to the welfare of the people, I intend to protect the principle of autocracy as firmly and as unswervingly as did my late and never-to-be-forgotten father."

² For an analysis of his theories, see *infra*, pt. i, ch. ii.

³ Cf. *infra*, pt. i, ch. iii.

vocating as a remedy a yielding to the Roman Theocracy of the West. Chaadaev himself never became a Roman Catholic. The culture of the French people he seemed to have admired more than their religion, but he did not distinguish between the two, rather regarding French culture as a product of their religion.

A different interpretation was given to Western thought by Belinsky.¹ This thinker rapidly passed through the intermediate stages from a metaphysical interpretation of civilization to a positivist view of society. He first began to gather around himself what is known in Russia as the "intelligenza". By the "intelligenza", or intellectual class must be understood that progressive and radical wing of Russia's educated people which holds the emancipation of the common people from their misery and ignorance to be its principal task and which opposes the existing institutions of political and social control. Belinsky was followed as a leader by Herzen and Bakunin who, each in his own way, stirred the intellectuals to action.

The lifeless despotism of Nicholas broke down under its own weight. The occasion was the Crimean war. The reaction to the disaster was volcanic. The old régime was doomed to pass with the defeat of Russia's most uncompromising autocrat, Nicholas I. Alexander II, who succeeded him, promised radical reforms, and the great opportunity for the progressive elements of the Russian nation had come.

Emancipation was the cry of the day. Emancipation of the peasant from serfdom, of the citizens from the state, of the woman from patriarchal tyranny, of the thinker from authorities and tradition. There must be struggle to the end against every institution that was irrational or oppres-

¹ Cf. *infra*, pt. i, ch. iii.

sive, whether political, economic, religious or social. The new order must not only improve existing conditions, it must revolutionize society from its foundations. It must be built upon positive scientific principles. This effort to recast society scientifically called forth whole schools of sociology of which the subjectivist school is the most significant. Its theoretic aspect had its counterpart in political organizations which advocated reforms, ranging all the way from moderate liberalism to radical utopian socialism. The tremendous pressure of awakened public opinion¹ compelled the government to act. On February 19, 1861, Alexander II signed the famous Act of Emancipation whereby fifty-two million serfs were freed. This act called forth unprecedented enthusiasm among all classes. Herzen addressed the Czar in his periodical "The Bell" with the words, "Thou hast conquered, O Nazarene!" and urged him to continue the reforms by other equally revolutionary measures.

When, however, the conditions of the emancipation became known, a heavy gloom was cast over all the friends of the common people. At its best the act was but a compromise favoring greatly the great landowners,² who were allowed to exact an abnormally high price for the land they ceded to the peasants.³

¹ The extent of the awakening may be seen in the large increase in the periodical press. When Nicholas I passed away there were but six newspapers and nineteen monthlies to announce the event to a population of about ninety millions. During the first decade of the reign of Alexander II the number of newspapers increased to sixty-six and the monthlies to one hundred and fifty.

² Before the Emancipation Act only 1.7 per cent of all lands were in the hands of small landowners, the bulk of 64.6 per cent was claimed by the government, and the rest by the gentry and by syndicates.

³ The government lands were to be given over at the same rate in order not to discriminate. The rate of interest (6 per cent) on the in-

Thus from the very start the peasant was condemned to perpetual poverty. Strong opposition to these and other equally inadequate measures of the reform acts was, of course, to be expected. Bakunin and Herzen thundered from abroad against the reaction, the former preaching an immediate revolution by the rise of the peasantry. At home Chernishevsky was the recognized leader of the intellectual class.¹ It was hoped that the peasantry would not accept the conditions of the emancipation when it should become enacted (1863). Bakunin, Chernishevsky and almost all of the leaders had great faith in the revolutionary abilities of the peasant. They pointed back to the rebellions of Razhin and Pugachev, which were ably supported by the peasants. The intellectual class was to prepare and to lead the revolution which was to take place in the summer of 1863. For this purpose the secret organization, the "Great Russian" was founded. It consisted mostly of university students of both sexes who began their propaganda among workingmen, soldiers and peasants. Out of the "Great Russian" movement arose the more radical secret organization of the "Land and Liberty", which aimed at an immediate rising concurring with the Polish rebellion (1863). The region of the Volga, where Pugachev's rebellion had taken place, was chosen. A pseudo-manifesto in the name of the czar was circulated which proclaimed liberty to all classes, and granted full property rights to the peasants without payment. The soldiers

debtedness was also unusually high, and almost ruined the peasants economically. The area of land allotted to the peasants was also not large enough. After more than forty years of appropriation (1906) the peasantry owns only 24.1 per cent, or 3.5 acres per individual allotment of all privately-owned lands. The nobility's share is 52.3 per cent.

¹ Cf. pt. i, ch. iii.

were also to be freed from service and compensated by land grants. There was to be no conscription and no percapita tax, and all government officers were to be elected by the people. The manifesto stated that should the local authorities resist the enactment of the manifesto, the population was authorized to rise in rebellion. This daring feat failed at the outset and a number of the instigators were executed. This initial failure did not stop the activities of the secret societies, but it divided them into two classes. One faction favored an educational propaganda of gradual preparation of the masses for the revolution, the other faction did not believe that education was necessary since the masses were always revolutionary (Bakunin's doctrine). The peaceful propagandists formed their "organization" of 1865, which adopted for its leading principle the propagation among the peasants of the idea of nationalization of land by stirring them up against proprietors, against the nobility and the authorities in general. This was to be accomplished through teaching in day and Sunday schools, the establishment of free libraries, and the organization of societies and workshops on the communal principle, etc. The faction of the "direct action" was inspired from abroad by Bakunin and led at home by the student Nechaev,¹ a reckless, despotic fellow. The government was aroused and began a merciless persecution, especially after the Student Karakozov made an attempt to assassinate the Czar (April 16, 1866). A number of the societies were discovered, their members were tried and most of them were exiled to Siberia.

During these troublesome years also Chernishevsky, although not approving Jacobinism, fell a victim to the gov-

¹ Nechaev is known as the author of the "catechism of the revolution", which teaches methods of "direct action" and justifies any crime, including murder, if it serves the end.

ernment's policy of persecution.¹ Chernishevsky's successor in the intellectual leadership of young Russia was the young, talented Pissarev.

He is usually called the philosopher of the Russian Nihilist Movement. Denying aesthetics and every other ideal principle, he advocated an extreme realism, individualism and utilitarianism.² He did not live long enough to develop his many ingenious ideas. His influence was that of a propagandist philosopher who inspired his readers by his bold and passionate utterances.

With the passing of Pissarev and his contemporary Dobrolubov,³ Lavrov became the acknowledged leader of the populist movement. Through his sociological theory of the "rôle of the critically-intellectual individual",⁴ he

¹ Cf. *infra*, pt. i, ch. iii.

² By individualism he understands the struggle for the emancipation of personality. He boldly casts off all traditions, believing that in order to create a new mankind all old institutions must be destroyed without exception. Strength is to be the criterion in the selective struggle. He is Materialistic-Determinist and sees in the great man but a product of the historic process. Marx greatly impressed him, but he did not become an orthodox Marxist, being carried away by his individualistic interests. As a thorough-going Nihilist he saw all evil in ignorance and the only salvation was to be found in science, especially natural science. Turgenev's Basarov he recognized and acknowledged as the true type of the new Russia. Summing up the criticism of "Fathers and Sons", he says: "At present young people are carried away and fall into extremes, but in these various passions show themselves to be the fresh forces, and this mind without any outside means or influences will lead the young people on the right road and assist them in life", *Works*, St. Petersburg, 1901, vol. ii, p. 427.

³ Dobrolubov (1836-1861) belongs to this group of leaders of the progressive intellectual class. A pupil of Chernishevsky, he contributed as literary critic to Chernishevsky's periodical, the "Savryeminik" (contemporary), which was the principle medium of spreading their progressive ideas. Dobrolubov's early death was much lamented in Russia.

⁴ Cf. *infra*, pt. ii, ch. i.

inspired the revolutionary youths. He also prepared a party platform which recognizes two principles of struggle: one the struggle against the theological-metaphysical or religious concept of life by means of science, the other the struggle of the toiler against the idle-consumer, which is also a struggle for equality of opportunity against monopoly of any kind. Lavrov, who fought the conservatives and pseudo-liberals, turned also against Nechaev, Bakunin and others of the left wing who wanted a revolution without a preparatory education of the people. In his writings he stood for the principle that no means should be used that might defeat the end itself. No revolution can be realized artificially; it will be successful only when the people are ready and when other conditions are equally favorable. Revolutionary failures are regrettable, although, he conceded, they have educational value. Like most other populists' platforms, that of Lavrov accepted the peasant commune as the basic economic institution of Russia, but recommended that it be made more efficient by the education of the peasantry.

When Lavrov was forced to leave his native country, Mikhailovsky became the intellectual leader of his generation, fighting valiantly for the interests of the individual, as he expressed it in his sociological theory of the "struggle for individuality",¹ and for the preservation of the peasant commune, which he believed was best fitted to give the individual the opportunity for a many-sided and rounded development.

Parallel to this educational revolutionary movement was developing the more radical movement which advocated revolutionary or direct action, and which culminated in the assassination of Alexander II (March 13, 1881).

¹ Cf. *infra*, pt. ii, ch. ii.

After his failure to start a revolution in 1863, Nechayev was preparing to launch another in the spring of 1870. He severed himself from all factions which wanted to begin the social revolution by propaganda and urged direct action. Organization and education, he taught, will be the task of coming generations, whereas "our own task is a terrible, thorough, ubiquitous and pitiless destruction. . . . Let us unite with the world of robbers, the only true revolutionaries in Russia". Nechayev's organization was known as the "Narodnaya Rasprava". (The judgment of the people.) He demanded unreserved submission from his followers, and when one of them, the student Ivanov, refused to subject himself to his iron will, he was murdered by order of Nechayev. The arrests and trials which followed this crime put an end to the leadership of Nechayev, and with it also terminated the revolutionary plot of 1870. With the passing of Nechayev, Russian Jacobinism did not cease. Its new leader became Tkachev, one of Nechayev's followers. He opposed Lavrov's propaganda of local revolts and incited to a political revolution, if a general social revolution was impossible. He was a Bakunist and, accordingly, wanted to use revolutionary organizations as a means of disorganization and the destruction of the existing political order.

The years of 1873-74 were the period in which the revolutionary enthusiasm reached its zenith. The circle of the "Chaikovstsy" in Petrograd, to which Kropotkin, Stepnyak and other revolutionary celebrities adhered, developed a titanic activity. It culminated with the general movement of the "going among the people" which lasted throughout the summer of 1874. This movement, which has no equal in Russian history, resembled a great religious revival. The bulk of the educated class, not only youthful students but many teachers, judges, physicians, officers and

officials joined the ranks. Denying themselves comforts and undergoing many hardships, they went to preach the new liberty to the people. The result of this crusade has been variously estimated. In its proximate results it was a failure; the peasant did not respond concurrently, he often turned against his enlighteners and delivered them to the authorities. Perhaps the greatest gain was to the propagandists themselves; while they went to the people as metaphysical, utopian dreamers, many of them came back as sober positivists.

The failure of the itinerant propagandists was to be remedied by a more enduring activity which a new organization, the "Land and Liberty" society took for its objective. It was to organize permanent settlements among the villagers and among the working classes of the towns. The propaganda of the "Land and Liberty" found more ready response among the proletariat of the cities than among the peasantry. The workingmen, however, went farther; they were more radical and direct in action of self-defense against the persecutions of the government. In 1879, the "Northern Alliance of Workingmen" was organized by some of the adherents of Tkachov. These did not refrain from terrorism as an effective means in the political struggle. But true populists could not uphold the terrorist policy, and the "Northern Alliance" split off from the "Land and Liberty" party. Another party dissenting from the old "Land and Liberty" was the "People's Will" party, organized in the South (1879). It was terroristic and advocated a propaganda by deeds. It had its Executive Committee which conducted all deeds of terror and under its auspices the regicide of March 13, 1881, was accomplished.

The "Land and Liberty" party split once more in 1879, giving birth to the "Cherny peredel" (Black Land Parti-

tion) party, which along with the advocacy of the nationalization of land, attempted to synthesize the interests of the city proletariat with those of the agrarian population. Plekhanov¹ was one of the organizers of the "Black Land Partition", and attempted to adjust its principles to those of Marx, although many of the older anarchistic ideas were retained.

The persecution of revolutionists and the reaction to revolutionary propaganda in general, which marked the accession of Alexander III, made actual propaganda almost impossible. The great revolutionary waves of the sixties and seventies had spent their force, and with the exception of occasional ripples there was for more than a decade general quiet on the surface of Russia's political sea.

Most of the leaders who survived the persecution fled abroad and took to study and engrossed themselves in literary activities. In the quiet of retreat, Plekhanov eliminated from his mind all anarchistic and populist ideas and declared himself a consistent Marxist. He began the organization of the Russian Social Democracy, directing his attention primarily to the working proletariat of the cities. During the eighties Plekhanov wrote his books, which were to differentiate Marxian Socialism from the older populist socialism, *Socialism and Political Struggle* (1883), *Our Variances* (1885). Later he began his polemic against the subjectivist sociology and his attempt to establish a Marxist sociology.² Socialism was taken up by the city proletariat during the nineties. There were great strikes in mills and factories everywhere, and for the first time Russia witnessed a real solidarity of the working masses. The intellectuals soon recognized in this movement the Marxian

¹ Cf. *infra*, pt. iii, ch. i.

² Cf. *infra*, pt. iii, ch. i.

process of social evolution, and only feared that it might lose its revolutionary character and drift into trade-unionism, and political opportunism. These fears, however, proved baseless. The government which persecuted labor organizations kept their revolutionary spirit alive, and German revisionism, although influencing some leaders,¹ had not much affect upon the workingmen themselves. In 1903, the Social Democratic party of Russia was consolidated, with the exception of a few racial groups, of which the Jewish Bund was the most important. New dangers arose, however, from the left wing of the party. Remnants of the old "People's Will" party, who were absorbed by the triumphant Marxism, felt their differences keenly. They interpreted the "masses" as not limited to the city proletariat but as embracing as well the peasantry and the intellectuals. They also wanted to use more militant tactics than the peaceful strike, and to revive the terror to which soon the ministers Sippyagin, Plehve and others fell victims.

In its reorganized form this militant wing of Russian socialism calls itself the "Social Revolutionaries". A rural branch organized by them was called the "Agrarian League". Their principal intellectual leader, Victor Chernov, has given the movement its philosophical bearing.²

The agitations of these socialist groups culminated in the revolution of 1905-06, after the disasters of the Russo-Japanese war. The freedom attained by this uprising and the formation of the Duma gave opportunity to the revolutionary leaders to show their executive abilities. In this they fell short, and a general reaction followed. Many Marxists having become more moderate Liberals, are now associated with the party of the Cadets or the Constitutional

¹ As, for example, P. Struve. *Cf. infra*, pt. iii, ch. ii.

² *Cf. infra*, pt. iii, ch. iii.

Democrats. This party is nationalistic and aspires to improve conditions by constructive reforms. Paul Milyukov and Peter Struve are its principal intellectual leaders.¹

This in brief is the general social-political background of Russian sociology. Its theories appear to be related to the various movements we have described, and they reflect the ideologies of both the social-political groups in power and those of the opposition. Sociology in Russia was at its zenith during the great reform movement of the sixties and seventies and in a lesser degree during the period of Russia's industrial development in the nineties and during the revolution at the close of the Russo-Japanese war.

In following chapters we will analyze the various schools and trends of Russian sociology, both in their chronological order and their historical setting.

¹ *Cf. infra*, pt. iii, ch. ii.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE SLAVOPHILS AND THE RUSSOPHILS (DANILEVSKY, LEONTIEV, AND SOLOVIEV)

THE SLAVOPHILISM OF DANILEVSKY

THE Slavophil views of Russian society were synthetized and to some extent purged of their metaphysical presuppositions by Danilevsky.¹

His approach is bio-sociological. He claims to have arrived at the conclusion, both from historical study and from biological analogy, that the Russians are a distinct and a peculiar people. He does not believe that Russia has for its mission the enlightenment of all mankind, as was claimed by the older Slavophiles; according to Danilevsky, there are no forms of civilization which could be advantageously adopted by all peoples; there are but *historical types of culture* and the Slavic people represents one of them, which, in comparison with other civilizations, should be wider in its scope and more complete.

Danilevsky's theory of historical types of culture is based upon the biological proposition that there is more than a relative distinction between *genera* and *species*.² He holds that the genus man or mankind is but an abstraction; real

¹ Nikolai Yakovlevitch Danilevsky (1822-1885) was an all-round scholar. He specialized in natural sciences, was a statistician, translator, and wrote on psychological, economic and political subjects. His book, *Russia and Europe*, is regarded as classic within the wide range of Slavophil writings.

² Cf. *Russia and Europe* (Russian), 2d ed., pp. 125 ff.

are only the species of man which in history can be recognized readily by their historical types of culture. His biological presuppositions bring him into conflict with Darwin's theories of the origin of species and Danilevsky tries to defend his theory against the great Englishman.¹

By his biological analogies Danilevsky attempts to bolster up and to corroborate his rather tractarian study of history, hoping thus to give it the appearance of something natural and inevitable. We give here an outline of the sociological aspect of his theory:

There is no cast-iron rule for dividing history into various periods. The division will depend, in part, upon the views of the historian, and in part upon the character of the development itself which may be modified more or less by local changes.² Only within the one type at a time is it possible to distinguish those periods of historical movement which are designated by the words: ancient, medieval and modern history. This division is but secondary; the primary classification consists in discriminating the distinct historical types of culture from each other.³ These are the independent, original planes, religious, social, and other of historical development.⁴

We can determine the stages of development of a particular type of society whose cycle belongs to the past. We can say:

¹ In a large work, *Darwinism*, of which but two volumes appeared. The author died before its completion.

² *Russia and Europe*, p. 91.

³ The Russian original which we translate as "historical types of culture" is equivalent to the German "Kultur-Historische". This nomenclature was used by the German historian Rückert, and it is possible that Danilevsky borrowed the term from him. For the relation of Danilevsky to Rückert, see article of Bestuzhev-Rasumnik, *Russky Vyesnik*, October, 1894.

⁴ *Russia and Europe*, p. 88.

here its infancy comes to an end, here its youth, its maturity, here we see its old age, its decay; which is to divide its history into archaic, ancient, mediaeval, and modern.¹

There can then be no division of general history except into a natural system of historical types of culture or independent and original civilizations. These in their chronological order are as follows:

(1) Egyptian, (2) Chinese, (3) Assyro-Babylono-Phoenician, Chaldean or Ancient Semitic, (4) Indian (Hindo), (5) Iranian, (6) Hebrew, (7) Greek, (8) Roman, (9) New-Semitic or Arabian, (10) Germano-Romanic or European. To these could be added two American types, the Mexican and the Peruvian which perished by violence thus being robbed of opportunity to complete their development.²

Only those peoples that produced an historical type of culture were the direct promoters of civilization. The various types are to be discriminated into isolated types of civilization, like those of India and China, and into civilizations which are built successively, one upon the ruins of the other, the decaying types serving the newly-rising types as material or as a "fertilizer". Such were the civilizations of Egypt, the Assyro-Babylono-Phoenician, the Greek, the Roman and the European.³

Analogous to the comets and to the cosmic matter which moves among the planets of the solar system, there are in the world of man, besides the directly functioning cultural types or independent civilizations, temporary phenomena which disturb the existing order. "Such were the Huns,

¹ *Russia and Europe*, p. 90.

² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 92.

the Mongols, and the Turks, who having completed their destructive task of aiding the struggling civilizations to breathe their last, and of tearing asunder their remains, disappear and are again engulfed in obscurity. Let us call them the negating agents of humanity".¹

Finally there are tribes which, for various reasons, have neither a constructive nor a destructive mission to fulfill. They are largely ethnographic material, adding to the diversity and richness of those types of which they form constituents; such are the Finnic tribes of Russia. At times also decayed historical types of culture descend to this stage.²

History proves that civilizations are not transferable from one historic type to another, their rôle is merely that of stimulating, "feeding" or "fertilizing". "If civilizations are spread by way of colonization or grafted upon peoples that are making their own civilizations, then the graft does not benefit the grafted either in the physiological or in the historical sense."³ It lives on it like a parasite and its own original development also is hindered.

"The transition from the ethnic stage to the civil and from the civil to a civilized and cultural stage is conditioned by series of spurs or shocks which stimulate and support the activity of peoples along a certain direction."⁴ Such spurs and wars, competition of all kinds, and similar stimuli.

Progress does not consist in a general movement of all peoples towards one set goal. Rather it consists in working the whole field of historical life in diverse ways. Thus

¹ *Russia and Europe*, p. 93.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 93.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

"the many-sided manifestation of the human mind is progress".¹

Civilizations which have developed upon the ruins of past historical types of culture, as, *e. g.*, those of Europe, have the appearance of exceptional progressiveness.² The East and Asia are "but characteristic indications of that age, in which a nation is wherever it may live".³

To nations as to all other organisms "is given but a certain lease of life, and when this is exhausted they must die".⁴ Hence progress is subject to the law of diminishing returns. "If the ethnic period is a time of ingathering, of storing for future activity, so the period of civilization is a time of expenditure . . . and no matter how great the store of energy, it must finally diminish and be exhausted".⁵

His theory of social evolution Danilevsky sums up in five generalizations or laws, which are as follows:

First law. Each family of peoples, which is characterized by a separate language or group of languages, so far alike among themselves that their kinship is immediately recognizable without elaborate philological investigations, presents an original Historical Type of Culture, if in its mental capacity it is fit for historical development and has passed its stage of infancy.

Second law. In order that a civilization capable of becoming an original Historical Type of Culture, may arise and develop, it is necessary that the peoples which belong to it shall enjoy political independence.

Third law. The beginnings of civilization of one Historical Type of Culture are not transmitted to peoples of a different type. Each type must work these out for itself,

¹ *Russia and Europe*, p. 92.

² *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

even when under the influence of more or less foreign types which have preceded it or which are contemporary with it.

Fourth law. The civilization peculiar to each Historical Type of Culture reaches its plenitude, variety and richness, only when the various ethnographic elements that compose it form a federation or a political system of co-ordinate governments; presuming that they were not already assimilated in a political whole.

Fifth law. The evolution of Historical Types of Culture is nearly analogous to those perennial plants which bear fruit only once. These plants, although having an indefinite period of growth, enjoy but a relatively short period of bloom and fruit-bearing and through this exhaust once and for all their vital forces.¹

This theory of the "Historical Types of Culture" the author applies to his study of the Slavic peoples in contrast to their western neighbors. He finds among the Slavs, especially the Russians, all the elements necessary to form an independent Historical Type of Culture. According to this author also, there are four main lines of activity to which nearly all independent civilizations have contributed: These are: (1) Religion, (2) Culture proper, as science, art and industry, (3) Politics, and (4) Social Economics. All past civilizations have contributed to one or more of these factors, not one has done justice to all. In the case of the Slavs it is to be different. He says: "On the basis of analysis of the general results of activity of past Historical Types of Culture, and comparing them in part with the special characteristics² of the Slavic world and in part with

¹ Cf. *Russia and Europe*, pp. 95-96.

² The "special characteristics" which Danilevsky believed the Slavs to possess are much the same as those recognized by other Slavophil writers mentioned, *supra*, ch. i.

those latent abilities peculiar to the Slavic nature—we may cherish a well founded hope that the Slavic Historical Type of Culture will for the first time present a synthesis of all the aspects of cultural activity. . . . We may hope that the Slavic type will be the first complete *four-basal Historical Type of Culture*.”¹

This outline of Danilevsky's views needs little comment. His Slavophil predictions are not coincident with the facts of Russian historical development.² There is still the possibility, however, that Russia may develop a relatively independent type of civilization.

Danilevsky's attempt to divide history “naturally” is commendable, nevertheless, his tenfold division is arbitrary, as is apparent from such groupings as the “Assyro-Babylono-Phoenician, Chaldean or Ancient Semitic”. Modern study of the civilizations of the Mediterranean basin shows at least as much relative difference among these as among the civilizations of contemporary Western and Eastern Europe. The cultural achievements of humanity are the product of no people in particular. It is true that there are types of civilization, but these are not so rigidly divided as Danilevsky supposes. In their aggregate they present a multimodal curve, their independence at its best being merely relative, as all have a common base. As modern means of communication continue to develop and the nations of the world are brought closer together, this fact becomes more and more generally recognized. And there are sociologists who believe that the future will produce one federated type of civilization.³

¹ *Russia and Europe*, p. 556. Italics are the author's.

² Cf. footnote, *supra*, p. 32.

³ For example, De Graff, *On Boundaries* and Yacov Novicov in several of his works.

II. *The Russophilism of Leontiev*

Akin to the Slavophil views just examined are the social theories of Leontiev.¹

By temperament an ultra-conservative, he even parted ways with the Slavophiles who seemed to him to undermine Russia's independence by their doctrine of Panslavism.² His aim was to preserve at any cost: first, a particular kind of mystic Christianity, strictly ecclesiastical and monastic and of a Byzantine and partly Roman type; second, a firm and centralized monarchical government, and finally, the original beauty and simplicity of life in its national forms. Democracy and internationalism he regards as signs of racial decay and therefore as the worst enemies of humanity.³ His reactionary policy he justifies by a theory of social evolution which presents in itself an attempt to synthesize the ideas of Saint Simon, Hegel, Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer.⁴

¹ Konstantin Nikolaevitch Leontiev (1831-91). By profession a surgeon, he served as an officer of foreign affairs in the near Orient, was censor of literature, editor, novelist and social philosopher. He ended his life in a monastery, little known and appreciated by his kinsmen. Volumes V and VI of his works cover his sociological writings.

² He says: "The idea of an orthodox cultural Russism is actually original, lofty and firmly official. But Panslavism "at any price" is but an imitation and nothing else. It is a contemporary European-liberal ideal, it is a striving to be like the rest—the Russians of our age must strive passionately towards spiritual, intellectual and cultural independence. . . . And then also the other Slavs will in time follow in our footsteps." *Works*, vol. vi, p. 189.

³ He says: "The leveling process brought about by the mixture of classes and the strong tendency towards shallow homogeneity, instead of the former despotic unity in an heterogeneous forcibly controlled environment—this is the first step towards disintegration." *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁴ Leontiev claims to have arrived at this theory of social evolution independently of Herbert Spencer. He says: "Herbert Spencer was not known to me when in 1870 I wrote my essay, "Byzantium and Slavophilism." *Ibid.*, p. 52, chapter vii of this essay contains in outline his theory of social evolution.

A brief outline of his theory is as follows: "The idea of evolution is carried over from the exact sciences into the historical sphere and presents a complex concept."¹ The process of evolution in the organic world is

A gradual ascent from the simple to the complex, a continuous adaptation on the one hand to the environment of its similar and kindred organisms, and on the other hand a continuous individuation from all similar and kindred phenomena. . . . It is a continuous process from inexpressiveness and simplicity to originality and complexity . . . a gradual accretion of complex elements, an inner increase and simultaneously a continuous integration . . . so that the highest point of evolution is the highest degree of complexity, held together by some inner despotic force. This is the case not only with organic bodies, but generally with all organic phenomena. . . . With this process of evolution goes on a continuous differentiation of form in the parts as in the whole. . . . The same is found in the evolution of an animal body, in the evolution of the human organism and even in the evolution of the human mind and character.²

"All organic phenomena are subject to the same law."³

"When things begin to approach death a simplifying of the organism begins."⁴

Before the final decay the individuation of parts as of the whole weakens. The disintegrating organism becomes internally more homogeneous, is closer to its environment and more like its kindred phenomena.⁵

Thus organic and social evolution constitute a triune process following the three stages: "(1) of *primitive sim-*

¹ *Works*, vol. v, p. 188.

² *Ibid.*, p. 189. Cf. also vol. vi, p. 219.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 192.

*plicity, (2) of flourishing complexity, and (3) of a secondary disintegrating simplicity."*¹

Leontiev thinks this formula is applicable also to the inorganic world. He says:

This triune process is peculiar not only to the world which calls itself strictly organic but perhaps also to everything existing in space and time. It may be characteristic also of the heavenly bodies, and also of the history of their mineral incrustations and of the character of man, it is clearly seen in the process of evolution of the arts, in the schools of painting, of music and of architecture; in philosophic systems, in the history of religions and finally in the life of tribes, government organisms, and in whole civilizations.²

The evolution of government is usually expressed in a simultaneous development of a peculiarly suitable form. Dissolution begins by the breaking-up of this form, and by its becoming more like its environment. "The form is a despotism of an inner idea, which prevents it from falling apart. To break the bonds of this natural despotism means the perishing of the phenomenon."³

Accordingly each nation has its own governmental form which in the main is unchangeable throughout its historical existence. There are, however, more or less rapid changes in its parts from beginning to end. In its development it is at first not self-conscious, and not at once to be understood. It expresses itself well only in its middle period of highest complexity and highest unity, sooner or later follows some injury to the parts of the form and after that begins its disintegration and death.⁴

¹ *Works*, vol. v, p. 197. Italics are the author's.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 193-194.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

⁴ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 204.

The author concludes that, as this is the case with all nations and governments, one ought to be active like "a moving sail or a steam boiler" as the nation is approaching its heights, but after that "it is more worthy to be an anchor or a brake for a nation which is descending as down a steep mountain".¹ By this curious application of his theory of social evolution, Leontiev seeks to justify Russian despotism and to combat democracy, which he feared as a sign of approaching disintegration.

We cannot deny to the author a certain degree of ingenuity, but throughout he lacks consistency and the ability to correlate facts with a theoretic formula. His picture of Democracy is a phantom of his imagination and is not drawn from historical facts. Throughout known history Democracy has not been primarily a leveling and shallow-ing force. Its tendency has been rather to equalize opportunity and so to advance a natural and not an hereditary aristocracy. Probably the highest degree of complexity has been reached only in democratic society which necessitates an extensive division of labor. It has been held together not by bonds of ecclesiastical and monarchical despotism, but by the bonds of homogeneous consumption and equalization of opportunity. Whatever of truth Leontiev's theory of the three organic stages may possess, the facts of European history do not fall within his categories.

III. *The Neo-Slavophilism of Vladimir S. Soloviev*

To conclude the review of the Slavophil theories we present the contribution of Vladimir Soloviev to this trend of thought.²

¹ *Works*, vol. v, p. 208.

² Vladimir Sergeyevitch Soloviev (1853-1900) was the son of the eminent Russian historian S. M. Soloviev. Vl. S. Soloviev is regarded as

P. N. Milyoukov¹ calls him the founder of Neo-Slavophilism or of the left insurgent wing of the Slavophil movement. He claims that Soloviev based this new school on the principle that the social ideals of Christianity must be realized in the social and political life of humanity, and that the Russian people united with the Roman hierarchy are best fitted to realize this ideal in a united Catholic Church.²

This premise of the older Slavophilism seems to have been difficult for Soloviev to part with, although he himself had severely criticized the Slavophiles as "idolaters of the people", because they considered the Slavic people to be endowed with ultimate truth, power and beauty.³

Soloviev is not so much of a partisan as his predecessors were. He is, however, strongly biased by religious predilections.

Sociology in his system appears as social ethics. He says: "The actual ethical problem inevitably carries us into the province which determines the current historical existence of society, or of collective man."⁴

The problem which he tries to solve is that of the interrelation of society and of the individual, or the problem of

one of Russia's most able thinkers and the creator of the first complete system of Russian Philosophy. His works are in nine volumes. His philosophical system has been summed up in a doctor's dissertation by D. V. Usnadse, "Die Metaphysische Weltanschauung Wladimir Soloviev's mit orientirendem Überblick seiner Erkenntnistheorie." Halle-Wittenberg, 1909.

¹ In an article, "The Disintegration of Slavophilism," *Questions of Philosophy and Psychology* (Russian), May, 1893.

² In *Russia and Its Crisis*, p. 63. Milyoukov says: "Pope and Tzar allied with the prophet of their union between them; such was Soloviev's apocalyptic vision."

³ Cf. his *National Questions of Russia, Works*, vol. v, pp. 139-336.

⁴ *Works*, vol. vii, p. 210.

individuation with social control. He resents on the one hand the ideas of the moral subjectivists or individualists who regard each individual as self-determining and independent of society; on the other hand he thinks that man is more than a social animal which exists only for the sake of the group.¹ According to Soloviev, the human individual is a potentiality for realizing unlimited possibilities. He is a unique form of infinite content. The potentialities of man, dividing him off from other animals, are three peculiar psychic characteristics, the religious, the sense of pity and the sense of shame. These are the premises upon which Soloviev's whole system of ethics and of sociology is built.²

Society is nothing else but an objectively-realizing content of the individual. According to its actual purpose society is not an outer boundary of the individual but is his completion, and in relation to the multiplicity of individual units society is not an arithmetical summing-up or a mechanical aggregate. It is an indivisible unit of life, which in part is already realized and is preserved through enduring social traditions, and in part is being realized in the present by means of social activities, and which finally proceeds through a better knowledge of the social ideal towards its future complete realization.³

In the process of historical evolution, too, these three principal remaining characteristics of the socio-individual life—the religious, the political and the prophetic—correspond to three successive stages in human consciousness and in the social structure, namely: “(1) The tribal which belongs to the past and which is preserved in the family, having changed only its outer form, (2) the national-gov-

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 273.

² Cf. *Works*, vol. vii, pt. i, and also pp. 480-81.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

ernmental order, which dominates at present, and, (3) the universal association of man as the ideal of the future."¹

Thus society is a supplemented or widened individual, and the individual is a condensed or concentrated society. The moral historical problem consists not in creating socio-individual solidarity (for it is potentially present) but in raising it into consciousness, in transforming it from an involuntary into a voluntary entity, so that everyone may understand, accept and do the common task as his own. From the beginning man appears to be a socio-individual being, and all of history is but a continuous deepening, elevating and widening of the two-sided socio-individual life. Out of these two indivisible and correlated terms the individual is the moving, the dynamic force and society is the indirectly controlling, static basis of history. There is no necessary antagonism between the individual and society; there is but conflict, arising in individual initiative, between new and previous stages of socio-individual evolution.²

The primitive group—the clan—contains in germ all the elements, religious, altruistic and artistic, which are necessary to the realization of individual human dignity. The clan developed into the tribe, the ethnic nation into civilized society. But in every stage the right of control by the group is conditioned and relative, man continuing to develop his primary ethical characteristics towards individual dignity.³

Each human society can assure its survival and raise its dignity only by conforming to its moral norm. The moral norm or law is the sanctioning by reason of those impulses

¹ *Works*, vol. vii, p. 215.

² Condensed from *ibid.*, pp. 215-17.

³ *Cf. Works*, vol. vii, pp. 480-81.

which proceed from the three peculiar psychic characteristics of man.¹

Accordingly the crucial matter lies not in the outward preservation of institutions, be these of one kind or another, good or bad, but "in a systematic effort to improve social relations and institutions internally, subjecting them to the one moral ideal of voluntary conformity for the general good".²

Progress in its moral or historical sense consists in "an organic and indivisible unification of the highly individualized man with social control", *i. e.*, progress is the identification of man individualized and man socialized.³ It is a continuous and better execution of duties which grow out of the past but which continue to serve as a new force to move on towards the perfect goal.⁴

"Organization in its general meaning is a coördination of many means and implements of a lower order for the purpose of reaching one general goal of a higher order."⁵

The moral organization of humanity is an indivisible triune task. Its absolute purpose is determined by the church as organized piety, collectively receiving divine influence; her formal means and implements are given by a purely human voluntary beginning of just pity or sympathy, collectively organized in the state; and only the final substratum or material of the divinely human organism is found in the province of the economic life, being controlled by the principle of restraint.⁶

¹ Cf. *Works*, vol. vii, p. 481.

² *Ibid.*, p. 287.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 420.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 433.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 476.

These are the general features of the theory of society which is the basis of Soloviev's Neo-Slavophilism.¹

To recapitulate, Soloviev starts with the premise that there are three primary psychic characteristics peculiar to the human species. They are the sense of piety, the sense of pity and the sense of shame, answering to the three logically possible stages of high, level and low. Because of these psychic peculiarities man is more than a social animal. He is a socio-individual being. His progress through the various historical stages, from the primitive ethnic group to civilized society, consists in the concurrent development and unification of his individual interests and aspirations with those of the group. His highest development is as a member of a Christian brotherhood, the Catholic Church, which represents organized piety. The state protecting society is organized pity, and finally, humanity's economic maintenance is secured by organized restraint, the third peculiar psychic characteristic of man.

¹ It is also the sociological aspect of his system of ethics: "The justification of the good," which is the subject of vol. vii of his works. Most of our quotations are taken from this volume. We call Soloviev a Neo-Slavophil not because he called himself so, for he did not, but because of the organic connections of his conclusion with the Slavophil School.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE WESTERNISTS

(CHAÄDAEV, BELINSKY, HERZEN, BAKUNIN, GRANOVSKY
AND CHERNISHEVSKY)

THE Slavophiles, who had turned away from the culture of Western Europe, emphasizing national and racial solidarity and exclusiveness, found themselves opposed by a class of thinkers who placed individual and humanitarian interests in the forefront, and who believed that Russia had much to learn from the West before it was to become a civilized nation. These thinkers were generally called "Westernists".¹

There appear to be three relatively distinct trends of thought that may be studied under the caption of Westernism. They are: (1) The theocratic trend of the thirties with Chaädaev as its representative intellect and theorizer; (2) the humanitarian trend of the forties with Belinsky as its leading exponent; (3) the populist philosophy of the sixties for which Herzen and others paved the way in the previous decade, but which is most closely associated with the name of Chernishevsky.

All these currents of thought were accelerated by Western ideas: the first had the impetus of Jesuit philosophy; the second of German idealism and French rationalism; and the last of German materialism and French positivism.

¹ Some English authors prefer to transliterate the term as "Occidentalists."

I. *The Theocratic Theory of Chaädaev*

The representative theorizer of the Theocratic phase of Russian Westernism was Chaädaev.¹ His opinion of Russia was that "it is one of those nations which, it seems, do not represent any necessary part of humanity but merely exist for the purpose of teaching the world at some time a great lesson".

According to our geographic location between the West and the East, resting with one elbow on China and with the other on Germany, we ought to unite in ourselves the two great fundamentals of knowledge: imagination and reason. We ought to correlate in our civil education the history of the whole world. But such has not been our lot. Marooned in the world we have given nothing to it, have taken nothing from it. We have added no single idea to the mass of human ideas, have given nothing to perfect human understanding, and have distorted everything which brought us such perfection.²

The root of this evil, according to his opinion, lies in the fact that Russia received its "first seeds of moral and intellectual enlightenment from corrupt Byzantium, ostracized by all peoples".³ "Our exotic civilization," he continues, "has set us apart from the rest of Europe in such a way that we have none of her ideas. . . . If our own ante-

¹ Peter Yakovlevitch Chaädaev (1793-1856) was a Moscovite gentleman of considerable erudition. His theories concerning Russia appeared in his "Philosophical Letters", the first of which when published in a Russian periodical, the *Telescop*, vol. 34, no. 15, roused the Russian nationalists to great indignation. The government exiled the publisher, and the author was declared insane and put under medical observation. Chaädaev's works are now being edited in Moscow; the first volume appeared in 1913, and contains his famous "Philosophical Letters", in French.

² Chaädaev, *Lettres sur la philosophie de l'histoire*. Works, vol. i, Moscow, 1913, p. 84.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

cedents do not tie us to any other people on earth, if, in fact, we do not belong to any other people on earth, nor to any of the moral systems of the universe, we cling, in spite of it, through our social superficiality, to the occident.”¹

Chaädaev thinks that the only way for Russia to become truly civilized lies through yielding to the Roman Catholic Church and faith. He looks with great admiration upon the Roman Church, which succeeded in accomplishing the unity of Europe, something that since the schism created by the reformation, no other institution has been able to achieve.

We never dreamed that for centuries this society [the Roman Church] had formed a real federal system and that this system was not dissolved until the time of the reformation. The nations of Europe considered themselves before this deplorable event as one social body. Although geographically divided into states, they were one from the moral point of view, as for a long time there was no other public right among them than the decree of the Church.²

Medieval history is to Chaädaev a history of one great Christian people and its wars may be viewed as civil wars. Trouble began with the Protestant schism. “The breaking of the unity of thought has broken the unity of society.”³

This last statement may be taken as the basic doctrine of Chaädaev. He saw no other institution fit to establish unity of thought except the intolerant Roman hierarchy. Rome has guarded the moral and intellectual development of all former generations since the origin of things. She, therefore, should remain the unifying and

¹ *Works*, vol. i, p. 137.

² *Ibid.*, p. 106.

³ *Idem.*

civilizing force of humanity. Chaädaev hoped for the day on which the schismatic churches, in a spirit of penitence and humility, in sack-cloth and ashes, should decide to recognize their error and return to the mother church.¹

Chaädaev was admired for his bold thinking by many of the Russian intellectuals, although but few of them took him seriously. They preferred for themselves the Hegelian philosophy of history which promised them a little more than an opportunity to yield to the control of a medieval institution.

II. *The Humanitarianism of Belinsky*

Belinsky² was representative of the humanitarian trend of Russian Westernism. He was not a sociologist in the severely scientific sense of the word, but he may be regarded as a precursor of what later became known as the populist wing of the Subjectivist School of Sociology. He saw the fundamental problem of that school and tried to find a solution of it. This problem consisted in finding a principle that would establish the true relation between society and the individual. He made use of the organic view. "A people," he says, "is not an abstract concept; a people is a living individuality whose vital diversities serve one end. A people is an individual like a separate man."³

When it first arises, a people is unconscious; passing

¹ *Works*, vol. i, p. 118.

² Vissarion Gregorievitch Belinsky (1810-1848), one of Russia's illustrious literary critics and publicists, reflects in his writings the rapid changes through which the intellectual class of Russia passed. From Schelling, Fichte and Hegel he went over to Feuerbach and Marx, becoming one of the first advocates of Marxian ideas in Russia. *Works* (Russian), four volumes.

³ Belinsky, *Works*, St. Petersburg ed., 1896, vol. i, p. 337.

through all the stages of a human being it emerges into consciousness within the periods of its youth and manhood. "The beginning of the life of each people is hidden by geographic, ethnographic, geological and climatic conditions. When man passes out from his state of nature, he begins a struggle with nature, subjects her to himself and even changes her by the power of his reason."¹

Primitive groups or tribes are "a kind of infusoria of political society, powerless to take on a definite, rational form, *i. e.*, a form of government."²

Through conflict primitive tribes become increasingly self-conscious and are amalgamated into peoples. "A people becomes a state only when control, sanctioned by time, reaches formulation; then folk life receives definite, confirmed spoken or written forms, and these forms pass into laws." Hence, "the state is the highest stage of associated life and its highest and only rational form. Only by becoming a member of the state does man cease to be a slave to nature, and only as a member of the state does he appear as a truly rational being."³

In Hegelian fashion Belinsky views society as a product of opposites. He says, "Struggle is the necessary condition of life; when the struggle ends life ceases. The subjective man is in eternal conflict with the objective world and therefore with society—but this conflict is not a revolt, it is a continuous striving towards one side or the other."⁴ "Hence each man has two lives, each of which successively holds and impresses him. In the conflict of these two he finds his own life."⁵

Thus Belinsky attempts to solve the problem of the rela-

¹ *Works*, vol. i, p. 342.

² *Ibid.*, p. 343.

³ *Idem.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

tion of the individual to society. We see that he makes the individual subject to the group. Society is to him "a huge body with innumerable heads, but with one soul, with one individual I."¹

When in later years Belinsky disavowed his allegiance to the German idealist metaphysicians and entered the ranks of the young Hegelians, he still remained true to his earlier views which made the individual a product of and subject to the group. He says: "What lives unconsciously in a people as a potentiality appears in the genius as a realization and as an actuality. A people is related to its great men as the soil is to the plant which it brings forth. Here is unity and not division, there is no dualism here."² The source of all progress, of all advance lies not in the dualism of a people, but in the nature of man.

Belinsky, after he accepted positivism and German materialism, did not live long enough to develop these new views nor to apply them to the political and social life of his generation.

III. *Herzen, the Precursor of Russian Populism*

The thought which Belinsky seized upon in the latter years of his life was brilliantly developed by Herzen,³ the famous leader of the Russian intellectuals, who was one of the first of the group later known as the Populist or Russian Socialist School of Sociologists.

¹ *Works*, vol. i, p. 358.

² Vol. iv, p. 466.

³ Alexander Ivanovitch Herzen (1812-1870), one of Russia's most powerful writers. He lived in exile in Western Europe after 1846. He is best known through the publication of his progressive periodical, "The Bell", which played a great rôle in bringing about the great Russian reforms of the sixties. *Works*, Petrograd ed., 1905, vii volumes.

Herzen left Russia as an ardent admirer of Western Europe. He hoped that from the West would come salvation to his native country. But when after the revolutionary year of 1848, a general reaction set in, he was much disappointed. He says: "I see the inevitable ruin of old Europe. I am not sorry for anything she has, neither for her superb education, nor for her institutions. I love nothing in this world save what she persecuted; I appreciate nothing but what she puts to death."

He was convinced that Western Europe was evolving a commonality—a bourgeoisie, which he greatly disliked and which he hoped that Russia might escape. "Commonality is the ideal toward which Europe is tending."¹ "Commonality is the last word of a civilization founded upon the unlimited right of private property; it is democratizing aristocracy and aristocratizing democracy." "In a bourgeoisie individuality is wiped out, although people without individuality are bettered."²

Everywhere the hydra-headed commonality lacks discrimination, is ever ready to hear everything, to see everything, to dress in everything, to eat everything; it is that autocratic mob of *conglomerated mediocrity*, as John Stuart Mill expresses it, which buys everything and therefore owns everything; a mob which is not ignorant, but also is never truly educated.³

"Commonality is the final mode of Western civilization; alas, it is the *etat adulte*."⁴

It must be noticed that Herzen was not agitating against the bourgeoisie merely as a class, as Socialist writers commonly do. He disliked the shallowing, leveling tendency, which was introduced into Europe with the triumph of

¹ Vol. v, p. 356.

² *Ibid.*, p. 357.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 392.

the bourgeoisie, and which had penetrated everything, even Socialism, which was to him only a further extension of the same commonizing or leveling tendency. Herzen, the founder of Russian socialism, was at heart an aristocrat, an individualist,¹ and his theory of a "special" evolution of Russian society reflects throughout his deep-seated individualism.

He resents the imputation that since the Russians belong to the European family, they must follow, according to an unalterable physiological law, the same evolutionary process through which the Romano-Germanic peoples have passed; "there is no such paragraph in the code of physiological laws, . . . the general plan of evolution permits of unlimited numbers of variations, unforeseen as the trunk of the elephant or the hump of the camel."² Hence there are no biological obstacles to a special evolution of the Russian people. "In nature, in life, there exist no monopolies, no means by which the crossing of zoological species, of new historical destinies, and of governmental forms could be prevented. But not only the phases of evolution and the forms of customs change; there are created new nations and peoples, whose destinies follow diverse ways."³ He points to the American people as an example, and adds:

if a new soil was sufficient to make from the commingling of old peoples a peculiar characteristic nation, why should a

¹ "The goal of each generation," says Herzen, "is itself. Nature not only refrains from making generations the means for the attainments of the future, but it never even cares for the future." *Works*, vol. v, p. 187. "The individual which is the only real monad of society, has always been sacrificed to some kind of a general concept, to a collective name, to some kind of a banner." . . . "We live not for the purpose of entertaining others, we live for ourselves." *Works*, vol. v, pp. 256 and 261.

² *Works*, vol. v, p. 402.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

people that had an independent development under conditions different from those of the Western nations and with other origins in the ways of life—depend upon European remnants, especially if they know in advance whither they lead? ¹

“Russia heretofore has evolved nothing of her own, but she has preserved some things; she, like a stream, reflected on the surface the shores which pressed her; she reflected them truly but only on the surface.” ² “The commune saved the Russian people from Mongolian barbarism, from the landlord of European fashion, and from German bureaucracy. The communal organization, although largely shattered, stood against interference of the state; it has fortunately lived till *the development of Socialism in Europe*.” ³

How fortunate for Russia that the present commune did not perish, that personal property did not dissolve the property of the commune; how fortunate for the Russian people that it was omitted from all political movements, from European civilization, which without doubt, would have undermined the commune and which now has reached in Socialism the stage of self-renunciation. ⁴

“The man of the future Russia will be the peasant,” just as in “France he will be the workingman.” ⁵ “The idea of a social revolution is a European idea; but the conclusion should not be drawn that the Western peoples are the only ones called to realize it.” ⁶ “In fact, should socialism prove unable to re-establish decaying so-

¹ *Works*, vol. v, p. 404.

² *Ibid.*, p. 403.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 274. Italics are authors.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 274-275.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

ciety and complete its destiny—Russia will complete it.”¹ “The Slavic world is much younger than the European.”² “In Russia there is nothing fixed, nothing fossilized; everything in it is in a plastic stage of preparation.”³ “The revolutionary idea of Socialism can become with us an idea of the people. Whereas in Europe socialism is taken for the phantom of disorder and terror, with us, on the contrary, it appears a prophetic vision of the future development of our people.”⁴

“To retain the commune, while giving freedom to the individual, to spread local self-government, while retaining national unity—in these lies the problem of the future Russia.”⁵ “National Russian ways of life and the science of the West, these two synthesized will become our power, our future, our prerogative.”⁶

The contribution of the Russian peasant world to future civilization consists of elements which are old, but now are rising into consciousness and are met with in the efforts of the West for economic reconstruction. They consist in these three factors:

1. The right of each one to the use of the soil.
2. Its communal ownership.
3. Local self-government.

Upon the basis of these three, and only upon them, can the future Russia develop.⁷

These quotations from a wide range of Herzen's works give us in brief his idea of the “special” evolution of Rus-

¹ *Works*, vol. v, p. 311.

² *Ibid.*, p. 315.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

⁶ Collection of articles of “The Bell”. Geneva ed., 1887 (Russian), p. 454.

⁷ *Cf. Works*, vol. vi, p. 285.

sian society. It approaches at several points the Slavophil view. Of this Herzen was aware; he says:

We and the Slavophiles represented a kind of two-faced Janus: only they looked backward, and we looked forward. At heart we were one; and our hearts throbbed equally for our minor brother—the peasant—with whom our mother country was pregnant. But what for them was a recollection of the past, was taken by us as a prophecy for the future.¹

Herzen, as also some of the Slavophiles, saw no solution of the existing social problems in political revolutions or in parliamentarianism. He wanted a social, not a political, revolution. His writings, which throughout his earlier works sounded a distinctly anarchistic note, changed their temper as he grew older. In his posthumous works, especially in his letters to his friend Bakunin, we get interesting evidence of his increasing conservatism. He says: "The slowness and confusion of the historic process is maddening and is choking us; it is intolerable to us and many of us hasten and hurry others, although we know better. Is this good or not? Herein lies the whole question."² His answer is that force can bring on a premature birth but will not make the infant more perfect. A certain stage in the process of social evolution may be broken up, but this does not guarantee that existing conditions are favorable for the next stage. "I fear not," he continues. "the word *gradual*, . . . gradualness, as continuity is imperceptible to any person of reason. Mathematics is acquired gradually, why then should the generalization of sociology

¹ From Herzen's *Memoirs*. Quoted by Milyoukov, *Russia and Its Crisis*, p. 366.

² "Letters to an old friend" (1869). A. J. Herzen, Geneva, 2d ed., 1874, pp. 288 *et seq.*

be inoculated like small-pox". And then he concludes: "I do not believe in the former revolutionary ways and I seek to understand human advance in the past and in the present, in order to know how to keep up with it, and not straggle nor run ahead so far that the people will not follow and cannot follow."¹

Herzen, we have learned, hoped for a special evolution of the Russian people. His aversion to specialization of any kind, on the one hand, and to mediocrity and diletantism, on the other hand, made him seek for a synthesis of these extremes. To have succeeded he could not claim, and so he resigned himself to the fact that the historic process cannot be accelerated or changed; the wisest way is to keep step. This comparative conservatism which marks the eve of his life remained, however, unnoticed by the fervent spirits of the younger generation who seized and cherished his revolutionary ideas alone.

IV. *The Anarchistic Theories of Bakunin*

Bakunin's² writings have little scientific value. They are extremely doctrinaire, being biased by the author's bitter hatred of existing social institutions, especially by his dislike of church and state. But he must be mentioned in this symposium of precursors because of his wide and con-

¹ *Idem*.

² Mikhail Alexandrovitch Bakunin (1814-1876), a dynamic personality expressing in himself the critical transitional stage through which Russia was passing with the rise of the bourgeoisie and the struggle for democracy. In 1840 Bakunin left Russia. He took part in almost all revolutions of that period which swept over Western Europe. Twice he was sentenced to death; he tasted Siberian exile. He is especially known by his opposition to Marx in the *Association internationale des travailleurs*, from which he was expelled in 1872. *Works* (Russian), Bolashev edition, two volumes, and French, "*Oeuvres de Bakunine*", 1895, also some in German.

tinuous influence upon the radical elements not only of Russia but also of other parts of Europe. Bakunin adheres to the organic view of society. "We must," he says, "look at human society as at any organism"; it is true that it is much more complex than a biological organism but just as natural, being subject to the same laws in addition to which it is governed by its own exclusive and characteristic laws."¹

"Each people appears as a collective being possessing physical, psychic and politico-social peculiarities, which individualize it, and separate it from all other peoples." All this is due "to an infinitely complex aggregate of an innumerable amount of very different causes, large or small, of which a part is known, while much of it remains unknown."²

Everything that exists, all beings, whatever be their nature in regard to quality and quantity influence each other, regardless of desire or consciousness, by means of direct or indirect actions and reactions. These endless actions and reactions combining into unified movement comprise what we call general coherence, life, causation.³

"This universal life creates worlds—it continues in the human realms, creating society with all its past and all its future development."⁴

Bakunin warns his readers not to interpret his words in the metaphysical sense when he says that "life is creativeness",⁵ and that man is a dynamic creative force within the human realm. He says:

What we call the human realm, has no other direct creator than man, who makes it, forging little by little from the outer world and from his own animality his liberty and his

¹ Bakunin, *Works*, Bolashev ed. (Russian), vol. i, p. 89.

² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

human dignity. He conquers it by a craving force, independent of himself, unconquerable and equally a part of all human beings. This force, this universal stream of life, is the same which we term universal causation or nature, and which appears in all living beings, plant or animal. The tendency of each individuality is to ascertain for itself conditions necessary for the life of its kind, i. e. needed to satisfy its own necessities.¹

“Within that environment which itself produces man he attains, by means of toil and thanks to his reason, his consciousness of liberty.”² “Nature itself in its successive phenomenal changes strives towards liberation. . . . A greater individual liberty appears to be an unfailing sign of perfection.”³

“Man is the most individualized of earthly beings but he also appears to be the most socialized of all beings.”⁴ Thus “Society is the natural phenomenon of existing peoples, independent of any kind of contract. It is governed by disposition and by traditional customs, but never by laws. It gradually progresses, being moved forward by impulses of individual initiative, and not by the thought and will of the legislator.”⁵

By this view of society and its moving forces, Bakunin justifies his anarchistic negations of law and government. The state, accordingly, is to him:

A huge cemetery in which occur self-sacrifice, death and burial of all phenomena of individual and local life, of the interests of those parts, which in their aggregate compose society. It is an altar upon which the real liberty and welfare of the

¹ *Works*, vol. i, p. 109.

² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

people is brought as a sacrifice to political greatness; and the more this sacrificing is extended the more the state is complete.¹

Hence the state is an abstraction which devours the life of the people; but for such an abstraction to be born, develop and continue its existence in the real world, a real collective body must exist whose interests are bound up with the existence of the state. Such cannot be the majority of the people, for they appear to be victims of the state. He concludes: "The state was always the possession of a privileged class: the priesthood, the nobility or the bourgeoisie".²

The rise of classes Bakunin traces back to the animal instinct of difference. He says: "Each species of animals subdivides into different groups and families which change under influences of geographic and climatic conditions."³ Through these external influences small groups or varieties are formed within the species which are hostile to one another and which seek to destroy one another. The instinctive hostility of animal groups the author calls: "Natural Patriotism", and he defines it as: "instinctive, mechanical and deprived of any critical attachment of oneself to the socially accepted, hereditary, traditional mode of life, and an equally instinctive, mechanical hostility to any other mode of life."⁴

"Natural Patriotism" carried over into human society (as it emerged from the animal world) and, equipped with religious sanction, became finally the government. "Thus God, or rather the fiction of God, appears as the sanction, and as the intellectual and moral cause of every slavery on earth; and the liberty of man will be complete

¹ *Works*, vol. i, p. 188.

² *Ibid.*, p. 189.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

only when man completely annihilates the pernicious fiction of the heavenly ruler.”¹

The origin of religion Bakunin explains by man's sense of dependence upon the powers of nature. Religion “like all other human institutions has its origin in animal life.”²

This is Bakunin's account of the rise of existing institutions. What form of society does he regard as proper and beneficent?

He believes that the organization of society should be from the bottom up. Federalism is the ideal organization,³ and the goal of evolution. According to the Hegelian trilogy, Bakunin views “the centralized states as thesis, anarchy or amorphism as antithesis, and federation of the independent groups and people as synthesis.”⁴ Anarchism as the antithesis is to be attained by direct action through “the propaganda of the deed”,⁵ and by teaching that the revolution (*i. e.*, the end) sanctions the means.⁶

V. *The Historism of Granovsky*

As representative Westernist and precursor of later Russian sociology must be mentioned Granovsky.⁷

¹ *Works*, vol. i, p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³ Cf. *Oeuvres*, vol. i, “Federalisme, Socialisme, etc.”

⁴ Bakunin's *Sozialpolitischer Briefwechsel mit Herzen und Ogarjow*, Stuttgart, 1895, p. 388.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

⁷ Timofy Nikolaevitch Granovsky (1813-1855) was a close friend of Herzen and a popular Professor of History in the University of Moscow. Kareyev says of him: “Granovsky thought in terms of history, and in terms of history he made propaganda.” (N. I. Kareyev, *Works*, vol. ii, p. 40.) Granovsky, as a propagandist professor, looms traditionally as a much greater figure among the Russian intellectuals, than as an author, among those who have to content themselves with his rather meagre literary output. *Works*, ii volumes.

Granovsky combated the Slavophil notion that the people are the dynamic force in history, and along with the other Westernists he defended individual initiative and humanitarian interests.¹

His thesis is that of *the disintegration of the masses by thought*. He says: "Each people has many beautiful and deep political traditions but there is something higher than these: this is reason, which destroys tradition's positive influence on life."² Although viewing society as a static mass and the individual as the actual factor of progress, he realized man's limitations; brought upon him through natural law. The life of mankind is subject to the same laws to which is subjected the life of nature, but the law does not equally realize itself in these two spheres. The phenomena of nature are much more uniform than the phenomena of history. Constant development is not to be had in history. History has a law which must inevitably be fulfilled; but no set time is given it—it may take ten years or ten centuries. The law stands like the goal towards which man is moving, but it is not concerned, as to which road he chooses thither, nor as to how much time he may spend on the way. Here the individual is not the tool, but is an independent abettor or opponent of the historical law; he takes upon himself the responsibility for a whole line of events called forth or suppressed by himself.³

Besides his discussion on the "laws" of society and historical phenomena Granovsky was probably the first to introduce among Russian scholars the statistical method of studying history. He says: "So long as history will not

¹ Cf. his essays on the four historical characters: Timur, Alexander the Great, Louis IX, and Francis Bacon. *Works*, 4th ed., pt. ii.

² Essay in review of Mishel's *History of Cursed Nations*, 1847.

³ Cf. *Works*, 4th ed. in one volume, Moskow, 1900, pp. 26-27.

adopt the necessary statistical method, it can never be called an experimental science.”¹

As the discoveries of naturalists did away with old and harmful prejudices that obscured man's view of nature . . . so the interpretation of historical laws will lead to a like result. It will put an end to those non-realizable theories and notions which disturb the regular development of the social life. History will not appear as a past cut off from the present, but as a whole organism of life, in which the past, the present and the future are in continuous interaction.

With Granovsky we may dismiss the Westernists who belonged to the transitional stage of Russian social theory, *i. e.*, from the humanitarian-metaphysical stage to the naturalistic and positivist stage.

Apart from their methods the theories now to be analyzed are those known as Russian Populism or Russian Socialism. As we have already observed, they presupposed a special evolution of Russian Society.

VI. *The Populist Theories of Chernishevsky*

Russian populism is associated with the work of Chernishevsky, its principal theorizer, who, although he was not primarily a sociologist, is important as one of the precursors of Russian sociology.

Chernishevsky² built his theories on presuppositions

¹ Cf. *Works*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

² Nikolai Govrilovitch Chernishevsky (1828-1889) is best known by his Utopian novel, "What is to be done"? He was a bold, original thinker with an encyclopedic range of knowledge. His "Notes" to John Stuart Mill's *Principles of Political Economy* are to be had in French translation. His work was prematurely curtailed by the severities of the Russian prison régime and by the Siberian exile to which he was condemned for no other offense than his advocating of some progressive ideas of society. He is considered the "Father" of Russian Nihilism. *Works*, St. Petersburg ed., 1906, ten volumes.

much the same as those accepted by the left wing of the Hegelian school of philosophy, especially as interpreted in the writings of Ludwig Feuerbach, *i. e.*, on materialism, though he is influenced also by French rationalism and positivism. To him historical and social phenomena are dialectic processes of development. He believes in but one set of laws, which controls alike the organic and the inorganic worlds.¹

Society is to him but the sum of individual lives. He says: "Aggregate life is the sum of individual lives",² and in its earlier stages is controlled by geographic and climatic conditions. But in civil society these influences become secondary. "Thus a people having entered the field of historical evolution, its occupations and customs cannot be explained by nature nor by temperament, which is a product of nature."³ Reason becomes predominant in civilized society. "Climate, soil, resources of capital, even the strength of physical force—all these are very negligible in comparison with the development of thought. Out of this development everything arises, everything clashes, even that greatness which is commensurate with it; by it only is everything upheld."⁴

Progress is nothing more and nothing less than a physical necessity. "Progress is simply the law of growth." The elements of progress in the history of society are much more complex than in the history of nature, and, therefore, it is much more difficult to observe its laws in society; but in all spheres of life law is the same. To deny progress

¹ Cf. his "Anthropological Principle in Philosophy," *Works*, vol. vi, p. 196.

² *Works*, vol. iv, p. 327.

³ *Works*, vol. iii, p. 515.

⁴ *Works*, vol. vii, p. 189.

is just as absurd as to deny the force of gravity or the force of chemical affinity.¹ "Progress takes place slowly, . . . but nine-tenths of it is accomplished in brief periods of intense activity. History moves slowly and yet almost all its advance is by leaps.² After each leap a reaction sets in, but of necessity each reaction gives an impetus to further advance."³

Great historical events are not dependent upon any one person's will, nor upon any personality. They are realized through a law as immutable as is the law of gravitation, or of organic growth. The rapidity or slowness of the process depends upon circumstances which can neither be predetermined nor foreseen. The most important of these circumstances is the rise of strong personalities, who by the nature of their activity give to the unchangeable trend of events a certain characteristic, and who hasten or retard the course of the trend; and by their superior strength give definite direction to the chaotic forces that move the masses.⁴ Accordingly, the individual appears to be but the agent of his time, but one of historical necessity. The individual, therefore, is himself subject to the demands and the standards of society. Satisfying the demands of society, man receives from it sympathy and coöperation, but when he deviates from it he arouses criticism and opposition. Yet the author does not regard public opinion as a direct force of control or of progress. He says:

Public opinion only shows the evil and the means to remedy it; but if these remedies are not applied the evil remains unchanged. All social phenomena depend upon the laws gov-

¹ Cf. *Works*, vol. v, p. 490.

² *Idem.* Cf. vol. vi, p. 87.

³ *Works*, vol. v, p. 491.

⁴ Cf. *Works*, vol. iii, p. 644.

erning society. . . . Laws only then are powerless when directed against the mere symptoms of the disease: but they are all powerful when having learned the real cause of evil the legislator changes that institution which is productive of the evil.¹

The author thinks institutions highly important social products. Thus, speaking of the institution of Russian serfdom, he says: "It arose just as naturally as later on arose the relation of hired laborer to the capitalist, . . . nothing in life comes about artificially, everything is a natural product."²

Social habits and customs become subject to civil institutions and are modified or changed by them. He says:

If we carefully survey the history of each European nation, all the so-called peculiarities are explainable by those civil institutions under whose influence they lived or live. . . . The nation changed its habits in harmony with the spirit of its institutions and laws. Events and institutions in various lands were different and, therefore, nations which began their existence with perfectly equal habits and inclinations appear at the present time entirely different.³

Customs are created by civil institutions. Laws which do not change civil institutions are also powerless over customs. But with the change in civil institutions, the customs of a people do necessarily change. The factors that change civil institutions in a nation are historical events of a critical nature.

"Progress in institutions consists in changes which are in harmony with the evolution of existing social needs."⁴

¹ *Works*, vol. iii, p. 526.

² *Works*, vol. vi, p. 4.

³ *Works*, vol. iii, p. 522.

⁴ *Works*, vol. vi, p. 91.

These quotations from a wide range of his writings are sufficient to show that the author emphasizes institutions as all important in shaping the character and customs of a people.¹

This emphasis upon institutions is easily understood when we remember that Chernishevsky wrote on the eve of and during the great social and civil reforms of Russia. He wanted to go further than the abolition of Russian serfdom. He wished his government to direct the reorganization of the Russian peasant commune in such a way as to preserve the institution of common possession of land and add to it the advantages of capitalistic production with its principle of division of labor; and yet to escape the consequent evil of reducing the individual to a tool by making him continuously do some one kind of work only, which the principle of division of labor forces upon him. He also wished to save his people from proletarianization and from the curse of unlimited aggregation of wealth and of private property. In short, he wanted Russia to leap the capitalistic era and enter directly into the era of social democracy. He says: "The evil effect of division of labor upon the economic system and upon the very organism of the working classes under the present régime is not to be doubted. . . . For human welfare the increase of production is necessary, and increase of production demands division of

¹ We must, however, not conclude that by his emphasis upon institutions Chernishevsky disregarded the interests of the individual. On the contrary, he exalted the individual's interests over everything else, he says: "Some presuppose for the state a purpose higher than the needs of separate individuals—namely, a realization of far-fetched ideas of justice, truth, etc. There is no doubt that out of some such principle it is more easy to derive rights for the state, than from that other theory which speaks only about the benefit to the individual in general. We hold to the latter; we do not hold anything on earth higher than the human individual." (*Works*, vol. iv, pp. 439-40.)

labor.”¹ Here “we have two formulas, the combination of which gives the result: the factor, which is necessary for welfare is at the same time during its development destructive to the mass of the people.”²

We have already pointed out that this paradox of the capitalistic era made Chernishevsky fall back upon the Russian commune as the one escape from the difficulty. The commune was to him neither a special product of the Slavic genius, as was claimed by the Slavophiles, nor an artificial product of the Moscovite State, as was held by some of the Westernists; he saw in the commune a survival of a primitive institution once common to all peoples, but which through historical circumstances has been retained in Russia although not in Western Europe. “But,” says the author, “in spite of the evil consequence of our slowness, . . . in the present stage of economic evolution in Western Europe, . . . this slowness becomes highly important and useful,” and he reasons that “since the highest stage of evolution equals in form the primitive stage,”³ and “since the achievement of progressive people can be adopted by primitive people without necessarily passing through all the intermediary stages, Russia can pass directly from the lowest to the higher stages.”⁴

These conclusions at which Chernishevsky arrived were identical with those of Herzen and of the populist movement in general.

¹ *Works*, vol. vii, p. 183.

² *Idem*.

³ *Works*, vol. iv, p. 331.

⁴ *Works*, vol. iv, pp. 327 *et seq.*

PART II

THE SUBJECTIVIST SCHOOL OF
RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF PETER L. LAVROV

THE populist movement inaugurated through the literary efforts of Chernishevsky and popularized by his disciples, Dobrolubov and Pissarev, culminated during the sixties and early seventies in the Russian intellectual youth "going among the people". This movement made clear two things: First, that the "people", *i. e.*, the great mass of Russian peasant folk, were utterly unable to appreciate the advanced ideas of the Russian intellectuals and emancipators. Secondly, it made clear that whatever progress was to be realized, must be achieved through the initiative and agency of an unselfish critical-intellectual class. Thus the Russian Subjectivist School took its rise.

The first and one of the most able advocates of this propagandism was Peter Lavrov.¹ We shall devote this

¹ Peter Lavrovovitch Lavrov (1823-1900), a man of noble birth, was educated as an artillery officer. He early showed interest in philosophical studies and in time devoted himself entirely to them. Having joined the Russian revolutionary ranks, he was exiled to a remote province (1868). Here he wrote his first sociological treatises, the famous *Historical Letters*, which were published under the pseudonym Myrtov. In 1870 he made his way to Paris, where he continued his work as writer on sociology and history, and as editor of much Russian revolutionary literature. His works have not been edited collectively; much of his writing is to be found among Russian periodicals under various pseudonyms as Myrtov, Dolengi, Arnoldy, Shchukin and others. His larger books, from which we shall quote principally, are: *Sketches concerning Questions of Critical Philosophy*, 1860; *Before Man*, 1870; *Civilization and Savage Tribes*, 1871; *Historical Letters*, pseudonym Myrtov, 1870, to be had in German; *Experiments in a His-*

chapter to an analysis of his theories, some of which have not lost their significance even to-day.

Lavrov's Philosophical and Methodological Presuppositions

Much misunderstanding and unnecessary criticism was aroused by Lavrov's use of the misleading terms "subjective point of view" and "subjective method". Whatever meaning these had for Lavrov's critics, what they connoted for him is apparent in the following quotation:

In sociology and in history there are truths which are as unalterable and absolute as are the truths of all other sciences. These truths are objective, they may be unknown at one epoch and discovered at another. . . . But sociology and history also contain other truths which cannot be discovered before certain epochs, not because of any objective inadequacy in the material to be known, but in consequence of the subjective unpreparedness of society to understand the question in its active setting.¹

He insists that history does not repeat itself and that the laws of social solidarity and the process of historical evolution are not something unalterable, but are themselves progressive. These are not objective truths existing absolutely and subject to revelation, they are truths which are brought out at certain stages of historical evolution and therefore are subjectively perceived by the people of a given

tory of Thought, 1876; *Problems in the Understanding of History*, pseudonym S. S. Arnoldy, 1898; *Principal Epochs* (literally "Moments") in the *History of Thought*, pseudonym A. Dolengi, 1900. (The first three books of this list are not obtainable in this country for reference; recourse was had for them to secondary sources, especially to Professor Kareyev's *Etudes*.) All of these writings were to be introductory volumes to a great encyclopedic work entitled, *The History of Thought*, which Lavrov did not live to finish. Lavrov is without doubt one of Russia's most able thinkers and scholars.

¹ Lavrov, *Experiments in a History of Thought*, pp. 92-93.

epoch.¹ Therefore it became necessary to acknowledge this important factor as a "highly necessary and fully scientific subjectivism".²

Besides his emphasis upon the kaleidoscopic changes of history which make rigid laws impossible, Lavrov also dwells upon the factors of social and individual evolution which seem to be inevitable in any study of society. He says: "Scientific structure is obtained by the co-working of two processes equally subjective, one of which takes place in the minds of the historians, and the other is the result of observing historical individuals and groups".³ But only those events are considered which contribute to the development of their (the historians') ideal, or those which mostly obstruct its realization. This selective tendency in dealing with historical facts as they make for or against a real or ideal good as conceived of by us—this development of our moral ideal in the past life of humanity—"this comprises to every one the only meaning of history, the only law of historical grouping, the law of progress".⁴ From these few quotations it is apparent that Lavrov did not mean to shirk an objective study of society in the interest of subjective standards which may more or less affect the choice of objective facts. He merely demanded the consideration of an additional fact, namely, that, besides

¹ Among others the author uses this example to make his thought clear: "Until in the laboring class there was aroused the desire to take part in public historical life in behalf of their own interests, there was no necessity for the historian to understand the past which had laid the foundation for this desire, and a multitude of facts recorded in annals and memoirs were well known, but did not enter and could not enter into a scientific understanding of history." *Ibid.*, p. 94.

² *Idem.*

³ *Historical Letters*, 2d ed., p. 34.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

the theoretical consideration of historical facts, man is bound by an ethical relation. In other words, he believed it necessary to ask not only the Aristotelian questions how? In what way? but also the questions whence? and whither? This teleological aspect of sociology seemed to Lavrov highly important, because to him, as to most Russian scholars of the time, the social sciences were to serve humanity in its struggle for happiness. The end towards which humanity should strive Lavrov did not mean to postulate *a priori*; he hoped to decide upon that after an inductive study of society, both animal and human, and thus to construct his theory of progress, basing it upon those factors which in the process of evolution seemed to have been most important for the individual and for society, and to have furthered human advancement.

The subjective point of view and the subjective method, should reveal to us the individual as the only real factor of society, and make it plain that to disregard him and his interests is to disregard the most important social phenomena.

But here we are confronted with the old vexing metaphysical questions of free will and determinism. Our author, who is a materialist with a mechanistic conception of life,¹ tries to rid himself of the difficulty by considering free will as a proximate reality, and determinism as an ultimate fact. He says: "The world of ends and means, like all other subjective phenomena, should be studied not only as a necessary resultant of mechanical, chemical and biological process subject to an unconditional determinism, but also as it is related to those peculiarities which

¹ He says: "A mechanistic system of the universe is the only one that can lead to a scientific understanding of the world, and it eliminates any concept of world purpose." *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 971.

were conceived of as exclusively subjective.”¹ The interpretation of the historical process, by taking both of these points of view into consideration, presents both an element of inevitableness which enters into the act of volition as a condition of the will itself and also an element of the best and the highest, which has no meaning from the point of view of determinism.² The reader will note that this statement admits of a charge of dualism, but it is not our purpose here to get into metaphysical quibbling. In his study of society, Lavrov follows out these two aspects with special emphasis upon the importance of the critically-minded individual.

What is Sociology and what are its Problems?

Lavrov had definite views on the province and problems of sociology. During the years of his work, however, as was to be expected, he modified his concepts somewhat. In his earlier works he defines sociology as “the theory of the processes and products of social development”.³ This definition permits the consideration of a wide range of problems theoretical and historical. In time, however, Lavrov saw fit to narrow the province of sociology and to transfer some of the problems to other social sciences.⁴ Thus sociology becomes “the science of solidarity of conscious individuals”, *i. e.*, the study of the “formation, growth, weakening and disintegration of this solidarity”.⁵ In another place he defines it as “the analysis or study of

¹ *Problems in the Understanding of History*, p. 111.

² *Cf. ibid.*, p. 127.

³ *Historical Letters*, p. 14.

⁴ Thus he names one branch the science of social morphology, whose problem is the evolution of social forms. *Cf. Experiments in a History of Thought*, p. 82.

⁵ *Problems in the Understanding of History*, p. 129.

the forms of solidarity among conscious individuals, of the conditions of its growth and its weakening in the various stages of development of these individuals and the forms of congregated life".¹

These definitions suggest the principal problems which Lavrov thought that sociology has to solve and upon which our author spent his energies. He saw two parallel processes moving throughout history—the growth of solidarity, and the growth of individuality. These he attempts to trace back to the simplest forms of organic life, and up through the stage in which the social animal, man, attains self-consciousness and attempts to direct his own future by applying his critical faculties. History becomes a record of the development of thought, showing the continuous attempt to reconcile solidarity or group interest with that of the individual. Society begins a positive striving to attain this moral good which he calls progress. For example, he says:

Thus sociology not only thinks it her task to understand the forms of solidarity and the processes which take place during the quantitative and qualitative changes of these forms, but also as inevitably it strives to realize the practical problem of creating such forms when understood; first so far as its actual understanding makes realization possible; secondly, by presenting elements of conviction held by individuals who have grasped the sociological meaning. The understanding of the problems of sociology not only in their theoretical interpretation, but also in their practical import, makes possible judgments by the individuals of their own behavior.²

Many of Lavrov's sociological theories are to be found

¹ *Experiments in a History of Thought*, pp. 75-76.

² *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, pp. 980-981.

in books to which he has given historical titles.¹ Therefore it may be of interest to know how he differentiates sociology from history. "History as a science is the comprehension of the phenomena of progress in the process of historical life, and the discovery of the laws of that order in which the phenomena of progress and of regress inevitably follow one after the other in this process."² In further differentiating this concept of history from that of sociology, he says:

The sociologist asks himself what phenomena of growth or of weakening, of widening or of narrowing, of solidarity could and ought to have resulted under given historical combinations of social forms and acquired processes of thought in a given society and at a given epoch? Which of these actually did so occur and which would inevitably have repeated themselves had the same historical conditions reappeared.³ The historian wants to know: what combination of living elements and survivals, of special problems of society, and what germs of the

¹ This is true with the exception of a few earlier works, as *Before Man* and *Civilization and Savage Tribes*, the gist of which, however, is found repeated and supplemented in later works, such as *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*.

² *Experiments in a History of Thought*, p. 99.

³ Our author adds here in parentheses that such reappearance with sufficient similarity is not met with in history. Similar to the questions quoted above, which he says are to be answered by sociology, are the questions which a sociological law has to formulate. He says: "The laws which are to be sought in it (sociology) will be those laws which shall serve for the solution of the question: Under what conditions can individuals of a certain development be bound by the solidarity of congregated life of a given strength? What elements of strengthening or weakening of this solidarity are conditioned by the degree of development of individuals and by the degree of strength of their solidarity? What technical demands proceed from the understanding of the form and the strength of this solidarity for the activity of the individual in view of this strengthening or weakening?" *Experiments in a History of Thought*, p. 82.

future, does a given epoch present; also in what way did this combination finally develop into a more or less different combination from the first,—by casting off some survivals, and by calling forth and developing in its environment new germs of the future? Both sociology and history take all their material from the collective organism, but the first is analogous to the study of physiological phenomena in the province of biology, the second to the study of the law of changes of form which condition the transition of the larva of an insect into a mature animal, or the transition of the human germ into a self-directing historical personality.¹

Thus it seems clear that in Lavrov's view sociology should study the static structure and function of the social organism while history should point out those events in the life of the organism which work toward and through changes.²

We may now proceed to a study of the three fundamental theories of Lavrov. They are:

1. A theory of social solidarity or of social control.
2. A theory of individuation or of personality.
3. A theory of social progress.

1. *The theory of social solidarity*

Solidarity and its antithesis, individuality began simultaneously and have conditioned one another all along the way. "The history of mankind," says Lavrov, "had as its task the attempt to solve the problems of individualism in the best possible way, the problem which was prepared for man by the preceding stages of evolution of the zoological

¹ It would seem that what Lavrov calls history, others might call the philosophy of history. The author thinks the philosophy of history conditioned by the problem of developing a theory of progress. Cf. *Problems in the Understanding of History*, pp. 131 *et seq.*

² *Problems in the Understanding of History*, pp. 20-21.

world in its sociological relation.”¹ For the purpose of analysis we will deal with these two factors separately, although actually they are never in isolation, but from their earliest stages continually interact. First we will attempt to show how, according to Lavrov, solidarity arises.

How solidarity arises. According to Lavrov, the study of the behavior of lower organisms presents to the observer facts which strongly suggest the source of the rise of solidarity. The process of multiplication of organic beings and their interaction differentiates into two opposite processes. On the one hand, there is the formation of complex but unified individual biological organisms, and on the other hand, there is the transition of such individual biological aggregates into a society, or collective social organism, which is characterized by a psychic solidarity, and is subjected by it to certain social laws, whereby purely social organisms are differentiated from biological organisms.² The unifying force of the earliest forms of solidarity is *instinct*. The social instinct, which stimulates individuals unconsciously to form social solidarity, appears early in the zoological world, as soon, in fact, as development has passed beyond that stage in which parts of protoplasm form new nuclei by approaching each other and uniting, or by separating, and all without any cause so far as the observer can judge. “In this manner socialization of particular elements appears to take place in the first stages of the evolutionary life process.”³ This association of similars, which in the lower forms takes place unconsciously and is but very loosely held together, increases with the growth in complexity of organic life. Lavrov says:

¹ *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 101.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 23.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

All higher organisms were at first apparently associations or colonies of like units. This association of individual units having thereby preserved self-existence, consequently, because of its association, worked out a more or less conscious solidarity. On the foundation of similar instincts, similar habits, similar sympathies, similar interests and similar convictions, the beginnings of social organism are erected.¹

Of course Lavrov is aware that these elementary psychological processes and elementary phenomena of socialization of organic units have, in the earlier stages of organic evolution, primarily only a biological meaning, as the biological process remains in them the factor chiefly dominant. Still it is possible with more or less exactitude to ascertain here the presence of psycho-sociological phenomena. He concludes: "Perhaps in them [the organisms] there awakens a certain consciousness of likeness with other units with whom association proceeds. There appears an elementary consciousness of similar danger and of similar needs; but most probably there is a vague desire to be together, a vague pleasure of associated life."² Thus in the association of organisms, in "mutual service for mutual aid", lay the beginning of coöperation and of solidarity, for the most part apparently unconscious, but "which, afterwards, merges into consciousness".³

According to Lavrov solidarity arises in the lowest strata of the organic world, because of the response of nerve tissue to the impress of certain stimuli; it proceeds by receiving assistance and pleasure from association; association develops mutual aid and coöperation finally becomes a conscious solidarity.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 65. Compare the earlier statement of Giddings, "Principles of Sociology," 1896.

⁴ At this point a question as to the author's view of evolution and heredity may be raised. Lavrov is a Darwinian; the Spencerian

Transition from animal solidarity to human society. The animal ancestors of man, according to Lavrov, having evolved during their various stages the ability to work out concepts and their combinations, the capacity for sympathetic life, the power of reasoning along reflections and instincts, finally the disposition for associated life—have transferred this heritage to man. He says: "The transitional ape-like beings, the primate apes, which developed into man, brought to him all the treasures of psychic and sociological heritage of the preceding zoological world."¹ With man, however, solidarity took on new forms, and we will now attempt to outline Lavrov's theory of their successive stages.

The first form of human social solidarity was the metronymic family. "On the basis of the primitive metronymic family," says Lavrov, "was formulated the first extensive purely human group which was the matrilinear tribe."²

This earliest natural form of social solidarity, which had to some degree also existed among animals, received new and heretofore unknown reinforcement, which goes under the name of religion. This reinforcement the author looks upon as pathological in nature but nevertheless as tremendously important as a factor in the growth of social solidarity. He says:

The firm center of pretribal society appears to have been the

formula he thinks is too far-fetched and that it explains nothing. He says: "Each element of the organic world adapts itself to the environment and transmits the results to its progeny by way of heredity. . . . The law of heredity and the law of transformation under the influence of the struggle for existence practically explain all conditions or origin, existence and disappearance of forms of the organic world." *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹ *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 99.

² *Historical Letters*, p. 52.

group of nursing mothers who cared for their own children and those of the tribe who needed them. But now a phantastic world of apparitions arose before the imagination of man through a general interest in one and the same object. The sources of the phantastic phenomena kept the adolescent near his mother, who had greater knowledge and whose experience in life permitted her to interpret signs more correctly. She held in custody the amulets which warranted good luck and prevented failure. The belief in *magic* bound with a new and a powerful sympathy the members of the whole group who exercised the rite collectively.¹

This new achievement, unknown to the animal world, had aided strongly in the development of the tribal form of society. It was perpetuated by imitation and the consequent rise of *custom*. Our author calls custom "the tool of solidarity".² By its aid small groups of men were merged into more stable forms of association, more lasting than any previous form. Says Lavrov:

The kingdom of custom may present itself to us as the inevitable condition of primitive social life, and as the most undesirable environment for individual persons. . . . It may be hoped, however, that in a distant future custom will cease to govern man. But this can hardly be accomplished otherwise than by developing widely the habit of critical thought and a life lived according to conviction.³

It is the nature of custom to remain unchangeable. Nevertheless it is bound to change in consequence of alterations in environment and conditions of social life which lead to new adaptations. Lavrov says: "In consequence of an unconscious accumulation of small deviations in thinking and in life from previous generations, or of an unex-

¹ *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 170.

² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

pected inflow of people belonging to a different culture, customs change, but for each generation its new form remains an *ancient custom*.”¹ This unconscious change accounts for the various differentiations of social forms in tribal society, but all the changes have this in common, they are within the “kingdom” of custom and of real or of fictitious kinship. Lavrov views them all as belonging to the pre-historic stage, the transition from which is determined by the rise of critical thought, directing changes. The series of changes, however, does not follow a straight line. It proceeds rhythmically by means of compromise. “As soon as the principal demands of a protest are satisfied,” says Lavrov, “the mind manifests something like fatigue, and a disposition to remain on the new forms of culture just established by the protesting mind; these forms adopt more and more the characteristics of life according to custom.”² Thus a new epoch of adjustment to custom begins, again to be upset by protest and consequent compromise with the new order.

Historical forms of solidarity are those which show signs of the working of the critical mind. “The characteristic of the first period of historical life,” says Lavrov, “was the attempt to weave into one fabric all the elements of social life, cultural, political, economic, aesthetic, philosophical, religious, and later also moral and scientific.”³ Controlled by this desire early Greek philosophers sought to rid reason and life of all contradictions and to harmonize in aesthetic products all collective life, collective understandings and beliefs, collective ideals of morality and activities arising from conviction. Rome, following Greece, sought to unify the conflicts of the mind and the contradictions in life in

¹ *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, pp. 156-157.

² *Ibid.*, p. 183.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

an elaborate legal system. In the middle ages this task was undertaken by the church through her scholastic philosophy. After the Protestant revolt there arose political systems of unification to which especially England, France and Germany were subject, although at present it has spread all over the world. The development of class solidarity as seen in the rise of the bourgeoisie was a unifying factor, since it paved the way to democracy, the final stage in the evolution of conscious solidarity.

Throughout the long process of the evolution of society the social organism struggled for existence by establishing firm forms of solidarity. Through customs, conscious interests, general convictions, general ideas, solidarity was established, and in a degree harmonized with the conscious development of the individual. "In this continuous struggle," says Lavrov, "grew, grows and shall grow the conviction that for a successful combat the best tactics appear to be the development of a solidarity between critically minded and energetic individuals, and the spreading of this solidarity among all mankind."¹

Dynamic factors of Solidarity. We shall conclude Lavrov's theory of solidarity by pointing out the factors which seemed to him to produce changes in the forms and functions of the social organism. "Where then to look for the moving force of all the various changes?" asks Lavrov. He answers by pointing to two combinations of forces. "First," he tells us, are "*the interests of separate individuals.*" Second, is *the influence of social environment.* . . . The interaction of individuals and their social forms appears as one of the most vital elements of history.² Lavrov does not disregard the factor of geographic en-

¹ *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 42.

² *Problems in the Understanding of History*, p. 27.

vironment. He says: "for the realization of a strong and firm solidarity in human society the most directly stimulating cause was the struggle of man against a hostile physical environment. . . . In the struggle with these many enemies the brain of man early worked out inventions of thought, and created the more stable forms of social life."¹ However, geographical environment plays its part primarily and chiefly in the earlier stages of the evolution of society. Individual interests and social environment become conspicuous elements when society has entered upon its historic career. Lavrov presents two groups of interests which he thinks the principal moving forces in the evolution of social solidarity. He says: "Pleasure received from social life, the instinct of sexual approach, and parental attachment make up the first group; need of food, safety and nervous exhilaration are the second."

Besides these fundamental needs or interests there are also more or less temporary interests which are in part pathological, and interests of development (individuation); the latter two are but false efforts to satisfy the fundamental normal interests.² These interests are not equal in importance but form a kind of hierarchy, which, according to Lavrov, is as follows: At first we have an unconditional rule of custom, departures from which are accompanied by sickly nervous excitations; secondly, after this despotic sway of custom, those interests hold their own which in the continuous progress of events disclose economic bearing.

Finally, with the beginning of historic life, influences of nervous exhilaration of an idealistic nature begin to be felt. They enter the struggle cœvally with the pleasures of cus-

¹ *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 42.

² *Cf. Problems in the Understanding of History*, p. 40.

tomary life and also with the lower political and economic interests. Struggle is carried on in the name of ideal interests, conceived of as the highest influence of belief and conviction.¹

The second complex of moving forces in the evolution of social solidarity is found in the social environment. Lavrov regards *play* as of great importance. Play, like most social activities of man, goes back to the animal stage. "In the play of animals," says Lavrov, "we observe the preparatory development of a great number of future instincts absolutely necessary for mature beings."² Play stimulates and develops the aesthetic, religious and intellectual interests of the individual. Inventiveness and imitation are most common on the play-ground. Another social factor of great importance, first recognized by John Fiske, is the prolongation of the infancy of vertebrates which, "and a great variety of plays, were the precursors of the childhood of man."³ Youth and adolescence also are great forces in promoting social solidarity. Language, custom, and religion, are preparing the individual to enter larger units of solidarity.⁴

To summarize. Solidarity emerges in the lowest strata of organic life. Association, which is pleasurable to congregated organisms, is a means of further development of solidarity. Development is continuous in the struggle against common enemies and in coöperation for satisfying similar need. The solidarity of the animal world is unconscious and is raised gradually into consciousness with the transference of the social achievements of the animal world into the hu-

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 59.

² *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 109.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 437.

man group. The earliest form of human solidarity developed in the group of nursing mothers. It grew under newly arising religious ties of group magic, group customs, and group rites. The kingdom of custom and fictitious kinship were the strongest forces of solidarity in tribal society, which came into existence because of these forces and was maintained by them. The transition to historical or civil society was brought about by rational activity still reinforced largely by custom, progressing rhythmically by means of compromises between the new and the old. Greek philosophers, Roman jurists and medieval scholastics attempted to create a solidarity of the mind. In modern society solidarity is strengthened by statecraft and by democracy and emerges into prominence with the rise of the bourgeoisie. The forces that helped on these developments of solidarity were the interests of the individual and the influence of social and of geographic environment.

2. Lavrov's Theory of Individuality

In the preceding chapter we saw how social and political struggles in Russia were potent in bringing the strong individual to the forefront. Russian revolutionary socialism had throughout its history an individualistic aspect. Our author may be regarded as a typical "individualistic" socialist. He devotes all his mental abilities to justifying this rather paradoxical doctrine, and therefore in presenting his theory of individuality we reach to the very heart of Lavrov's sociological theorizing.

Individuality is the antithesis of social solidarity. It is, however, intrinsically related to it, which makes its consideration as a separate topic difficult. Of this our author is himself aware. He says: "When speaking of the individual, it is necessary to have in mind the social life; and

when speaking of society, individuals are inevitably in question. Nevertheless, the phenomena constituting the theory of individuality can easily be separated from those constituting the theory of society.”¹ It is clear that certain social phenomena are attributable to social and geographic environment, others to individual initiative, and others to the interaction of two or more factors. In the study of these complex phenomena, it is the problem of the theory of individuality to specify those “happenings of human activity which primarily issue from the independent individual as source”.²

Following his investigation to its earliest sources, Lavrov presents an important aspect of his theory of individuality in his study of the *genesis of the individual*. Thus he traces the individual back through the animal world and finds its source in the third fundamental phenomenon of organic life, *i. e.*, the need for nervous excitation which already manifests itself with the beginning of life,³ and which gradually increases with the growth in complexity of the organism. The earlier works of our author, especially “Before Man” and “Civilization and Savage Tribes”, are in part devoted to the study of animal psychology with a special emphasis upon the transitional stages in the development of the animal mind. Comparing the psychic life of invertebrates with that of the lower forms of vertebrates, Lavrov finds that among the latter it is possible to observe an increasing individual difference in submitting to instincts and habits. Furthermore, the vertebrates are better adapted

¹ *Sketches concerning Questions of Critical Philosophy*, p. 11.

² The first two being the need of food and of safety which are at the basis of the economic and political interests. Cf. *Problems in the Understanding of History*, p. 11.

³ Cf. *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 44.

for training and domestication, and finally, they show the ability to herd in cases of emergency under the temporary leadership of one of their kind.¹ All this, Lavrov concludes, shows not merely a quantitative but also a qualitative difference between vertebrates and invertebrates. "Activity of mind—this is the stage reached by mammals in their psychical evolution."² In observing the complex psychic activities of primates he thinks that more often similarities are met with among animals of various species in the lower stages of development than among the higher. He says:

In animal groups, the further development progresses, according to its degree, so much more these groups differentiate among themselves according to psychic type. In its highest product the diversity of evolution in both aspects extends to individuation of psychical complexes, approaching that which we meet with among highly developed human individuals.³

Lavrov differentiates the species of animals into types. "Within the different classes, families and species, there are worked out different groupings of psychic elements—these are different types of mind."⁴ His estimate of the animal's psychic functioning is high. He sees in it almost all the characteristics which are necessary for the development of the individual.

Summing up his investigations of the animal world, Lavrov says:

The preparation of man as a reasoning and social animal in the zoological world may present itself to us in the following

¹ Cf. *Memoirs of the Fatherland*, 1870, pp. 68-80.

² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³ *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 59.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

manner: We may acknowledge that the elements into which psychology differentiates the psychic activity of man have in all probability entirely similar analogies among animals. *Differentiation* lies here at the basis of the psychic life; *perception* moulds itself out of elementary undifferentiated psychic acts; concepts begin to form, also *images* and in some cases *understanding*; motives of activity appear first in the form of unconscious *reflexes*, and afterwards in a form of instinctive activity partly conscious but not sufficiently so to aim at a general end, and only later taking on the character of rational activity which is prompted by inner stimuli of sympathy, or by motives of gain, to the point of passion. There are also motives approaching *aesthetic* feelings with an aim to decorate. Finally there are signs of religious and of moral possibilities.¹

This psychical superstructure is based upon the biological principle: that the higher the animal species the less is division of labor in the social organism conditioned by physiological peculiarities of the individual, as this, for example, is observable among ants. On the other hand, the higher the animal species the less the individual is able passively and willingly to yield to society and to the existing order. Thus, according to Lavrov, the human individual, in both his biological and his psychical characteristics, was well prepared within the animal world and he continues the struggle for individuality within the group which has produced him.

The Individual a Product of the Group

Our author is well aware of the intrinsic relation which exists between the individual and the group. He says:

¹*Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 93. Compare this array of the psychic traits of animals with the analysis of animal nature made by Professor Thorndike of Columbia University. See *The Animal Mind*.

Conscious individuals are nothing else but products of social processes, conditioned in all their acts by intellectual and affective life and by the order and life of that collective organism of which they are a part. In the separate individual is vested the life of society. No one individual can receive motives, knowledge, habits of thought and life, either as ends or as means, except in and through that society in which the individual developed and continues to live, and whose product he himself is.¹

The Historical Functionings of the Individual

The frank admission of the social dependence of the individual does not however mean to Lavrov that the historical functioning of the individual is *nil*. On the contrary, he asserts that, "in the functioning of the social aggregate the real is but the individual."² In history the first place must be allotted to conscious influences. The relative importance of these is determined by their scale or by the gradation which they hold in consciousness. Our author asks, therefore, "According to this consciousness, what processes are of predominant influence upon the genesis of events?"³ His answer is that there are three groups of processes. One emanates unconsciously from the physical and psychical constitution of man. The second is obtained by the individual, also unconsciously, from the contemporary or ancestral social environment by way of habits, traditions, customs, established laws, and political regulations, making up what may be called the general cultural form.⁴ Thirdly and finally, there are interests and

¹ *Problems in the Understanding of History*, p. 115.

² *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³ *Historical Letters*, p. 32.

⁴ The author defines culture as: "That combination of social forms and psychical activities which . . . manifests a tendency to transmit itself from one generation to another as something unalterable." *Problems in the Understanding of History*, p. 26.

inclinations that are completely conscious and which seem to form themselves independently of outside pressure and appear to be self-willed products of consciousness. They become especially powerful because they contain a new social force, "the motive from the inevitable logical conclusion".¹

Hence *the individual is a social force* which plays a rôle in history. This rôle is achieved only with his ability to view things critically. "Without criticism," says Lavrov, "there is no development; without criticism there is no perfection; without criticism of one's environment man would never have progressed beyond the animal stage."²

With the awakening of critical thought, humanity enters upon a new historical epoch. "The development of critical thought in man is the condition of understanding both the problem of solidarity and the problem of the development of the individual; and it formulates the problem of progress by harmonizing the two."³

"Upon the individuals who are enlightened rests the responsibility for disseminating knowledge and culture for the benefit of the majority, so making possible their own individuation and culture."⁴

This categorical imperative of the enlightened minority towards the majority, the author explains upon utilitarian grounds. There is pleasure in respect of one's own development, "which remains the basis of human morality and which exists only where self-respect exists".⁵

¹ Cf. *Problems in the Understanding of History*, p. 55.

² *Three Discussions on the Contemporary Importance of Philosophy*, p. 55.

³ *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 370.

⁴ Cf. *Historical Letters*, pp. 90 et seq.

⁵ *Sketches Concerning Questions of Critical Philosophy*, 1860, p. 31.

The utilitarian interests of the individual have not of course always been ideal. More often the impelling force has been personal greed, nevertheless its influence often has been beneficent.

The individual and social forms

The developing individual, critical of all social forms, applied to family ties as well as to political unions his analytical faculties. None of the social forms proved sufficiently powerful to withstand on the one hand the greed of egotism or on the other the enlightening grasp of high ideal interests: high as compared with the narrow interests of the family and the mechanical ties of the state. He says:

The diversion of the powers of the state to the interests of particular individuals or groups, undermined the solidarity of the state. But the conflict arising from exploitation was developing in the individual a more sharply defined consciousness of his relation to the state. In accord with his egotistic interests he understood that the enlightened individual has to view the forms and functions of the state not as elements of progress but as a means for attaining ends apart from the interests of the state.¹

With the growth of the critical intellect the group became conscious of the difference between the social organism and the mechanism of the state, thus paving the way for democracy.²

The conclusion of the author is that:

Individualism does not always appear to be a progressive factor, since it has too often undermined solidarity in the interest of a class. On the other hand, it should not be regarded as only a regressive factor, since almost all achievements of conscious processes have been attained under its influence.

¹ *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, p. 272.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 273.

Everywhere and always it has been one of the most powerful of dynamic forces.¹

Thus the critical reasoning individual may be a disintegrating force destroying existing social forms, initiating and organizing new ones. He is a variant from the norm, the nucleus about which, under favorable conditions, a new type group is formed.

Lavrov shows himself aware that his theory could be attacked by those defending historical determinism, and states his relation to the determinists' position. He does not deny the existence of determinism in the world, and therefore the individual who sets before himself some desirable end must do so in harmony with the inevitable and the immovable. His end can be attained only by the use of the determined as a tool. There are eventualities which will follow without individual effort, but again there are occasions where individual initiative is imperative. The agent of historical determinism is the force of thought and the energy of volition as shown by the individual.²

Summing up Lavrov's theory of individuality we find that individuation in the lower forms of life was physiological. Developing with the psychic processes, it becomes in man relatively rational and self-purposive. The individual, although a product of the group, reacts upon the group, disintegrating old forms and preparing for the formation of new types which survive because they are adopted by the group. The individual's freedom, although important as a working force, is conditioned by the comparatively unchangeable order of the historic process.

The theses of Lavrov's sociology are: Solidarity and its antithesis, Individuality; and the synthesis of these two op-

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 231.

² Cf. *Problems in the Understanding of History*, pp. 120 et seq.

posites is the whole subject-matter of his theory of progress, to a consideration of which we shall now proceed.

Lavrov's Theory of Progress

Lavrov views the theory of progress as "an application of natural laws of ethical development to the problems of sociology as they present themselves in their historical development".¹ Progress is not necessarily a continuous movement. "Necessary is only an evaluation of the historical movements from the point of view of progress as a final end."²

A theory of progress presents therefore two problems, a theoretical and a practical one. The participation in the struggle for progress appears to be a moral obligation of the individual who has grasped the meaning of it. This requires a program of action and a theory of ends to be attained. "A theory appears to underly the practice of progress as a natural process and as a real historical phenomenon, namely the application of the theory to that social order and to that social environment which calls the agent of progress to its practical activity."³

In what has progress consisted, and in what could it consist, in the history of mankind? This query Lavrov answers by saying:

The theory of progress presents three questions which have to be put in the following order: (1) On the basis of contemporary data of biology, psychology and sociology, in what could progress consist in human society? (2) On the basis of classified and investigated historical material, in what have consisted the various phases of historical

¹ *Historical Letters*, p. 294.

² *Ibid.*, p. 296.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

progress? (3) On the basis of society sufficiently near to be observable by us, on the basis of the various existing groups of rational activity, taking also into consideration the historical origin of the contemporary order and the principal phenomena of progress in history, in what does a social progress possible for our time consist?¹

The achievement of progress, obligatory upon every enlightened individual will depend upon the answers given to these three queries.

In order to answer the question, in what *could* progress consist, it becomes necessary first of all to define the nature of progress. Lavrov believes that there are two processes which constitute the factors of progress, that they seem to oppose each other, and that in history have often done so. He says:

Before us is the growth of personal thought, with its technical inventions, with its scientific achievements, with its philosophical constructions, with its creations of art and with its moral heroism. Before us also is the solidarity of society with its principal incitement, "each for all and all for each" to all the necessities of life and development, from each one all his strength for the work of social benefits, for social good, for social development.²

If, then, the process of conscious individuation is a factor of progress, conditions favoring further individuation ought to be socially approved. On the other hand, strong social ties are necessary to the welfare of the individuals that compose the group. Therefore whatever furthers social solidarity is also a factor of progress. Society will be ideal when its units have like interests and like

¹ *Historical Letters*, p. 332.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 332-333.

convictions, live under equal conditions of culture, exclude as far as possible all disturbing elements and forbid all modes of the struggle for existence among themselves.

Picturing thus the two phases of society, Lavrov inquires whether individuation may not be possible without the exploitation of the group and whether the enlightened minority has a right to live at the expense of the majority. His answer is that,

the truly progressive development of individual thought is realized only when the development is directed towards a consciousness of solidarity between the more developed individuals and the less developed groups, and is directed also towards an alteration of social relations favorable to the lessening of inequalities in the development of members of a homogeneous society. The true development of the individual can take place only in a developed group of men, under the interaction of the social elements. . . . In a healthy aggregate, individuals develop at the expense of other individuals by means of an active coöperation of all those who are themselves on the path of development.¹

"Facts of history," says Lavrov, "show that there are no uncompromising contradictions between a strong social bond and a strong mental activity within society, and that individual thought can work constructively . . . in the direction of solidarity between the developed individual and society."² Progress, therefore, is possible only when "into the convictions of the individual in a developed minority there enters the consciousness that his interests are identical with the interests of the majority in the name of the durability of the social order."³ On the basis of these require-

¹ *Historical Letters*, p. 335.

² *Ibid.*, p. 336.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

ments, progress becomes "the growth of social consciousness, in so far as it leads to the strengthening and widening of social solidarity; and it is a strengthening and widening of social solidarity, in so far as it rests upon the growth of the social consciousness."¹

The agent of progress is the developing individual upon whom progress depends. The individual discovering the laws of solidarity applies them to his environment and reshapes that environment according to his ideal. Throughout history the enlightened minority has done little to advance progress. It has used its superiority primarily for selfish ends. But the few who have lent themselves to the welfare of the group have done so everywhere with due attention to local interests, following these general practices:

. . . changing the forms of distribution of social forces, especially the forms of distribution of wealth, in harmony with existing conditions of production and exchange; utilizing existing customs and legal forms of social organization; taking into consideration different existing conquests of scientific thought, the structures of philosophic thought, the types of thought in art and the ideals of moral thought; accomplishing these changes in the direction of the greatest strengthening and widening of social solidarity and of the largest growth of social consciousness; finally strengthening the accomplished changes by political forms in better harmony with the accomplished change, strengthening them with those ideal products of science, philosophy and art which best justify the change, and incarnating into actual life those moral ideals which correspond to the respective healthy needs of man.²

The author assures us that only in this wise could progress have been possible in human society. From this viewpoint he asks the next question: In what do the real phases of

¹ *Historical Letters*, p. 339.

² *Ibid.*, p. 350.

historical progress actually consist? The answer to this question is found in the history of civilizations, whose problem it is "to show how the critical thought of the individual transforms the culture of societies, by striving to carry into their civilizations truth and justice."¹ This problem our author attempts to solve in his great work, "The Principal Epochs in the History of Thought". Here he searches through the wide range from animal and primitive tribal society to present industrial society and the rise of democracy. He shows how, out of the zoological and prehistoric periods man emerged as a reasoning being, but conditioned in his activities by strong custom, whose roots were deep in animal instincts. He was a being for whom no solidarity and no individuation could exist as conscious motive. But presently on the basis of individualism and of conscious interest in events which themselves were more or less conditioned by a conscious grasp of interests, there developed a hierarchy of life's ends which called forth a further development of them but was checked by a lack of motives to stimulate struggle against survival from the world of established custom, and against occasional fads or modes. As one of these historical forces predominated, so was one or the other of the forms of development conditioned. Solidarity was confined to particular groups. Universal solidarity has met less favorable conditions in civil societies than in the period of the kingdom of custom; the animosity of group with group grows deeper with the efforts of each to strengthen its own inner solidarity. New historical periods have begun within small groups of intellectuals, which have desired their own development. These groups have worked out critical thought, and their first product has been two new historical forces: first, a personal conviction as a product

¹ *Historical Letters*, p. 352.

of the development of the individual in the direction of service to ideal and not to egotistical interests; and second, a universalistic conception of the unity of mankind. The group of critically intellectual people has been, and probably will remain, relatively small. The majority will still be directed by its selfish aspirations, by habit and by the mode. The elite group will be large and strong enough to become an example to be imitated and thus to create the mode which all will want to attain to, and the intellectual class that all will wish to belong to.¹

Lavrov is thus brought to the third practical question, namely: In what consists the social progress possible for our time? To this he gives no definite answer, believing that not books but experiences of life have here to decide. However, from his wide range of writings upon practical questions, one may infer that the principal task is to achieve a reconstruction of the existing economic order and political forms according to the socialist program. Also, philosophical systems, types of art and ideals of morality must be construed so as severally to lend their assistance.

Lavrov called himself a socialist, but he was not a Marxist. Although holding the economic factor an important one, he was no economic determinist. His socialism was based upon ethical considerations rising out of his social imperative.²

We have seen that Lavrov expects from the sociologist a formula of progress; from the historian he demands to know how far the ideal has been realized; and from the enlightened individual and the social reformer, he demands changes in society to bring it closer to the goal established by sociology.

¹ Cf. *Principal Epochs in the History of Thought*, pp. 995 et seq.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 108.

To recapitulate tersely: Lavrov sees social progress in the development and strengthening of solidarity, so far as it does not hinder conscious processes and motives in the rational activity of individuals. Again, social progress consists, in like manner, in the continuous development of the conscious processes and rational activities of individuals, so far as it does not hinder the development and the strengthening of solidarity among the largest possible number of individuals. Therefore, *progress is a harmonizing and synthesizing of the social forces of solidarity and individuality.*

In estimating Lavrov as a sociologist, one must credit him with contributions which before or after him were or have been made independently by others, preëminently by American sociologists. Lavrov's system shows the influence of Kant, Hegel, Comte, Proudhon, Buckle, Darwin, Spencer and Marx. Lavrov applied Kant's criticism, which lacked historical background, to Comte's positivism, which was historical but lacked the criticism that was valuable in Kant. Darwin's and Spencer's evolutionism he sought to reconcile with the historicism of Comte, Hegel, Buckle and others. He has hardly succeeded in accomplishing an altogether satisfactory synthesis; especially is he weak in the epistemological formulation of his premises. Still to him belongs the honor of having been among the first to attempt this synthesis, which since has quite generally been attempted by others. He was also among the first to show the fallacies and inadequacies of biological analogy in sociology and to seek to base sociology upon psychology and ethics.

Thus Lavrov adopts a social imperative which reminds one of Kant's formulations, although he tried to strip it of its idealistic premises.¹ His emphasis upon the criti-

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 27.

cally-minded individual as a social power and as the creator of new types and standards was strongly resented by his contemporaries, because of his unfortunate use of such terms as "subjective method" and "subjective point of view". Still he did not mean by these anything more than Professor Lester F. Ward meant by the term "anthropoteleological method". With all his merits as an independent thinker and tireless investigator, Lavrov was a child of his time. His early philosophical training was Hegelian, and the Hegelian scheme of trilogy is easily discernible in all of Lavrov's works. His sociological concepts are three: "Solidarity" is the thesis, "Individuality" is the antithesis, and "Social Progress" is the synthesis of the former two. It is interesting to note in passing that his critically-minded individuals as agents of social progress are those young Russian revolutionists who made up his following.¹

Lavrov's sociology is truly Russian, because it was stimulated and conditioned by the social and political movements in the Russia of his day. Its purpose was to justify the progressive elements of Russia in their struggle against autocracy, and also to supply his followers with a program which was scientifically sound. Apart from these tractarian tendencies, there is much of lasting value in Lavrov's work, which ought to find its deserved recognition.

¹ A faction of the Russian revolutionary propagandists named themselves "Lavrovtsy", *i. e.*, Lavrov Followers, and were in opposition to the anarchistic Bakunists and also to those Marxists who resented the subjective view.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF N. K. MIKHALOVSKY

WHAT might be called the "Sturm und Drang" period of Russian history called into life the Russian subjectivist school of sociology. To Lavrov, as we have seen, belongs the honor of priority in this school. The writings of Mikhailovsky,¹ one of Lavrov's contemporaries are not less important and have had a wider circulation. He is one of the few Russians who may be credited with having developed a sociological system of his own—a system which has not heretofore, been brought under the covers of one specific sociological work, but which must be collected and deduced from his miscellaneous writings. This chapter is an attempt to make the social-philosophy of Mikhailovsky accessible to the student of sociology.

Mikhailovsky was recognized and generally feared as a critic and publicist. For almost half a century he followed this dangerous profession without meeting the fate of his less fortunate colleagues, Chernishevsky, Lavrov, Kropotkin, and many others who were exiled. Because of this con-

¹ Nikalai Konstantinovitch Mikhailovsky (1842-1904) received his education at the St. Petersburg School of Mines. As early as 1860 he began his literary career, contributing to many of the principal periodicals published in the Russian capital, such as the "Otechestvennyie Zapiski" and the "Russkoye Bogatstvo." He enjoyed unprecedented popularity, which he successfully maintained to the end of his days. His sociological and ethical theories shaped the thinking of his generation in Russia, and he was generally acknowledged the leader of its populist movement. His writings have an encyclopedic range, filling, in the most recent edition, ten large, double-column volumes.

stant danger, Mikhalovsky developed the art of expressing his opinions in an indirect way. Thus his own sociological theories are to be found in essays analyzing and criticizing the theories of Darwin, Spencer, Comte, Mill, and others. In common with other writers of the subjectivist school of Russian sociology, Mikhalovsky held that the struggle for individuality was of the greatest importance.

Mikhalovsky's Philosophical and Methodological Pre-suppositions

Philosophically, Mikhalovsky is a radical positivist and an empiricist. He follows Hume as corrected by Mill. Comte also influenced his thinking. Mikhalovsky says: "With both factions of Comte's disciples I agree in acknowledging the principle postulates of positivism in regard to the limits of the knowable."¹

While rejecting every imperative, whether it be Kant's, Lavrov's, or any one else's, Mikhalovsky nevertheless believes in the necessity of a strictly ethical relation among social phenomena. In fact, he believes this to be his principal problem: the reconciliation of the abstract truth with concrete truth, *i. e.* with truth socially evaluated. He says: "I have never been able to believe it impossible to find a view wherein abstract truth and concrete justice could go together supplementing each the other."² Elsewhere he says:

This system of reconciliation between the abstract good and the concrete good, requires a principle that not only may serve as the directing factor in the study of the objective

¹ Mikhalovsky, *Works*, iii ed., vol. iv, p. 99.

² Vol. I, p. v. The Russians have two words to express the concept truth. *Istina* is abstract truth in the absolute sense, *pravda* is applied truth in the sense of justice. Mikhalovsky makes use of the expressions, *pravda istina* and *pravda spravedlivost*.

world, thereby answering the scientific questions that naturally arise in every man; and as a directing factor in practical activity, thereby answering queries of conscience and of ethical evaluation, which also naturally arise in every man; but which also must finally accomplish these things with such power that the proselyte must strive with religious zeal towards that end which the principle of the system reveals as true happiness.¹

This system which he calls the *pravda* system gives but little space to the epistemological aspect of phenomena. Like Spencer, Mikhalovsky is agnostic about the nature of things. His *pravda* system he applies principally to social and ethical phenomena and he postulates as the final criterion of judgment the individual and his interests. He says:

In all political questions you must make the focus of your reasoning not the interests of the nation, not the government, not the commune, not the province, not the federation, but the individual. The individual is the center from which the rays of truth will interpret to you the meaning of that or any other social bond. You will not get confused by the historic kaleidoscope if you will remember that all psychic processes take place within the individual and only within the individual. Only the individual receives impressions, perceives, thinks, feels, suffers, and enjoys.²

He maintains that all mental processes take place within the individual, but recognizes that the individual is limited on the one hand by nature and on the other by the historic trend of things. "It is generally acknowledged that man can attain only to relative truth. He attains to the elements of truth through the medium of his five senses; had he less or more, the truth would appear differently to him."³ How-

¹ Mikhalovsky, *Works*, St. Petersburg, 1896, vol. iv, p. 405.

² *Ibid.*, p. 460.

³ *Idem.*

ever, this relative truth possesses in practical life an absolute value because it fills the compass of man's possible attainment. In addition to these natural limitations, peculiar social limitations are added by the historical trend of things. "Tell me," says Mikhalovsky, "what are your social bonds and I will tell you how you look at things."¹ Dismissing absolute truth as unknowable, he strives nevertheless for what he calls human truth. He says: "Truth is that which satisfies the mental cravings of man."² Thus it seems clear that the basis of his *pravda-system* is the human individual.

The Methods of Sociology.

Mikhalovsky's sociological method grew out of his philosophy. "Is it," he asks, "scientifically commendable to eliminate the teleological aspect from sociology? Can the objective method alone give sociology sufficient results?"³ His view is that elimination of the teleological idea would silence talk about "progress" and that there would be no distinction then between development and disintegration.⁴ A purely objective attitude seems impossible and undesirable. When the nature of phenomena permits of an examination of the whole process subject to investigation, by any man who has sufficient information, the objective method is used; but where for the verification of the investigation, besides the objective facts an evaluation of facts is needed, the subjective method must be used.⁵ Besides this Mikhalovsky believes that the very nature of man renders an unbiased attitude towards facts impossible.

¹ Mikhalovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

² *Cf.* vol. iii, pp. 330-354.

³ Vol. i, p. 55.

⁴ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 132.

⁵ *Cf.* vol. iii, p. 401.

Previous experience, whether conscious or unconscious, and the moral character of the investigator inevitably determine his judgment.

Thus Mikhalovsky approaches the study of social phenomena in much the same way that Lavrov did. The criticisms brought against Lavrov's methods apply therefore to those of Mikhalovsky.

Mikhalovsky rejects the principles of analogy in the study of social phenomena; he considers them misleading. However he reserves the right of comparison of social phenomena with certain biological phenomena because of the many points of contact existing between sociology and biology.¹

The Province of Sociology and its Relation to the Sciences

Sociology was to Mikhalovsky the science of the laws of intra- and inter-group relations and of the relations between group and individual. He says: "Sociology can never persist unless its object becomes the discovery and modification of the laws of inter-relation among the various forms of group life, and the relations of these forms to the human individual."² He accepts Comte's classification of the sciences which he regards as one of the greatest philosophical contributions of all time.³ But he differs from Comte in viewing psychology as an independent science, building his sociology largely upon its principles.

Social phenomena, he maintains, are governed by specific laws. This however does not mean that sociology is unrelated to other sciences.

Sociology as well as biology deals with the struggle for existence. It points out for us the direction the struggle takes

¹ Cf. vol. i, p. 378.

² Vol. vi, p. 299.

³ Cf. vol. iv, p. 99.

under the influence of coöperation. If several types of co-operation co-exist, the relation of one to the other, as well as their combined influence should be studied. The sociologist observes these influences not only in human society, but also in animal societies.¹

Thus sociology not only receives from other sciences but in turn contributes to them; for example, the sociological analysis of the laws of coöperation aided in the understanding of changes in the biological structure of animal organisms.

Statistics are indispensable to sociology. But because of the insufficiency of material obtainable under existing methods, they are far from satisfactory. Mikhalovsky significantly warns his readers that "if the statistician forgets that his laws are but empirical laws applicable only to those conditions of time and place whence they have been deduced, an unjustifiably fatalistic attitude of mind will be produced because of the meagerness and limitation of the facts obtained as a basis for the laws."² Statistical conclusions, because constituting a purely inductive process, ought to be supplemented, Mikhalovsky thinks, by deductive methods to such extent as the complexity of the social phenomena may require.

With these philosophical and methodological presuppositions well in mind we may now proceed to an analysis of Mikhalovsky's principal thesis, to which all his other sociological writings are subordinated. An exhaustive examination of his many writings results in the following analysis of Mikhalovsky's Theory of Sociology, which may be considered under the general heading of :

¹ Vol. i, p. 381.

² *Ibid.*, p. 374.

The Theory of the Struggle for Individuality

1. The relation of the Spencerian and Darwinian theories of evolution to the theory of the struggle for individuality.

2. The biological aspect of the theory of the struggle for individuality.

3. The psychological aspect of the theory of the struggle for individuality.

(1) The individuating process and the functions of the hero and of the mob.

(2) The individuating process and the function of love.

(3) The individuating process and the function of religion.

(4) The individuating process and the functions of libertinism and asceticism.

4. The economic aspect of the theory of the struggle for individuality.

(1) The individuating process and the functioning of division of labor.

(2) The individuating process and the functioning of Russian economic institutions.

5. The historical aspect of the theory of the struggle for individuality.

1. *The Theory of the Struggle for Individuality in its Relation to the Spencerian and Darwinian Theories of Evolution.*

Mikhailovsky began his sociological theorizing by a critical analysis of the Spencerian theory of evolution as applied to social phenomena.¹ He denies the validity of Spencer's law of evolution especially as applied to the evolution of society. He says, "Spencer's two fundamental laws (of

¹This work is entitled, *What is Progress?* It appeared in 1869 and is placed in vol. i of his collected works. It is also to be had in French translation.

integration and of differentiation) are not sufficient to explain evolution as a transition from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Therefore the generalization of Spencer does not work out in the field of experience, it does not formulate any general and evident fact which can be taken as a cause for evolution.”¹ Again, he believes Spencer’s theory to be inconsistent in its relation to the individual and to society. “Spencer,” he continues, “who likes to escape the teleological meaning of progress, had nevertheless to admit in his course of observation the necessity of evaluating the individual and the group.”² Spencer’s theory, however, at its best shows but the continuity of change without regard to human happiness as an end. If society as an ideal unit, develops like an organism from a homogeneous state to a heterogeneous, from the simple to the complex, “What,” asks he, “happens at the same time to the actual individual,—the member of society? Does he experience the same process of development as the type of organic progress?”³ Mikhalovsky points out that according to the Spencerian formula the differentiation of society is possible only at the expense of the individual. While society is advancing from homogeneity to heterogeneity the indivisible parts composing the social organism have changed from heterogeneity to homogeneity. Thus, for example, the savage man utilizes all his faculties, mental and physical, but this is not the case in a society which is based upon minute division of labor. Primitive man as a member of a homogeneous society is a complete individual, an individual in which the mental and physical aspects are in mutual harmony. Mikhalovsky concludes:

In the homogeneous mass of primitive society the indivisible

¹ Vol. i, p. 29.

² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³ *Idem.*

units of society were heterogeneous in so far as this was possible under the given condition of time and place. They were complete bearers of their culture; but with the transition of society from the homogeneous and complex began the destruction of unity of particular individuals and their transition from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous.¹

The idea of a social organism he held to be not only fictitious in principle but also impossible of practical realization. "In an organism," he says, "the whole, not the parts, is suffering or enjoying itself; in society, on the contrary, only its parts are conscious, therefore there is no similarity between society and organism."² Accordingly: "Society is not an organism, but a coördination of indivisible organisms. It consists not of organs specially predetermined for one or another function, but of indivisibles, which have all organs and therefore execute the sum of functions."³ Mikhalovsky believed that if society could be reduced to an organism it would be its destruction. He says: "If in the struggle for existence society becomes an organism, it, like all organisms, must be limited as to the length of its life. Its doom is inevitable. But if individuality conquers, society does not become an organism, and thus it does become practically immortal."⁴ Mikhalovsky does not deny that society is changing like a physical organism, but he asserts that the indivisible parts of society are changing in a direction opposite to that of a physical organism. The differentiation of indivisibles (i. e. men) and the differentiation of organs in a physical organism were brought by Spencer and his school under a common denominator. Mikhalovsky, on the contrary, regards

¹ Vol. i, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³ *Idem.*

⁴ Vol. i, p. 573.

them as mutually exclusive phenomena to be in eternal and inevitable antagonism.¹ This opinion of Mikhailovsky was to become the cardinal factor in his whole theory of the struggle for individuality.

Dismissing Spencer's theory of evolution on the basis of this criticism, he proceeds to substitute another formula of evolution, or progress. This reads as follows:

Progress is the gradual approach toward integrality of the indivisibles, and thus to the sub-divided and re-divided division of labor among men. Whatever retards this movement is immoral, or unjust, or harmful, or unwise. Whatever diminishes the heterogeneity of society is moral, or just, or wise, or useful, nothing else: this same act is increasing also the heterogeneity of the separate members.²

Like many other Russian thinkers he disliked Darwinism because of its anti-democratic and plutocratic interpretation by the bourgeoisie of Western Europe.³

The principles of differentiation, of variation by means of adaptation, and of competition, or struggle, are frequently carried over from the realm of biology, as interpreted by Darwin, into the realm of sociology. Mikhailovsky resents the practice, thinking it an arbitrary use of biological laws in sociology. He attempts to show that the principle of adaptation is not necessarily a progressive phenomenon within the limits of differentiation, because "adaptation always helps the practical type at the expense

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 149.

² *Ibid.*, p. 150. For a more detailed comment upon this formula, cf. the next section on the biological aspect of the theory of the struggle for individuality.

³ Cf. his essays on "Darwinism and Liberalism," *Works*, vol. i. By "Darwinism," he meant the carrying over of the principles of natural selection into the human sphere. He did not depreciate Darwin's contribution to the explanation of the origin of species.

of the ideal type.”¹ He illustrates his thought by showing how a species may change for the purpose of survival.

Let the formula $(a+b+c+\dots m)$, $a, b, c, \dots m$ signifying characteristics peculiar to the species, represent the life of a certain species. If, by transition of this species into some new type the relation of its organs and characteristics remains the same, and they merely differentiate and become more complicated without changing their former relation, the result is $(a+b+c+\dots m)^n$ and innumerable other changes are possible in the formula of life. They all amount to this, that the species adapting itself to new conditions of life, loses some former characteristic of its organization and develops others, thus possibly simplifying itself rather than becoming more highly differentiated. Thus the formula $(a+b+c+\dots+m)$

$\xrightarrow{n}$

may change to the formula $\sqrt[n]{a+b+c+\dots+m}$.²

This illustrates Mikhalovsky's contention against the principles of Darwinism. Adaptation intensifies the physiological division of labor by differentiating organs for special functioning. In this manner organized matter is pushed further towards complexity. Under its influence the sum of forces and the capacities of the indivisibles grow continually. Heredity, according to Darwinian sociology, is the static factor, the inertia of society; while adaptation and survival are the dynamic factors of society.

Mikhalovsky rejects this view as lacking a progressive element because it does not consider the best as the fittest. He says: "Darwinism presents in itself the latest revised and supplemented edition of utilitarianism."³ "When converted into a sociological doctrine Darwinism," he continues, "only substitutes for the word 'species'—

¹ Vol. i, p. 289.

² *Ibid.*, p. 257.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

'society'; for the term 'differentiation of characteristics' — 'division of labor,' for the slogan 'struggle for existence' — 'competition.'"¹ Worst of all, this view of progress disregards the interest of the individual. Mikhalovsky says:

Understand, then, that in such a progress the individual regresses. If we contemplate only this aspect of the matter society is the greatest, the nearest and the worst enemy of man, against which at all times he must be on guard. Society strives to transform the individual into a mere organ of itself.²

This danger is, however, not as great as some think. Mikhalovsky calls attention to the fact that man is not necessarily subject to the laws of natural selection. Although he has his natural limitations, nevertheless artificial selection strives to outrun natural selection. He says:

The natural trend of things exists only when and where there is no human being, because man by each step, even by the simplest operations of life modifies his environment and changes in one way or another the existing combination of forces . . . man brings with himself a new force into the world, which, like all other force complexes presents a certain coördination of the principal forces of nature, and also, like all other forces, strives to control all nature.³

Mikhalovsky's critique of the evolutionary doctrines of Spencer and Darwin and his formula of social progress reveal his purpose to rescue the individual from the degrading encroachments of social control. To obtain a highly complex and differentiated society both without sacrifice of the individual's own complexity and with the raising of the individual to the highest possible power, this was the problem Mikhalovsky set himself.

¹ Vol. i, p. 295.

² *Ibid.*, p. 461.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 329, 331.

2. *The Biological Aspect of the Theory of the Struggle for Individuality*

Mikhalovsky although sternly critical of the biological school of sociology could not break away from the Comtian precedent of rearing the structure of sociological theory upon biological foundations. He therefore makes a study of biological forms of individualities, starting from the principles of Karl Baer and Ernst Haeckel. Baer maintained that the perfection of the organism varies directly as the degree of its complexity; as the high or low differentiation of organs and structure in morphological relations; as the physiological division of labor; and as the coördination of functions (physiologically considered).¹ This same idea was present in the doctrines of other biologists but was completely developed by Ernst Haeckel in his tectological studies. He worked out a sixfold classification of biological individualities² which Mikhalovsky follows, applying it to the social relations of the human in-

¹ Cf. vol. i, p. 228.

² These we give in the original from Haeckel's works:

"I. *Plastiden* (Cytoden und Zellen) oder Elementarorganismen."

II. *Organe* oder Idorgane, Zellenstöcke oder Zellfusionen, einfache oder homoplastische Organe, zusammengesetzte oder heteroplastische Organe, Organsysteme, Organapparate).

III. *Antimeren* (Gegenstücke oder homotype Teile). "Strahlen" der Strahltiere, "Hälften" der endipleuren (bilateralsymmetrischen) Tiere, etc.

IV. *Metameren* (Folgestücke oder homodyname Teile). "Stengelglieder" der Phoresogamen, "Segmente," Ringe oder Zoniten der Gliedertiere, Wirbelsegmente der Wirbeltiere, etc.

V. *Personen* (Prosopon) Sprosse oder gemmae der Pflanzen und Coelenteraten usw. "Individuen" in engsten Sinne bei den höheren Tieren (Später als Histonalen zusammengefasst).

VI. *Cormen* (Stöcke oder Kolonien). Bäume, Sträucher, etc. (Zusammengesetzte Pflanzen). Salpenketten, Polypenstöcke, etc." Haeckel, "Prinzipien der Generellen Morphologie." Edition of 1906, p. 106. Cf. Mikhalovsky, *Works*, vol. ii, p. 346.

dividual. In determining the mutual relations of these biological individualities our author sent forth the following argument: The higher the stage of organic individuality the more firmly are the cells held together. Among the higher animals cells insignificant in number are utilized in the formation of physiological individuality and strive to adapt themselves to independent functioning within the organism. The organic individuality, named by Haeckel *Plastide*, is high or higher in proportion to the quantity of plasmic molecules composing it; it is high also in proportion to the complexity of the atomic compositions of these molecules; again the more the molecules are dependent upon one another and also upon the whole *Plastide*, and finally the more the *Plastide* is centralized and independent of a higher individuality, the organism is individual. The individualities which Haeckel calls *Personen* or Individuals are more perfect in the degree that they are more differentiated in their organic and histological structure, and in the functions of their integral parts, and the more these parts are dependent upon one another and also upon the whole, and finally the more centralized and independent the individual itself is in its relation to the next higher individuality—the colony. The last individuality, which Haeckel calls *Cormen* or colony, is more perfect the more heterogeneous are the individuals, the organs and the tissue composing it; and the more independent the five previous individualities (i. e. the *Plastide*, *Organe*, *Antimeren*, *Metameren*, *Personen*),¹ are the more they all are dependent upon the whole colony, and the more the colony itself is centralized.² In brief each individuality strives towards greater and greater complexity, but this complexity can be attained only at the expense of lower

¹ Cf. last foot-note.

² Cf. Mikhalovsky, *Works*, vol. ii, p. 351.

individualities. Thus conflict in the process of evolution is inevitable. Each individuality contends with its neighboring individualities which it tries to subdue. Says Mikhalovsky:

The history of life with all its diversity, with its beauty and its ugliness, consists in a succession of victories and of defeats. The struggle is waged with alternating fortunes; either one or another of the stages of individuality is victorious. But the struggle never ceases . . . Man, as an individual presents by himself one of the stages of individuality [the fifth, according to the classification of Haeckel.] Into his make up enter four lower orders and over him is the individuality of a sixth order i. e. society, which in its turn may have different forms which will become absorbed in the next stages in the system of individuality.¹

This argumentation and conclusion shows us the biological first principles of Mikhalovsky's system of society. The conclusions deducible from all this as to the duty of the individual and as to his relation to society are apparent. Mikhalovsky expresses them thus:

The struggle for individuality arises for the human individual out of the very situation that nature has allotted to him. His task is two-fold. First the individual must mercilessly subject to himself as an integral all lower individualities which have entered into his constitution. According to the old Roman motto: *divide et impera* he must rigidly carry out the policy of division of labor among his bodily organs demanding from each the highest efficiency for the sake of his own personal interests. Secondly, the individual must carefully guard himself that this motto: *divide et impera* may not be applied to him by some other stage of individuality, no matter how high sounding a name it may have.²

¹ Mikhalovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

² *Ibid.*, p. 354.

This two-fold task Mikhalovsky regards as the principle duty of each individual, and one imposed upon him by nature itself. He regards man and society as organisms on different stages of individuality and exposed to the same dangers as are all other organisms in the biological realm.

On the other hand, Mikhalovsky fears that a continual division and redivision of labor will result in the atrophy of some organs of the human body. He points to the feebleness of woman in certain physical and mental functions.¹ The existence of a sexless ant suggested to him the possibility of a sexless man, as a result of the continual redivision of labor.²

At this point we may indicate the fallacy and inconsistency underlying the biological foundations of Mikhalovsky's theory. Although he strongly and justly criticises Spencer and others of the biological school for their misleading use of biological analogy yet he himself does not escape this pitfall. Having refused to adopt the organic theory of society, he nevertheless considers society as the sixth stage of individuality in Haeckel's classification. (The Cermen of Haeckel's classification is an organic society). But according to Mikhalovsky's own statement, human society should not be considered as an organism at all.³

¹ "Let us express the sum of the strength and ability of man and woman by the formula $a+b+c$. After division of labor, the formula for the man became $a+c$, and for the woman $b+c$. The two formulae, (each simpler than the first) when intensified in their one-sidedness to a^m+c^n and b^p+c^t , becomes dangerous through the threatened atrophy of the "b" capacity in the man and of the "a" capacity in the woman. Therefore, from time to time it may become necessary to return to the primitive proportions, *e. g.* to $a+b+c$ rising to $(a+b+c)^n$." Vol. i, p. 258.

² The reader may have noticed that this view is tenable only on the theory that acquired characteristics are transmissible by heredity. Mikhalovsky, like most laymen in biology of his day, holds this view.

³ Cf. vol. i, p. 54. Also *supra*, p. 131.

Again, carried away by his biological analogy, Mikhalovsky declares the existence of a ceaseless war between the individual and society. No one denies that the individual is in danger of being arrested or diverted in his development by a too rigid social control or by a too intensive subdivision of labor. On the other hand, Mikhalovsky does not fully appreciate the fact that much of the superiority of the human over the animal individual is attributable to the wholesome influences of human society.

3. *The Psychological Aspect of the Theory of the Struggle for Individuality*

Psychic phenomena are real to Mikhalovsky. He regards psychology as a science independent of biology although related to it. He was one of the first to apply psychological principles in the study of social phenomena. We have seen that to him progress is the harmonious development of all of the natural functionings of the individual and that therefore it is the individual's imperative duty to protect himself against control by any group which threatens to encroach upon these functionings.

In his effort to safeguard the individual Mikhalovsky turned his attention to the frequent mass movements of which Russia had had its full share and which, it appeared to him, were psychic and pathological in their nature and tended greatly to the suppression of individual initiative. He made careful studies of these mass movements and described them in two works under the title, *The Hero and the Mob*.¹ Here he points out the bearings of these phenomena upon the struggle for individuality. In these studies he also shows the socializing forces of impression, suggestion and imitation, although he emphasises especially their baleful influences.

¹ These studies were first published about 1882 and fill a large part of the second volume of Mikhalovsky's collected works.

(1) *The Individuating Process and the Functioning of the Hero and the Mob*

Mikhalovsky's *hero* is not necessarily a great man as Carlyle and others of the "great man" school picture him. "Hero," he says, "we shall call that man who by his example captivates the mass for good or for evil, for noble or degrading, for rational or for irrational deeds. *Mob* we shall call the mass which is able to follow an example or suggestion whether highly noble or degrading or morally indifferent.¹ This definition our author trusts will protect him against the charge of attempting to revive the great man theory of history as presented by Carlyle and others. Great men, according to Mikhalovsky, do not fall from Heaven upon earth but rather grow from the earth up into the Heavens. They are products of the very environment which at the same time creates the mob. They incarnate in themselves those forces, feelings, instincts, thoughts and desires which are found scattered in the mob. The "great man" may seem a demi-god from one point of view and an insignificant creature from another point of view. Occasions give men their relative evaluation. Says Mikhalovsky:

Men not considered great in their own generation, were resurrected as great by a succeeding age. Hence the problem lies in the mechanics of the relation between the mob and that man whom the mob considers a great man; and not in some objective standard of greatness. Therefore an evil doer, an

¹Vol. ii, p. 97. It may be noticed here that Mikhalovsky was not of the opinion that great men do not influence the trend of history. On the contrary, he says "Granted that he (the great man) be but a tool of history, yet him has history chosen out of tens and hundreds of thousands to be its tool; but it is a feeling, thinking tool, and, more than that, one consciously acting and striving towards a set goal. The great man may be the resultant of certain forces, but while striving towards his goal, he becomes in turn an active, conscious agent—a cause in the further process of events." Vol. ii, p. 386.

idiot, or an insane man may be as important as some world-renowned genius, so long as the mob has followed him, has truly subjected itself to him, has imitated and worshiped him.¹

Our author then proceeds to show by what process the mass selects a hero from out of its own composition. He thinks that Carlyle was not far from the truth when he asserted that in each person lives a craving towards an ideal, towards something definitely higher and better than any trifling and narrow actuality. This craving for the ideal may express itself in following some one who suggests a kind of heroism. Mikhailovsky gives his own interpretation of the existence of those cravings which call for a hero; but the hero himself is simply one who first breaks the ice, who makes the decisive step which the mob awaits anxiously in order to precipitate itself in one or the other direction. The hero in himself is important only in so far as he has called forth a mass movement, giving it its initial impetus.²

The author cites many interesting historical episodes to illustrate the nature of the *hero* and of the *mob* and of the controlling factors of suggestion and imitation. He observes that the Middle Ages were unusually rich in pathological moral epidemics such as flagellation, frenzied dancing, persecution of the Jews, the crusades, and witch-burning. All mass movements have characteristics in common; these we must discriminate from characteristics that tend to unconscious imitation. The former characteristics may differ in kind, but among general conditions there is, apparently, some kind, or similarity, or current which occasions the imitative character of mass movements, whatever their difference in origin or in cause. In pathological cases the cord of imitation vibrates strongly, but its silence

¹ Vol. ii, p. 98.

² *Ibid.*, p. 100. Cf. p. 366.

in those phenomena which we recognize as normal does not necessarily follow. Mikhlovsky thinks there is a general law of imitation. He says:

Let us imagine a meeting of about 300 members who are addressed by an orator. Let the initial number 10 express the excitement that the orator feels, and let that excitement induced by the first outbursts of his oratory in every one of his 300 hearers be expressed by 5, or at least half of his own excitement. Each in the audience will express this by applause or by increased attention; in their pose and in the look on their faces there will be something strained. Each will observe not the excited orator alone, but also the many strenuously interested or excited fellow listeners. Granting that each hearer perceives but half of the general excitement, we still must express it numerically not by the number 5, but by the number 750, i. e. ($2\frac{1}{2} \times 300$). As to the orator himself, who is the center of the reacting currents of excitement, he may become entirely crushed by them as in fact often happens to inexperienced orators. Of course in reality such avalanche-like growth of excitement cannot be quite as rapid as would theoretically be true because not every one of the 300 hearers sees from his seat each and all of his 299 excited comrades. But the general law of the process is still such as I have described.¹

So the mob is created under pressure of the interactions of similar stimuli, its principal characteristic being unconscious or involuntary imitation.

It remains to be shown under what conditions the tendency to imitate prevails and what manner of people are most prone to make up a mob.²

¹ Vol. ii, p. 145.

² Mikhlovsky combats the idea of certain writers that the mob must be something exceptionally cruel. He says: "The mob, like a photographic camera, copies the beautiful and the ugly. Man, who is in a

Imitateness, according to Mikhalovsky, even in its most abnormal forms, is but a specific case of consciousness obscured, of feebleness of will, occasioned by special circumstances. These special circumstances are the key to all these various phenomena. For the creation of a disposition which readily imitates and is good material for a mob movement, it is necessary to have either an impression strong enough to overcome for the time being all other impressions, or, to have a continuing lack of all impressions. The combination of these two conditions would further increase the effect of imitation.¹ In a word they are the conditions that the hypnotist needs successfully to exercise his powers. Such conditions were characteristic of the Middle Ages. The mediaeval masses were always ready to yield their wills to some hero. Deprived of all original initiative and of all stability, they were depressed by the monotony of the social environment and by the poverty of individual life. Therefore, whenever a peculiar personality appeared the mob was ready to follow him, to make of him a hero or a saint. One needed but to start a frenzied dance, or to whip himself,—all without any good reason,—and he became at once a hero to the crowd.² Mikhalovsky presents much

condition of one-sided concentration of attention, will involuntarily commit acts good or evil. This is a simple case of imitation. But it becomes complex partly by the addition of conscious factors and partly by the struggle between the elements in the image to which attention has been drawn." Vol. ii, p. 459.

¹ Mikhalovsky believes that physiological imitation in the animal world is attributable to these causes, and not to natural selection, as the Darwinians assert. Animals imitate color, forms and relation of parts from other animals or objects, and this not because of any external process of selection or of gradual adaptation, at least not because of these alone; but because of an inner dynamic force stimulated into imitative activity by the environment. Cf. vol. ii, pp. 113 *et seq.*

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 161 *et seq.*

historical evidence in support of his contention that the cause of the mob with its readiness to imitate is found in the infringement of individuality. The only remedy is to prevent society from turning the individual into an organ or tool for the sake of social efficiency and social safety.¹ The craving toward an ideal which made Carlyle seek for heroes is caused by the suppression of individuality. It will cease whenever society shall give to the individual the opportunity for an harmonious development.

(2) *The Process of Individuation and the Functioning of Love*

In his studies of the psychic aspects of the struggle for individuality, Mikhalovsky turns his attention to the phenomenon of love between the sexes. Though love, he asserts, has physical roots, its flower is nevertheless psychic and is of great importance in completing human individuality. The desire for love originates in the physiological differentiation of organic individualities. The development of the family and the growth of sexual differences go hand in hand. The family in itself represents a type of individuality. According to the law of evolution the family itself differentiates its parts, establishing among its members a division of social and physiological labor. Results of adaptation to these special functionings are still noticeable in certain peculiarities of the

¹ "In the measure," says Mikhalovsky, "that division of labor more and more draws its deep furrows into society, so the striving for unison is but an unconscious make-believe, and in reality changes its character and direction: instead of sympathy there is but imitation. This increases to such a degree that there may be bloody conflict between the representatives of various branches of the divided social labor . . . this was the case especially in the Middle Ages, because of the absence in society of those elements which in one way or another balance the disadvantages of division of labor." Vol. xi, p. 190.

human body. In time the process of differentiation cut man in half and to regain his integrity he seeks his missing half in the opposite sex. Thus love is a striving toward integrity, a striving of men and women toward one another with the purpose of re-establishing the original nature of man. Each one of us is but a half man or a half woman and each half seeks its other half. A happy marriage is a successful selection or coming together of two halves of the whole and an unhappy marriage is an unsuccessful selection.¹

His differentiated sexual status man receives by heredity and cannot alter. But there are secondary sexual characteristics which are developing in man, and which threaten to lower his type. Man's individuality is subjected to the individuality of the family into which enter parents, children and other kindred. Continuous subjection of one stage of individuality to higher stages including the clan, the tribe, the people, the class, the profession, the caste, political and economic groupings, differentiates the sexes more and more, consequently more is required to fill the widening gap. Mikhalovsky correlates the exceptional social stratification of the Middle Ages with its abnormal romanticism. The romances of Abelard and Eloise, of Dante and Beatrice, of Petrarch and Laura, the "*Cours d'amour*" and similar mediaeval phenomena were products of the extreme social differentiation of the sexes, which therefore demanded much more from love than would otherwise have sufficed for the harmonious development of individualities.

Mikhalovsky's conclusion is that

in a given race or in a given epoch, the more men are manly and the more women are womanly, the more powerful will love be. Social differentiation among men and women increases the contrasts, which in their turn increase the demand

¹ Cf. vol. i, p. 509.

for love. Here we get not halves of human beings, as was provided by nature, but still smaller fractions, and the smaller the fraction the more passionately does it strive to supplement itself,—to complete its integrity; but tragically it then becomes increasingly difficult to find this larger supplementing fraction.¹

The increase of divorce Mikhalovsky accounts for in great part by this same cause—too great differentiation of the functions of the sexes. He says:

Civilization which has conquered the individual in the interest of society, increases the desire for love and makes its satisfaction more difficult because of the increased differentiation of its individuals. The more civilized individual seeks greater compensation in love than the uncivilized or less civilized individual, because for the latter the functions in the life of the male and of the female are less differentiated.²

It is clear that to save individuality from such abnormalities society should provide for both sexes ample opportunity to develop all their natural characteristics harmoniously. But society has its own interest, and seeks to increase efficiency by dividing social labor and by maintaining social control. Therefore arises the inevitable struggle between the individual and society.

(3) *The Process of Individuation and the Functioning of Religion*

Mikhalovsky writes relatively little upon religious subjects. He avoids passing any opinion upon dogmatic questions, taking the position of an agnostic positivist who relegates the question of an ultimate cause to the realm of the unknowable. But he recognizes in religion an import-

¹ Cf. vol. i, p. 554.

² *Ibid.* p. 577.

ant social phenomenon which has its psycho-social bearings, and which plays a considerable rôle throughout the struggle for individuality. He defines religion as "the inseparable bond of the things which are, and the things which ought to be. This bond powerfully and infallibly directs the activities of man."¹ Mikhalovsky believes that one may have true and many-sided views about the trend of things, that one may stand at the summit of the knowledge of his time and yet not have any directing principles of life and activity. On the other hand one may have high directing principles and yet keep them apart from objective science, or, knowing their relation to science, one may fail to apply them in practical activity; that is, one may have them as facts but not use them in life. "These *disjuncta membra* of the life of the spirit," he concludes, "must be brought into harmonious unity, and to do this is the function of religion."² He observes that the demand for religion in spite of its abuses and its outlived grotesque forms, never ceases to exist even among the educated classes in Europe. It manifests itself in the rise of continuously new forms and sects, as *Robespierre's* "religion of reason;" or Auguste Comte's "religion of humanity;" or the "religion of morals" offered by the society for Ethical Culture; or the "Neo-Budhism" of the Theosophical Society or the "petites religions de Paris" and elsewhere. Historically every new form of social relationship was correlated with the expansion of a religious idea. Religion can be traced through the clan and through the family with its ancestral worship, to the rise of nations with their state religions, always greatly aiding in the maintenance of unity and of solidarity. What love is doing in supplementing the physi-

¹ *Final Works*, St. Petersburg, 1905, vol. xi, p. 5. Cf. *Works*, vol. vi, p. 124.

² *Idem*.

cal differences of individuals, religion is doing for the highly differentiated and specialized realm of ideas. It aids individuality to find itself spiritually, just as love aids the individual to find himself physically.

(4) *The Process of Individualization and the Destructive Functions of Libertinism and Asceticism*

In concluding the study of the psychic aspects of Mikhailovsky's theory of the struggle for individuality there remain to be mentioned the phenomena of libertinism and of asceticism to which our author devotes much attention.¹

Libertinism and asceticism have, according to Mikhailovsky, the same psychological bearing. They are the individual's protest against a too rigid control by society. The libertine's protest is militant and active, the ascetic's protest is peaceful and passive. But each breaks all relations with society.² Individuality will not stand being curtailed beyond certain limits and it will avenge itself upon its enemy—society. Says Mikhailovsky.

Man in himself is not a double-faced Janus, in him are not wedded two subjects and two consciousnesses but many subjects and many consciousnesses, which, however, are hierarchically subjected to the control of the whole, which is self-conscious, and which shows its will as the indivisible Ego. The more centralized this unity is, the more are the specialized and serviceable functionings controlled and adapted by the higher ones; and the more elevated in stage is the individual. In this despotic centralization lies the secret of the health, happiness and moral superiority of the individual. Inversely, sickness and moral degradation express themselves objectively in the de-centralization of our Ego, by the

¹ In his essays on the "Volnitza and Podvizhniki" in vol. i.

² Cf. vol. i, p. 580 *et seq.*

disintegration of individuality as if there were a revolt of the lower individualities against the legal rule of the entire Ego.¹

The libertine and the ascetic are two of the pathological reactions to this suppression of the entire ego, and either can be cured only by a healthy social environment which permits an harmonious development of all normal characteristics of the individuality.

4. *The Economic Aspects of the Theory of Struggle for Individuality*

The economic aspect of society looms high in Mikhalovsky's theorizing. "The task of sociology," he says, is to interpret the relation of objective happiness, i. e. wealth, to subjective happiness, i. e. consumption of wealth."² He believes that individuality can best express itself in work. Work is to the individual what motion is to matter. Work is purposeful expenditure of energy and therefore it is in work that there develops the personality of the individual. Of course Mikhalovsky does not limit his concept of "work" merely to the production of material goods: he includes in it all purposeful activity which can sustain and develop man. Coöperation in work is the strongest factor of socialization. The "people" and the "working class" are to Mikhalovsky almost synonyms. Among the economic aspects of his theory, division of labor and Russian economic institutions receive close attention and therefore we shall now proceed to analyse these.

¹ Vol. xi, p. 358.

² Vol. i, p. 443.

(1) *The Theory of Individuation and the Function of the Division of Labor*

We have seen that Mikhailovsky attaches great importance to the division of labor. He considers it in its physiological, social and economic phases. His formula of progress demands integrity of indivisibles, and the complete-as-possible and many-sided division of labor among men. That means, in his view, that division of labor is desirable only so far as it leaves unharmed the integrity of the indivisible, that is the individual, man. Physiological division of labor within the organism was attained by differentiating the organs and increasing their complexity. Man, being the most complex indivisible, has also the task of exercising all of his organs to prevent them from atrophying. Atrophy of the physical or of the mental characteristics of man is possible through social or economic sub-division of labor; therefore we are confronted with the problem of devising such forms of coöperation as shall safeguard the integrity of the individual. The reason Mikhailovsky gives for safeguarding the individual's physiological complexity is that "each natural physiological function is a source of pleasure; therefore the indivisible has happiness in the degree that the physiological functions are complete and varied."¹

Mikhailovsky distinguishes between coöperation and the economic division of labor. The first is simple social coöperation and consists in the co-working of equal persons pursuing the same end. The other is complex social coöperation and consists in differentiating and specializing functions during the process of production. The latter has ushered in the factory system, and Mikhailovsky rejects it as dangerous to the individual's physical, intellectual

¹ Vol, i, p. 60.

and even moral development. He says : "Among bees and ants the economic division of labor has resulted in physical degeneration as appears in the sexless workers among bees."¹ This result he fears will occur in human society when a factory worker becomes a "hand," his work consisting in certain mechanical, continuous and similar motions of hand or foot. Although modern life demands intellectual equipment, the very mode of working is such as to weaken the mind because it calls for an unceasing stimulation of certain nerves, which inevitably has the effect of deadening them.

Mikhalovsky criticises the Manchester School of political economy which sees in the economic division of labor the advent of the brotherhood of man. He says :

Division of labor supports love not more nor less than a rope supports a man who has been hanged. If such a man were not taken off the gibbet and buried after justice had been satisfied, the rope would cut deeper and deeper into his neck and finally the head would separate and the body would fall. If love towards one's neighbor is to be established upon the principle of division of labor the principle will cut in deeper and deeper to support the love towards one's neighbor, but by this process it will diminish the number of neighbors.²

So the economic division of labor is death to individuality. It will transform him into a tool and crush in him that harmony of functions which alone renders him happy, and elevates him in the animal world.

When in later years Durkheim's "Division du travail social" appeared, and when the modern forms of division of labor were looked upon as an organic division of labor, with individuals specializing in coöperation, and

¹ Vol. i, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*, p. 182.

thereby achieving both solidarity and individuation, (the opposite of what Mikhalovsky had held would happen) he still defended his conclusions, pointing out that the modern workman is by no means an independent individuality. He usually is rigidly controlled by the small trade union which has no sense of solidarity with society at large. The highly differentiated union system, called into life by the modern division of labor, has all the disadvantages, he believes, of the caste and of the guild systems of the past, and none of their advantages, because of the minute specialization in the various branches of production. The coöperation of the industrial world, for example, is in principle radically different from the coöperation of a group of scientists. The solidarity which binds together various branches of science is not organic solidarity founded upon the division of labor, but, rather, is a mechanical solidarity based upon simple coöperation. Similarity, not difference, is the principal bond which creates solidarity among men of science.¹ This he thinks is not true of the organic division of labor.

(2) *Individuation and Russian Economic Institutions*

Mikhalovsky holds that one of the duties of sociology is to point out what institutions of production are best for the safeguarding of the integrity of individuality.² We have just now seen that he opposes the modern division of labor, and, naturally, he also opposes the factory system with production on a large scale. He thinks Western Europe irredeemably degraded and lowered to the bourgeois type,³ but he hopes that Russia may be spared this lowering of

¹ Cf. Mikhalovsky's article on Durkheim's Theory. In *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, May, 1897.

² Cf. vol. i, p. 443.

³ Mikhalovsky discovers a difference between type and stage of devel-

type by the maintenance and development of her communal system. He says:

Adversaries of our communal land system clamor for personal liberty. They say that the commune ties the owner hand and foot to the soil, and that it does not give him any freedom for individual activity. This was once spoken in the West. There the commune decayed, the individual triumphed and received the liberty of choosing his occupation, he had but to adapt himself to the new conditions. The right of "free choice" of the emancipated individual was however immediately limited by historical development. He became a factory slave instead of a land owner, producing great wealth and yet actually starving.¹

So Mikhalovsky believes that individual initiative in economic lines is possible only to a property holder. He says: "Fear more than anything else a social order that will divert property from labor. It will deprive the people of the possibility of individual initiative, of independence and of liberty."²

Nor does Mikhalovsky hold the theory of the classic economist that the natural resources of the country can be developed only by a competitive system of industry. He says:

The natural resources of a country can also be developed

opment. Division of labor raises the stage of development but lowers the type; for example, the sexless ant is more efficient than the ancient undifferentiated ant. It produces more, and is, therefore, more useful to its society, wherein the stage of civilization rises while the type is lowered. Thus also he believes the English workingmen to be upon a higher plane of civilization than the Russian peasant who lives in the commune; the latter, however, has a higher type of civilization because it presents a wider range of activities. *Cf.* vol. i, pp. 477-478.

¹ Vol. iii, pp. 199-200.

² Vol. i, p. 704.

by communal land ownership. For this purpose it is but necessary to have well directed social principles. . . . Besides wealth consumers, there exist in this world also consumers of human beings, and these should not be allowed to be brought as sacrifice to the Moloch of national wealth.¹

The commune of the country and the workingmen's cartell of the cities were precious to him not for their own sakes like one's own idol, but because they were a refuge for the individuality of the common man fleeing from the threatening perils of a capitalistic-industrial order of society. Mikhalovsky therefore advocates the maintenance of the commune by government interference² because he is convinced that the commune determines the future of the Russian people. The commune, if properly restricted and conducted, will give an opportunity for the harmonious development of man's entire individuality; it will protect against any lowering of the type and it will gradually approach a higher plane of civilization.

5. *The Historical Aspect of the Theory of the Struggle for Individuality*

The idea of the struggle for individuality reflects itself also in Mikhalovsky's views on the philosophy of history. Like many other philosophers of history he discerns three stages in the evolutionary process of history. He calls them the objective anthropocentric stage, the eccentric stage and the subjective anthropocentric stage. His exposition of these stages reminds one of Comte's famous interpretation of history. Mikhalovsky does not deny Comte's influence upon him. He says: "The law of the three stages (of Comte) which does not satisfy me completely I neverthe-

¹ Vol. vi, p. 301.

² Cf. vol. i, p. 704, and vol. iv, p. 1000.

less acknowledge as an extraordinarily valuable generalization, but when I first became acquainted with the great work of Comte, I already had my own views on the subject sufficiently developed.”¹ The principal difference between the two is that Comte emphasizes the intellectual aspect of the historical process, believing that it explains other functions of society; while Mikhalovsky, on the contrary, proceeds from the ethical relations and the forms of coöperation peculiar to certain periods in history. He agrees generally with Comte, however, as to the extent of the several stages. We shall indicate briefly the characteristics of each.

(1). The *objective anthropocentric stage* is characterized by a naive faith, in which man regards himself as the one objective, absolutely real, center of nature. “It receives its highest development,” says Mikhalovsky, “when all humanity, man in general, is recognized as the center of nature, and not this or another ethnological, political or professional caste.”²

It is the age of anthropomorphism, mysticism, theology and religion. Economically it expresses itself in simple co-operation i. e., in work towards a common end.

(2). The *eccentric stage* reduces the dualism of body and soul to manifest absurdity and puts man under the rule of abstract concepts. “Man,” says Mikhalovsky, “is here halved and torn and deprived of his empirical content.”³ His ideals and duties are all outside of himself in an abstract void, which he thinks more worth while than himself. During this period metaphysical systems flourish. Economically this period expresses itself as complex co-operation which takes the form of the division of labor and the specialization of economic functions.

¹ Vol. iv, p. 100.

² Vol. i, p. 199.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

(3). *The subjective anthropocentric stage* is characterized in two-fold manner, by its humaneness and by the control of nature by man. Says our author:

Here we hear men say: "Yes, nature is unmerciful to me, she knows no difference of justice between me and the sparrow; but I also shall be unmerciful to her; with bloody judgment I shall conquer her. I shall compel her to serve me, I shall eliminate evil and create good. I am not the goal of nature, nature has no goal. But I have a goal and I shall reach it." ¹

In this stage ethical ideals and purely humane theology are attained. It is at the same time the age of science and of positivism. Economically it is characterized by coöperation still simple but more highly developed than in the first period of human history. Mikhalovsky, who is deeply impressed by this historic process, says that were he an artist he would create only three paintings, which should express in turn these three stages. He pictures in words what he would limn upon the canvass: "In the midst of a city's square a half rotten execution block and on it the prostrate skeleton of the last criminal. A raven that is on the scene, could he speak, would caw the principle of Kant: *fiat justitia pereat mundus!*" ² This is a picture of the eccentric period developed to its logical extremity, as in Kant's contention that the last criminal ought to be punished though society had itself ceased to exist.

The subjective anthropocentric period has also its gloomy aspect. This Mikhalovsky thinks could be pictured by Byron's poem, "Darkness," which represents the struggle of the individual with nature. ³

¹ Vol. i, p. 215.

² *Ibid.*, p. 137.

³ Lord Byron, *Works* (ed. by E. H. Coleridge), vol. iv, pp. 42-45.

"The bright sun was extinguished, and the stars
 Did wander darkling in eternal space,
 A fearful hope was all the World contained;
 some lay down
 And hid their eyes and wept; and some did rest
 Their chins upon their clenched hands, and smiled,
 And others hurried to and fro, and fed
 Their funeral piles with fuel, and looked up
 With mad disquietude on the dull day,
 The pall of a past World; and then again
 With curses cast them down upon the dust,
 And gnashed their teeth and howled: . . .

 Even the dogs aided their masters, all save one, . . .

 The crowd was famished by degrees; but two
 Of an enormous city did survive,
 And they were enemies: they met . . .

 and beheld
 Each other's aspects . . . saw, and shrieked and died. . . ."

In general Mikhalovsky is pessimistic about the triumph of the individual in his struggle with environment and with society. In Russia matters have not gone his way; the commune has gradually been disintegrating, and signs of the times seem to indicate that his hope of a special economic and social evolution in Russia will remain but a pleasant dream of reform and that the bourgeoisie will triumph in Russia as it has in Western Europe.

Conclusion

We have attempted to give an analysis of Mikhalovsky's sociological system which he called "The Struggle for Individuality." These ideas permeated all of his social, ethical and historical thinking. We have presented each one of its important phases, although there were many difficulties to be overcome on account of the incoherence of the scattered material. Mikhalovsky often expressed the hope of being

able to write one comprehensive book, and to unite the various parts of his system into a coherent whole, but his busy life as editor and as critic made this impracticable.

Regarding his theory, we may say that in reality Mikhalovsky does not differ very radically from the organic school in sociology, which he criticised. He only substitutes the concept Individuality, for that of Organism. We must remember that the hierarchy of Haeckel's Individualities which Mikhalovsky adopted without reservation, itself consists of organic individualities. The only difference is that he views organisms as in a negative and hostile relation to one another, but this is more in the nature of an opinion than of a fact. One may find in this tectological hierarchy as many reasons in support of the contrary opinion. Humanity strives as persistently towards social solidarity as towards individuation. Therefore the rigid individualism of Mikhalovsky is more an ideal of his than an historical and scientific necessity. Apart from this weakness Mikhalovsky has rendered valuable services as one of the first writers to make psychological analysis of social phenomena. His early protest against a too intensive division of labor has been proven to have been fully justified, only he overlooked the fact that extreme differentiation in production is offset by an ever-increasing homogeneity of consumption¹ and by the shortening of hours of labor, giving everyone opportunity to develop his individuality without sacrificing the advantages of a subdivided and specialized labor.

Mikhalovsky seems to be bitter and unjust in his attitude towards society. He forgets at times the great services which it has rendered to the individual. But this may be pardoned him if we remember that he wrote in sociology not as a professor who has only scientific interests in mind

¹ See Giddings, "The Quality of Civilization," in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xvii, no. 5,

but as a leader of a movement which was fighting the institutions of autocracy. Like Lavrov's theories his system was principally a scientific justification of a current, social political movement. His aim was to protect the individual against too rigid autocratic control, and he sought to reconcile what he called the *pravda*-truth with the *pravda*-justice. His heart beat warmly for his people, whose intellectual leader and guide he was for a generation. Thus Mikhailovsky is important principally to his own people and generation, but he also contributed to sociology at large, and this should be gratefully although it has been tardily acknowledged by the scientific world.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF YOUZHAKOV

LAVROV and Mikhalovsky greatly influenced the intellectual classes of Russia. Many, stimulated by their writings, tried to branch off and to develop theories of their own. The most important of these later writers was S. N. Youzhakov whose contributions to Russian sociological theory we shall consider next.

Youzhakov¹ appeared in the Russian sociological arena as a critic of the "subjectivist" method in sociology, attacking both Lavrov and Mikhalovsky. His argument is briefly this: Lavrov is wrong in maintaining that history does not repeat itself. Youzhakov says: "There are common features in the recurring events of history, and deviations are found: even in exact science there are deviations as, for example, in astronomy."² Again, there is but one human logic, "The logical process of thinking and the psychological phenomena of perception are alike among all men, so that things true to one are true to others also; they may be checked up by others."³ The peculiarity of the subjective

¹ Sergey Nikolaevitch Youzhakov (1849-1910) is well known in Russia as a contributor to various leading Russian periodicals and as the editor-in-chief of the Russian "Large Encyclopedia." His contributions to sociology were made between the years 1872-1875, and have been edited in two volumes under the title of *Sociological Études*; vol. i, St. Petersburg, 1891, and vol. ii, St. Petersburg, 1896.

² Youzhakov, *Sociological Études*, vol. i, p. 242.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

method, Youzhakov thinks, is that it is based upon an evaluation of the relative importance of social phenomena, and upon the individual views of the investigator as to what relations of members of society to each other and to the whole, are normal. There is really no special contribution in this, and the subjective method therefore is but an emphasis of one very important sociological proposition, namely, that society is based upon individuals, and that the evolution of society takes place by means of individuals and for individuals.¹ This proposition Youzhakov considers of vital importance. Yet he sees no need to study subjective and ethical phenomena by other methods than those hitherto generally adopted in the social sciences. Youzhakov, therefore, prefers to call the subjectivist school in Russia simply the Russian School of Sociology, believing that the Russians were first to emphasize the psychological and ethical aspects of sociology. Youzhakov worked towards the development of a complete system of sociology according to an outline that is given below.

Outline of Youzhakov's Theory of Sociology

- I. A survey of the sociological problems and of the principal forces in the socializing process.
- II. The organic principle as a factor of the socializing process.
- III. The moral principle and the social equilibrium.
- IV. The economic principle and the social struggle.
- V. The political principle and the disturbed equilibrium between the moral principle and the principles of organic and economic struggle.
- VI. The intellectual principle and progress, conceiving progress not as natural evolution, as it appears in

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 242 et seq.

the combined results of the organic, economic and political principles, but as a purposefully directed evolution of mankind towards self-preservation and perfection.

VII. Classification of the forms of social life.

VIII. Historical environment, i. e. the relation of one society to its neighboring societies.

IX. Physiological environment.¹

The author does not claim to have treated all these topics exhaustively. Some of them are barely indicated, and others meagerly synthetized.

What Youzhakov actually has written may be analyzed under the following heads:

- I. Sources of Youzhakov's philosophical and sociological views.
- II. What is sociology and what are its principal problems?
- III. What is society and what are the ultimate and proximate causes of socialization?
- IV. The organic-physical aspect of sociology.
- V. The ethical aspect of sociology.
- VI. The economic aspect of sociology.
- VII. Résumé and conclusion.

I. *Sources of Youzhakov's Philosophical and Sociological Views*

Youzhakov, belonging to the school of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky, holds in general the same philosophical views that they had appropriated and developed. He is positivist and empiricist, acknowledging Comte and Spencer as his principal authorities. Like Comte he holds: (1) That what is true of inorganic and of organic phenomena, is

¹ Cf. vol. ii, pp. iii-v.

true also of social phenomena; (2) That the laws of physical life everywhere are applicable to social life; (3) That physical and organic laws are modified in society by new conditions and agents and that, therefore, they there present a peculiar and specific character.¹ On the basis of these generalizations Youzhakov in part adopts Comte's classification of the sciences, but he describes sociology as an abstract science which analyzes the structure and function of social aggregates, (social statics), and, which studies the forces of development or progress (social dynamics).² Spencer's theory of evolution as it applies to the inorganic and the organic realm is adopted in principle by Youzhakov, but with reservations as to its uniform validity in the evolution of society. Here he accepts Mikhalovsky's criticism of Spencer and Darwin, although he deviates to some extent from his fellow countryman's constructive theories. Buckle and Darwin had their share in shaping Youzhakov's views, and he was intellectually influenced by many others, especially by some of the French writers. Thus, like Lavrov, he attempts a synthesis of the principal sociological theories, gathering them around the individual. He thinks that the individual can by means of his social and economic surplus adapt environment to himself and direct it to a goal.

So far we have mentioned the theoretic sources from which Youzhakov has drawn. But the real forces that stimulated him to study and write on sociology were not his scholarly interests. He was one of the populist leaders whose interests were to re-shape Russian society and lead it on to progress. Thus he is not only a contributor to the subjectivist school of sociology; he is a comrade of Lavrov and Mikhalovsky in the Russian people's cause of social reform.

¹ Cf. vol. i, p. 4.

² Cf. vol. vi, pp. 40-44.

II. *What is Sociology and What are Its Principle Problems.*

We have already mentioned that Youzhakov in general followed Comte's classification of the sciences, viewing sociology as the final product in the formulation of scientific thought. He defines sociology as "the science of the laws controlling group living and accounting for its origin, development and disintegration."¹ Sociology generalizes, accordingly, the products of many other social sciences such as political economy, ethics, law, and linguistics.

The first and chief business of sociology, our author thinks, is the discovery of those forms of social life in which the universal laws of interaction (or association) and of equilibration are manifested.² In dealing with this problem, the author makes an analysis of the laws of evolution as they apply to social phenomena. Although he devotes much space to them, he does not get very far away from the Spencerian view as found in "First Principles." The second principal business of sociology, Youzhakov believes to be the exposition of the influence of organic life upon the universal laws of association and equilibration.³ We recognize here the organic nature of society in contrast to the inorganic or physical nature of environment. We shall deal with this problem later.⁴ The third main task of sociology is to show the influence of individuality within the social aggregate upon association and equilibration, the peculiarities arising from the association of individuals within a social aggregate, and how association reacts upon individuals and upon environment.⁵ Finally Youzhakov devotes attention

¹ Vol. ii, p. 39.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 45.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 48.

⁴ *Infra*, sec. iv, pp. 163 *et seq.*

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 49. *Vide infra*, sec. v.

to the economic aspect of sociology. Viewing on the one hand the modern production of wealth as a handicap to individuality, he on the other hand acknowledges it to be an important factor in the struggle for individuation. Accordingly the storing of matter and energy by society is the phenomenon of economic culture, and the equilibration of stored energies appears as civilization or as ethical and political culture.¹

III. *What is Society and What are the Ultimate and Proximate Causes of Socialization?*

In his study of the socializing process our author makes a distinction between aggregates formed by co-dwelling and aggregates that can be called societies. "A co-dwelling group is an integral composed of units with poorly expressed individualities,"² i. e. of units possessed of but an inferior ability to counteract the influence of environment and the conditions of existence in general. Such groups are the material from which societies are formed at the price of suppressing a mass of lower individualities that are sacrificed to higher individualities. Thus "Society is an aggregate of active units which has created its own social environment or culture and which has welded itself into one complex body. In brief, society is an actively cultural social aggregate."³ The ultimate cause of socialization is complex activity. The author arrives at this conclusion or formula from a survey of the cosmic and of the biological processes. The cosmic process is that of continuous integration, differentiation and equilibration. The organic process consists in the storing of energy by the matter in organisms. Physical disintegration absorbs

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 75.

² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

³ Vol. i, p. 36.

less energy than is dissipated by chemical integration. This liberated surplus is spent on work which by society is stored into objects of culture. Hence activity is inverse to the organic process, it consists in the physical disintegration of chemically integrated matter.

Activity and passivity present the fundamental difference between animal and plant life, activity being the new additional characteristic of an animate being. Purposeful work is the dynamic aspect of activity. The organic process consists in the storing of energy by the matter within the organism. Purposeful work or activity, or the active process, consists in its expenditure. "If," concludes Youzhakov, "we have called work the dynamic aspect of the phenomenon of activity, then individuality and culture are its static aspect. In individuality and culture activity becomes materialized, the former in the structure of the organism, the latter in environment."¹ Thus activity expresses itself in a reaction on life and environment. It differs from the reaction of passive life (which adapts itself to environment) by adapting environment to itself to satisfy its needs. Hence purposefulness in reacting on environment is its first distinctive characteristic and "activity is work for the purpose of self-preservation."² The proximate causes of the process of socialization arise from this ultimate cause which, as we have seen, Youzhakov identifies with *activity or purposeful work*, which shows itself first in the struggle for self-preservation. Individual self-preservation naturally tends towards the formation of groups which, through habit, in time become permanent. Group life creates a new task, for along with the struggle for individual self-preservation the struggle for the preservation of the group becomes necessary. These two

¹ Vol. i, p. 36. Cf. also pp. 161 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 162.

interests, naturally conditioned, may come in conflict, the one at times infringing upon the other. So are created the ethical problem, and moral concepts, which, arising out of conflict between the individual and the group, become an important socializing factor. Energies expended in maintaining the group are obtained from the surplus anteriorly produced by efficiency from co-operation and by better security. Thus surplus grows as the group increasingly practices the exploitation of nature and the division of labor. Coöperation creates social activity. The welding of social-cultural activity with social life creates society. Thus activity after having established the group, uses the products of group life for further socialization, and its activity becomes social progress when it succeeds in establishing an equilibrium between social and individual activity.

IV. *The Organic and Physical Aspects of Sociology*

What influence have the laws of organic life and of physical environment upon the social aggregate? This question Youzhakov attempts to answer in his Sociological Études. He analyzes the generalizations of Darwinism and Malthusianism as these are applied to social evolution, and puts them in juxtaposition with what he calls historical selection. Of the two principal generalizations of Darwinism, natural selection and sexual selection, he believes that only the latter has been of considerable influence in the development of society. He enumerates the principal phases of sexual selection in human society as follows: (1) In communal marriage, sexual selection is conditioned by the numerical inequality of the sexes occasioned by infanticide. (2) In polyandry, sexual selection is conditioned by the same cause, here the factor in selection is the handsomeness of the male. (3) Along with polyandry develops polygamy, begin-

ning with wife-stealing¹ and the factors which are selected by this practice are personal strength and bravery of the male. (4) When polygamy becomes legalized selection is conditioned by a caste system and its accompanying despotism of the wealthier or so-called higher classes whereby the selective process in the lower strata of society is artificially limited. (5) In monogamy, sexual selection loses its importance. The selective process is conditioned by social stratification and by the mutual leanings of both sexes. The rise of the power of the state which regulates marriage and divorce, the general prevalence of monogamy, the triumph of democracy which grants equal rights to both sexes, and the corresponding changes in moral ideals—these are, according to Youzhakov's opinion, consecutive stages in the elimination of sexual selection as a factor in social evolution.² Youzhakov made some statistical verifications of the generalizations of Malthus. On the basis of these, he argues that the Malthusian formula, holding true in the realm of nature, is offset by what he calls historical selection, which tends to supersede the struggle for existence. Scientific production, a fairer distribution of economic goods, and opportunity for intellectual development, which he believes inevitably tends to check human fertility—these are the factors which equilibrate demand and supply and which eliminate the dangers of over-population.³ Artificial selection⁴ struggles with natural selection and strives to disintegrate

¹ Cf. vol. i, p. 98 *et seq.*, and p. 200.

² The author gives interesting ethnographic observations among the various Slavic tribes and he believes that among the primitive Slavs wife-stealing was a common practice, and therefore also polygamy.

³ Cf. vol. i, pp. 80-81. Divorce, concubinage, and prostitution in modern society are having some importance as factors of sexual selection, but their rôle is more negative since sexual excesses usually result in sterility or in a relatively small number of progeny. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 91.

⁴ "Historical selection" is Youzhakov's expression.

the hereditary and adverse products of natural selection. Historically this process of disintegration was carried out through the aid of human culture, which already in savage society showed itself in the use of artificial weapons, which checked to some extent the process of natural selection. Cultural activity, once begun, must continually increase, to maintain its superiority over nature. It selects the best artificial tools and weapons needed in the struggle. Besides the superiority of the weapon, complex coöperation becomes an important factor in this struggle against natural selection. Coöperation develops with the growth of economic, political and religious institutions. These give the group a strong sense of solidarity, and moral ideals, which limit the individual struggle, and which, with the growth of intelligence and of surplus, create an equilibrium between the increase of population and the means of subsistence.¹ Moreover, Youzhakov might have added, that natural selection is offset by historical selection because cultural achievements are not transmitted hereditarily, but must be learned anew, although more rapidly by each generation. Thus not nature but nurture is the principal factor of historical selection.

If natural selection should be thought desirable in society it must establish conditions which of themselves do not exist. Says Youzhakov:

In such a society no legal inheritance of wealth and of political power must exist; all of its members must receive an equal general education and all must have an equal opportunity for a higher education or for a specialized education; all must be equally cared for until of age, but the institution of private property must be maintained. Under these conditions natural selection would have a chance to show itself, though there are no guarantees that it would help to perfect the race.²

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 110 *et seq.*, and pp. 121-122.

² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

Thus is social progress principally differentiated from organic progress; and thus does social progress tend to limit or to suppress organic progress. Although there is much that is analogous¹ between a social and a vital organism, the laws of the latter are subordinated to new laws which themselves appear in the process of the development of the social organism.

Natural selection was the decisive factor in the early savage stage of man. Physical environment was then but of secondary importance, but as man began to learn to the full how to utilize his environment, the serviceability of his environment became decisive. Natural selection was thus weakened by man's use of his environment, the latter in its turn becoming decisive in his historical development. But in time environment is conquered through the development of culture; and then the process of history is determined by the coordinated activity of culture and of the individual's initiative. Youzhakov concludes:

Thus the history of mankind from the days of the primitive family and tribe to the present forms of civilization presents in itself three distinct periods: (1) The period in which natural and sexual selection are the determining factors of development, and in which the direct influence of environment is of secondary serviceable importance; (2) the period in which with the disintegration and partial elimination of the complex agents of organic progress, the influence of environment rises to primary importance; and, through the inadequate development of culture the characteristics of this period are determined by the climate, the soil, the topography and the general

¹ "The (biological) concepts of life and death are as applicable to social aggregates as to cultural evolution. . . . Social life and its culture are to be conceived of as analogous to organic life in the process of chemical disintegration and physical integration of matter." Vol. i, pp. 70-71.

conditions of nature: finally (3) begins the epoch in which culture attains such power that it either eliminates the influences of physical environment or considerably delimits their importance. It is in this period that mankind, more than ever before, becomes lord over its destiny and its history. The terms that conveniently designate these three periods are: (1) savagery, (2) barbarism, and (3) civilization.¹

V. *The Ethical Aspect of Sociology*

Organic activity differentiated the individual. His struggle to preserve himself in the arena of life created the group which, on the one hand made individual existence possible, and on the other hand continually threatened individuality by differentiating the individual's activity into special functionings in the interests of the aggregate. The interrelations of the individual and the group give rise to morality and create the ethical problem.

The struggle for existence at the stage of active social life takes the form of a struggle for individuality and the struggle for culture. These two are the goal of social evolution. Under normal conditions they develop along parallel lines and in direct relation to each other, but if culture suppresses individuality, the lowering of culture itself results. On the other hand, individuality which destroys culture, shortens life and lowers its own type.² Individuality becomes a personality³ when the social aggregate in which it is found regards it as a member or a responsible agent of the group. This makes the formation of a moral principle possible. Says Youzhakov:

¹ Vol. i, p. 231.

² Cf. vol. ii, pp. 184-185. By culture, the author means the surplus products from the adaptations of environment to the needs of the group.

³ Cf. vol. ii, p. 187.

Moral progress consists in the adaptation of the activities of the individual to social conditions, and this adaptation expresses itself in the creation of perfect ideals of sociability and in the perfect correlation of the ideals of an epoch with the feelings of individuals. Thus the development of morality becomes a process of adaptation of life to social existence. The degree of this development may be the best criterion for determining the status of society.¹

The moral principle is the product of an equilibration between the struggle for individual, and for social, self-preservation; in the moral individual energy voluntarily harmonizes with the interests of social life; in it the antagonism between individual and social development is abolished. On the one hand is seen the abolition of criminality in the individual; and on the other, the abolition of coercion by the group. Thus moral principle consists in a socially harmonized self-directed activity. Coercive harmony is authority: self-directed socially disharmonious activity is criminality. Hence the development of moral principle equally limits the province of crime and the province of coercion, and at the same time advances individual activity and serves the purpose of social self-preservation. Accordingly, morality is but a form of activity which is conditioning aggregate life and which makes further development possible.² Criminal activity of individuals tends to disintegrate society, and unnecessary social control which handicaps individual activity is no less a waste of social energies. Only a proper equilibration of social and individual interests can perpetuate society and prevent abnormal disintegration and decay. All social phenomena have for their cause not any one category of antecedent

¹ Vol. i, p. 148.

² Cf. vol. ii, pp. 191-192.

events, but all categories. Thus, for example, economic changes are produced not only by economic factors but also by political, intellectual, moral and organic factors. In this manner moral activity of necessity reacts upon economic, political and organic activity as well as upon itself.¹ Since moral ideas are the product of the equilibration of social and individual interests, therefore "the discovery of the laws of equilibrium between these two tendencies, and the laws which would establish the continuity of this equilibrium, will mean the discovery of the laws of progress of social life and will make it possible to establish a formula of social progress."²

VI. *The Economic Aspect of Sociology*

We have learned that activity in the sense of purposefully directed work lies at the basis of the process of socialization according to Youzhakov.

Economic activity creates a physical or material surplus which in turn makes possible the growth of culture or general surplus product. Now cultural activity, we already know, prevents further organic differentiation because of the artificial production of tools and weapons. In this manner individuality is protected against further organic differentiation. Further economic development has the tendency to establish permanence of location and of functioning. The higher the culture, the more stable are social relations, the more differentiated are the social functions and the more unchanging are the individual's location and occupation.³ This process of economic differentiation, or division of labor becomes, however, a menace when society in its effort to increase its aggregate efficiency transforms

¹ Cf. vol. ii, p. 221.

² *Ibid.*, p. 186.

³ Cf. vol. ii, p. 97.

its members more or less into mere organs and turns them back upon the road of organic development. This control of activity by organized society tells sooner or later in a decrease of the sum of energy in the differentiating aggregate itself, in its own gradual weakening and disintegration. Only those aggregates which succeed in making tools out of their economic surplus instead of out of their living members escape the vicious cycle of historical rise and fall. But when culture becomes a supplementary weapon, in the struggle between rivaling races, it does not lead towards organic differentiation and cyclism. It becomes a factor in establishing progressiveness, altruism and morality. In brief, economic surplus becomes a weapon in protecting and developing individuality.¹ The weapons of cultural activity, such as wealth, power, morals, find their static expression in the development of institutions. Wealth as the weapon of the economic struggle has its own institutions whose history Youzhakov develops from the earliest times of wealth production. We will briefly enumerate their characteristics.

The period of savagery passes as man learns the arts of pastoral and agricultural pursuits. Wealth in cattle makes the growth of population possible. This wealth among nomadic peoples becomes a means of autocratic control. Law and justice are based upon the principle of kinship which the nomad learns from his herds. The tilling of the soil encourages permanent settlement. In agricultural communities the principles of law and justice change from the kinship basis to the basis of toil. Thus in ethnic society surplus is attained principally through cattle breeding and agriculture. In civic society economic development passes through three stages, that of slavery, that of

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 95-100 and 263-264.

monopoly and that of disintegration of the factors of production. The passing of slavery was beneficent as far as it helped to prevent the rigid cultural integration which threatened to demoralize society. The establishment of artisan monopolies and guilds in place of slave labor tended towards a similar although less crude, cultural integration. It, however, differentiated political from economic functions. Further development of capitalistic monopolies gradually displaced the medieval trade corporation and the artisan guilds and still more divorced the economic from the political functions.¹

Economic functioning, which became an important factor in individual and group control, has an analogous function in the international struggle. As national wealth and national power were achieved in passing through the successive stages of slavery, monopoly and free labor, so analogously international control has to pass through the like stages. The first was that of raiding expeditions and the levying of tolls upon the conquered. The second was the development of the world-wide commercial and industrial monopolies such as the great trading companies of Spain, Holland and England, which tolerated no competitors, but disposed of them forcibly. The third stage is characterized by the *laissez-faire*, *laissez-passer* policy in industrial and commercial exploitation, with accompanying wars for the control of world markets. But along with this development grows the international solidarity of the working classes. Slavery produced no solidarity, the medieval trade union had but a limited solidarity, whereas the modern labor movement is expanding its boundaries beyond occupational and national lines.

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 271-292.

VII. *Résumé and Conclusion*

In reviewing our survey of Youzhakov's sociological studies we see that in general he developed the principal ideas of Comte and Spencer, as well as those of Lavrov and of Mikhalovsky. We cannot credit him with having successfully or adequately developed a synthetic system of sociology, which was what he attempted to do. Nevertheless he brought out and emphasized a few important truths which are now quite generally accepted by sociologists. Thus he showed quite clearly that the socializing process is an equilibration between the inner and the outer relations of life and environment. In this process, life first adapting itself to environment, in its turn adapts environment to itself. This Youzhakov calls social culture. The surplus gained from the control of nature sets limits to natural selection among men. Thus ethical and not biological laws begin to control human relations. Self-directed activity increases social and economic surplus and helps to produce an equilibrium between the individuating and the socializing forces and also between supply and demand in the increase of population.

The emphasis laid upon the rôle of surplus in emancipating the individual from a too rigid social control and from the evil consequences of too highly differentiated and too minutely divided labor exhibited a truth which, as we have seen, was not sufficiently emphasized by Mikhalovsky. Thus Youzhakov's illuminating discussion of this factor is a welcome element in the later subjectivist school of sociology.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF N. I. KAREYEV

KAREYEV¹ is the most synthetic of the subjectivist school. As a philosopher of history he recognized in sociology the science which can give to history a scientific interpretation, and saw that with its aid a formula of social progress can be found which, in his opinion, should help to solve the problems of the historian. He says: "A formula of progress must give an ideal criterion for the evaluation of historical progress; without such evaluation a reasoned judgment upon actual history and its meaning is impossible."² His major interest is the philosophy of history, which he is more careful than many writers are to distinguish from sociology.³ Accordingly he attempts to assign to so-

¹ Nikolai Ivanovitch Kareyev (1850-) is the only contributor to the subjectivist school who belongs to the professorial rank. He holds the chair of the philosophy of history in the University of Petrograd, and he lectures also on sociology. Among the subjectivist sociologists he is distinguished by his wide and thorough scholarship and a degree of originality. He is the author of many works on history, philosophy and sociology. His sociological ideas are principally developed in volume II of his *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, 1883; *The Nature of the Historic Process and the Rôle of the Individual in History*, 1890; *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes*, 1896; and *Introduction to Sociology*, 1897. Although since this last date he has written considerably, he has not contributed anything of importance to sociology.

² Kareyev, *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes*, p. 211.

³ E. g., Dr. Paul Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, Leipzig, 1898.

ciology its definite province. A study of his work suggests the following analysis of his sociological contributions.

- I. Kareyev's philosophical and methodological presuppositions.
- II. What society is in its various aspects.
- III. The nature of the historic process and the rôle of the individual in history.
- IV. The sociological problem of progress.
- V. Conclusion: Kareyev and the subjectivist school of Russian sociologists.

I. Kareyev's Philosophical and Methodological Presuppositions

Like the other writers of the subjectivist school Kareyev is an idealistic positivist and empiricist. He believes that an idealistic attitude is compatible with a strictly positivist view. He explains it thus: "Idealism is misinterpreted and confused with spiritism, the latter being a metaphysical system as much as is materialism."¹ He observes that many writers who characterize idealism as unscientific are nevertheless not free from it, "because any seeking for a meaning in objective phenomena is idealism in the larger sense of the word."² Therefore to consider psychic phenomena as objects of study according to scientific methods is not contrary to realism as some naturalistic sociologists assume. "If," he concludes, "philosophy should be scientific, science should be philosophic."³

Looking at the problem of free will and determinism he believes it to be a mistake to regard it from the individualistic point of view. We should consider not the

¹ *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Études*, p. 127.

² *Ibid.*, p. 128.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

abstract individual versus nature, but the social individual versus nature, i. e. the individual in continuous interaction with other individuals. He says: "Events do not run by themselves in a certain direction, we are directing them . . . of course, the action of man upon the trend of history is not without an antecedent cause; but if my activity instead of being subjected, subjects things to itself, does it follow, that my activity, because independent of the general trend, must be independent of everything?"¹ To him the process of history is the interrelation of human activity with the process of nature.² "This," he says, "is why, although considering myself a determinist, I firmly believe in the necessity of individual interference with the process of history."³

These quotations sufficiently indicate Kareyev's attitude in the controversies upon subjectivism and objectivism which were carried on with his school. He spends much time in stating his position which here can be but briefly summarized. He does not advocate a subjective method but he emphasizes the subjective factor in society, which he believes cannot be disregarded by social science.⁴ He says: "The very principle of scientific objectivism demands that an object be studied from all sides in all its manifestations, and if we once find a subjective aspect in social facts we cannot escape from the conclusion that there is a subjective factor in sociology."⁵ Since, according to Kareyev, social life and all of history are but one and the same product of a coördinated conscious and

¹ *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes*, *Ibid.*, p. 301.

² The process of history is more fully treated in sec. iii, *infra*.

³ *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Études*, p. 302.

⁴ *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 222 *et seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

unconscious activity of individuals upon nature and upon each other, therefore, the activity of everyone is a social factor. Thus to the sociologist the principal object of investigation should be the individual in his social activity. The thinking, feeling, willing individual, who creates social institutions, and experiences their reacting influence upon himself has the right to demand a sympathetic evaluation. Kareyev concludes:

The advocates of objectivism should recognize that in sociology there necessarily arises a subjective relation since the investigator meets with phenomena which he himself has experienced in his own life. On the other hand, those who recognize a subjective factor should limit themselves to such subjectivism as has just been indicated, and must bar any other.¹

In dealing with the epistemological aspect our author recognizes four forms of knowledge: *Numenological* knowledge, which seeks for the nature of phenomena; *phenomenological* knowledge, which has to do with the phenomena themselves; *nomological* knowledge, which determines the laws under which phenomena work; and *deontological* knowledge which gives principles to our ideals. Numenological knowledge is hypothetical and cannot be listed among the empirical sciences. "These phenomena, laws, and principles . . . these three comprise the knowable to us."² According to this scheme natural sciences are limited to questions of what is, but social sciences must consider both what is and what ought to be.

A general law in science, according to Kareyev, "is a formula in which is expressed a constant relation of co-existence, or sequence."³ There are in existence not only laws of nature but also laws of the human mind and laws of

¹ *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Études*, p. 245.

² *Ibid.*, p. 195.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

human society. All these laws are natural laws. The problem of the social sciences is to discover the laws both of individual activity and of social conduct. The latter being ethical in nature has an additional philosophical element.¹

In general Kareyev adopts Comte's classification of the sciences, but would improve upon it by dividing them into phenomenological and nomological sciences corresponding respectively to Comte's concrete and abstract sciences. The advantage of this change of nomenclature shows itself, Kareyev thinks, in distinguishing the philosophy of history from sociology, and assigning to each its own province. Thus history, which describes the consecutive process of events, is a phenomenological science; whereas the constant relations of its phenomena are its philosophical aspect and must be studied by a nomological science like sociology.² Broadly speaking, sociology is "the general theory of society,"³ and philosophy of history is "that abstract phenomenology of the cultural and social life of man which has to answer the questions: what has humanity received, and what will it gain from its historic life."⁴ Thus history, the philosophy of history, and sociology are seen to be closely related to each other, history supplying the material, sociology pointing out what is constant in the historic process and the philosophy of history deducing its teleological lesson from established facts.

Besides the study of the historic process, sociology has also to deal with the social life of man in particular, which brings it again into a cross relation with biology and with psychology. "Sociology," Kareyev says, "must be directly based upon psychology which thus becomes the connecting

¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

³ *Idem.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

link between sociology and biology.”¹ Neither history nor sociology can dispense with psychology, especially social psychology. The spiritual culture of a people and its social organization are products of the psychic relations of individuals and constitute the province of social psychology. Psychology has its place, “on the border line of sociology;”² the latter still having a special task to investigate those special phenomena which cannot be explained either by biology or by psychology. Social organization, for example, he thinks a phenomenon so to be accounted for. Thus he says in another place: “Psychology has to do with spiritual culture, but sociology with social organization.”³

Kareyev sums up and presents the relation of the various aspects of sociology to biology and to psychology in the following table.⁴

	BIOLOGY	PSYCHOLOGY	SOCIOLOGY
1. Object	Species	Cultural group	Social organization
2. Indication	Organic structure	Culture	Social forms
3. Factors of unity	Physical heredity of structure	Physical tradition of culture	Conservation of social forms
4. Factors of change	Individual variation	Individual initiative	Freedom of the individual
5. Principal	Struggle for existence	Psychic interaction	Social solidarity

He gives but little attention to the statistical aspect of

¹ *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Études*, p. 141.

² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

³ *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 8.

⁴ *The Nature of the Historic Process and*, etc., p. 502. Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, pp. 99-100.

sociology, and expects little from it for the reason that he believes "empirical generalization cannot pass for sociological laws,"¹ and that statistics at their best are but samples. Kareyev's conclusion is that the general truths discovered by the special social sciences must enter into the structural woof and warp of sociology which, on its side, must synthetize and weave together the diverse products of the social sciences; therefore sociology stands much closer to political theory, to law, and to economics, than to biology, upon which alone some writers would establish it.² Thus sociology is a science which has both a wider and a narrower province. "In the first sense," says Kareyev, "it is the discovery of laws governing all phenomena in society, i. e. its social-biological, social-psychological and peculiarly social aspects. This last aspect belongs to the more narrow province of sociology."³

What are the methods of sociology? Are they those common to all other social sciences, or has sociology its own methods? Our author devotes much space to answering these questions.⁴ The gist of his conclusion is this: It is not enough to speak about a logic, or a methodology, of the

¹ *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 35.

² Defending his synthetic view against eclecticism Kareyev says: "Eclecticism is given its proper sphere only in philosophy where the individual attitude of the thinker has an important part and where the union of the two systems is brought about by compromise. An eclectic takes from various systems what suits his taste and what answers his purpose even though this union of heterogeneous ideas be incompatible with sound logic and prove contrary to the facts. In science it is different: the scientist, examining the opinion of other scientists, accepts from them only that which is actually established in logic and in facts." *Introduction to Sociology*, 3rd ed., p. 131.

³ *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes*, p. 145. The author himself devotes his attention principally to what he calls the wider province of sociology.

⁴ Cf. his *Introduction to Sociology*, 3rd ed., pp. 180-230.

social sciences, for there exist such differences among them that each, and, therefore, sociology as well, must have its own methodology. Sociology is a pure and abstract science, and that fact must condition its whole methodology. Although scientific logic has but two methods, the inductive, and the deductive, which in their turn are nothing more than different expressions of synthetic and analytic thinking, particularly arranged for the attainment of scientific ends, yet those two methods may have various secondary forms, such as the hypothetical, the analogical, the dialectical and the comparative; and these are used in the various social sciences and in sociological theory. The word "method" has been employed loosely in speaking, for example, about a biological or a psychological method in sociology when what has been meant, is that sociology should be based upon biology or upon psychology. Sociology must not shrink from using the deductive method because it has been misused by metaphysicians. Nor may it abstain from using the inductive method merely because John Stuart Mill has rightly shown that induction as used by natural sciences may not be applied to social phenomena, which are always complex. Induction must adapt itself to its material. The comparative historical method is valuable and permits of the deductive method by generalization from particular cases. Kareyev concludes that "Neither the general logic of the social sciences, nor the methodology of history, political economy, law and politics, is sufficient to take the place of a sociological methodology which still awaits its complete development by sociologists."¹

II. *What is Society in its Various Aspects*

What is society? Is it an organism, or a mechanism, or a psychic phenomenon? Kareyev devotes much attention

¹ Cf. his *Introduction to Sociology*, 3rd ed., p. 222.

and effort to answer by a careful analysis of the various theories built upon one or another assumption. The gist of his critique and his own deduction will be considered in the following pages.

Is society an organism? Our author replies in the negative, making the following comparison between an organism and society :

An organism is a concrete whole, society is discrete. The parts of the former are unconscious beings, the parts of the latter are conscious beings. The ties of the one are material, and of the other spiritual. The former absorbs its parts, the members of the latter retain their individuality. The one changes arbitrarily, the other adapts forms to its needs through the activity of its members. In the organism there is developed a general organ of feeling with unity of consciousness; in society there is no common organ of feeling, the individual retains the consciousness of his ego and expresses his adherence to the whole by the form *we*. The organism is something limited in space, while society has no particular form. The former bears in itself the germ of its death; the latter is created for lastingness and for immortality. The development of the one takes place by a differentiation of its whole at the expense of the integrity of its parts; the progress of the other consists in the development of the individual by the aid of the whole. The former postulates no goal; the latter lives by its teleological ideals.¹

In this manner Kareyev disposes of the organic view of society. He believes that the Darwinian principles which hold true in animal society should not be applied to human society. He says: "Darwinism cannot be unreservedly accepted by social science because the sociological principle of solidarity, without which even the smallest society cannot

¹ *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 88.

exist, is an antithesis to the biological law of the struggle for existence.”¹ Where once there was animal struggle, now psychic interaction and social solidarity have become prevalent. Where once there was organic heredity, now cultural and social traditions are the determining factors in human society. Where once there was individual variation of the organism, now individual human initiative and man's independence in social organization are substituted in the historic life of mankind. Thus in human society the process of natural selection,—which consists in individual variation perpetuated through heredity and by the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence,—is offset by another process which begins in individual initiative but has a chance of becoming traditional through psychic interaction and resulting changes in social organization, which tend to become permanent if there is an increasing solidarity of the interacting individuals. This social process may be progressive or regressive, as also natural selection may be which does not always perfect the organism, but merely adapts it to its actual environment. Upon this reasoning Kareyev establishes the principal differences between human and animal societies. He does not deny that animal societies have some psychic characteristics similar to those which are found in human society. “Animal social forms are the transitional stages from organism. They have some psychic characteristics similar to those which are found dominant in human society. He says: “animal social forms are the transitional stages between an organism and a human society . . . the social forms of animals are, biologically speaking, peculiar to each species, its members cannot pass into other forms.”² Man, on the contrary, can

¹ *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 99.

² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

simultaneously be a member of several abstract wholes. "The animal is bound to its visible aggregates, while man can become antagonistic to the acknowledged views of his society; the animal subjects itself, and enters struggles which are purely concrete in nature."¹ Thus society, according to this reasoning, is not principally a biological phenomenon nor a mechanical aggregation of independent individuals. The individuals are themselves social products, entering instantly into a heritage of tradition and culture, held together by psychic interaction and continuing to change with the aid of individual initiative. Society, therefore, is largely a psychic phenomenon: "every social organism is nothing else but a certain organization of human interrelations through which the conscious or unconscious will of human life is manifested."²

What then is society? Says Kareyev:

It is not entirely an organism, nor yet completely a development of art, but social evolution points to what it should be, namely, a living product of art, a harmonious coördination of individuals, possessing solidarity without sacrificing their individuality, and remaining individualistic without being to one another antagonistic.³

Social phenomena begin with the animal family in which temporarily several individuals live under the authority of parents: this is the biological aspect of the social aggregate. Beginning with the establishment of customary relations, which are transmitted to new generations by means of education, we have the psychological phenomena of social aggregates. And beginning with accidental and unstable massing or herding of animals for self-defense and for sub-

¹ *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 110.

² *Introduction to Sociology*, 3rd ed., p. 131.

³ *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Études*, p. 278.

sistence we have the inception of strictly social phenomena. Thus social phenomena extend over a wide range, from the natural growing of animals, up to and through civil society with its state, its law and its industrial co-operation.¹

Our author also pays some attention to the anthropological aspect of society. He distinguishes between races in the physical sense, and in the cultural sense, the former being principally a product of physical environment, while the latter are a product of superorganic environment, i. e. of a continuous psychic interaction. The psychic characters of race are more enduring than the physical characters are. Races cannot keep their unity unless their members remain in continuous psychological interrelation, and this of course becomes impossible when great distances begin to separate them. There is no necessity for racial decay so long as there is harmony between the superorganic environment and the increase of the race; abnormal use, i. e. exploitation, of the former inevitably leads to racial decay. Nationality should not be confused with race. There may be a natural nationality developed out of race coördinated with a particular culture, or there may be an artificial nationality created by political coercion. This latter kind of nationality however is in constant danger of disintegration.² Kareyev's notion of society is thus in harmony with his synthetic view in sociology. Society is a complex product of biological, psychological and environmental factors, but the psychological factor performs a dominating, organizing function manifested through the individual units in society.

¹ Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 19.

² For a detailed discussion of the author's anthropological aspect of society, cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, pp. 111-156.

III. *The Nature of the Historic Process and the Rôle of the Individual in History*

To the nature of the historic process Kareyev paid particular attention, and he incorporated the results of his investigations in one of his larger works bearing the same title as that of this section. He does not attempt to deal with the historic process metaphysically, but confines himself to its pragmatic aspect. The pragmatic process of history, he states, "consists in the generating activity of other people."¹ "In the historical process," he says elsewhere, "there take part human individuals united in societies."² The contents of the historic process being volitional acts of individuals and social changes, it becomes necessary to study the nature of man in his social reactions, especially in the psychic aspect. "Our task consists in finding out how one individual reacts upon other individuals, and why particular cases of such activity present among themselves such great differences."³ Here he also raises the question whether the *hero* and the *mob* must be considered as two distinct and separate entities in a state of psychic interaction? He concludes: that "the *hero* (a) must be placed over against other units (b, c, d, etc.), i. e. must be measured up with homogeneous and measurable factors and not with the mob; (b) the sum of units (b, c, d, etc.) is not an indivisible whole."⁴ There is a continuous mental interaction among individuals and these in their entirety make up pragmatic history. Thus the nature of the historic process is essentially psychological. Every action is a creation called forth by some

¹ *The Nature of Historic Process and the Rôle of the Individual in History*, 1st ed., p. 376.

² *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Études*, p. 148; cf. also p. 152.

³ *The Nature of the Historic Process*, etc., p. 376.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

previous inner or outer stimulus. "Nevertheless," says Kareyev, "each of these depends in addition upon an individual psychic process."¹

For example, the *hero* reinterprets the impressions received by him from the mob, and the impressions received by the mob from him. These in their turn are reinterpreted more or less individually before reacting upon members of the mob. The individual, therefore, is not necessarily a passive tool of history, nor is he merely a reflection of environment. "In a word," concludes Kareyev, "we acknowledge a relative independence and originality in the individual, although we do not deny the general importance of outside forces and influences."² The inequalities of reaction among persons under apparently similar conditions are attributable, on the one hand, to the complexity of the various inner and outer factors, and, on the other hand, to the individual differences among the members of society. Kareyev spends much time analyzing the sources of these differences, and he makes an attempt to divide the differing individuals into classes. Briefly stated, differences of individual activities under apparently similar conditions are attributable: (1) to the degree of dependence of a particular response upon other responses; (2) to possible expectation that an action may produce a definite response although it is a complex result of several actions; (3) to the relative consequences caused by an action as compared with other actions. In the first case, the operative cause-action is belittled in its importance by not acting alone; in the second case the importance of the operating cause-action is exaggerated. In both of these two cases, however, the fact of relativity in both cause and effect

¹ *The Nature of the Historic Process*, etc., p. 378; cf. p. 269.

² *Idem*, cf. pp. 277 and 283.

is apparent. In the third case there is an element of relative evaluation attached to the action, which increases its importance. To these three our author adds a fourth cause of difference in individual activity, which he sees in individual power of invention.¹ Although it is one of the problems of social science to classify individual minds into categories or types, Kareyev confesses his inability to do this at present, and makes but a rough classification into highest and lowest types of mind. The principal characteristic of the former is ability to plan complex activity and to coerce others to execute the plan. The lowest type is characterized by incapacity for individual initiative and willingness to be the tool of another's will.²

Thus does Kareyev analyze the nature of the pragmatic process of history. It is a continuous psychic interaction, wherein the activity of some of the members of society calls forth the activity of the others. But this influence of some persons upon others is subjected in a degree to individual change before it, in its turn, becomes an antecedent of some new activity. The degrees of development attained by individuals, as well as their social satisfactions, being thus different, the changes they produce are similarly different. The *ego* is but seldom introduced to any marked extent into the trend of events. In most cases it is largely a reflex of some one else's activity and will. Nevertheless subjective change injected into something new is the pragmatic process of history, and this fact demands a close analysis of the rôle of the individual in the historic process. To it accordingly Kareyev devotes much space. The problem is to determine the rôle of the individual in the cultural process of history," i. e. in those changes which take place in the

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 305.

² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 346-347.

material, spiritual and social forms of the life of a people.”¹ Social culture is nothing else but the coördination of continuously similar repetitions of thoughts, acts and relations of the individual members of society, subject to the psychic interactions of these members, and to conditions of environment.² What rôle does the individual play in this process, and how is his creative activity compatible with the process of evolution? These questions he raises and proceeds to answer.

Beginning with the last question he agrees that from the evolutionary point of view the change of one cultural fact by another can not be exclusively the product of human will. Evolutionary changes have their lawful relations; and yet, Kareyev reminds us, “the elements of culture develop not only according to their own laws, but also under outer influences, to which class belongs also the conscious influence of the human will.”³ The activities of man which result in cultural changes appear to have not only genetic, but also teleological elements. Together these form a coördination of causes which, in their entirety, our author calls “the sum of ends.” The general end is nothing pre-existing, it is related to individual ends and purposes as is the sum to its components.⁴ Cultural evolution should not be confused with organic evolution. In cultural evolution, individual initiative and its imitation become factors. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish among causes which condition the spread of innovation by means of imitation. The gift of invention is not pos-

¹ *The Nature of the Historic Process*, etc., p. 596.

² *Ibid.*, p. 477. Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 55.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 597. Cf. also pp. 427-428.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 598.

essed by each individual, and any innovation must have a favorable environment, lacking which it cannot spread. The environment is not merely material, although nature and economic and material forces do determine man's action to a limited degree. Kareyev calls special attention to such facts as habits, customs, passions, prejudices, and all kinds of feelings and ideas which exert an influence upon individual initiative. These psychic factors and social forms Kareyev calls a super-organic environment.¹

He says: "the tendency of super-organic environment is to deprive the individual of his independence and originality, as the individuating principle consists in the safeguarding not only of individual independence but also of the changes in cultural-social forms proceeding from individual initiative."² Individual variations may be either unconscious and unintentional or, again, conscious and intentional.³ Both unconscious and conscious changes are observable in the development of language, of law and of religion. Such exist also in the natural and artificial coöperation of economic life, and in the development of political institutions. What is the relative extent of the conscious and the unconscious factors, it is difficult to determine, because every social phenomenon is very complex. Also the historic process itself becomes an additional factor in the lives of individuals

¹ Kareyev adopts this term from Spencer. But he informs it with new content. He says: "We adapted this term to cultural-social phenomena as to an environment of a particular kind which surrounds man in society and conditions his activity." *The Nature of the Historic Process*, etc., p. 475. He calls super-organic environment also secondary environment. Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, p. 64.

² *Ibid.*, p. 598.

³ Kareyev points out that unconscious and unintentional variations are consistent with the organic viewpoint in sociology; not so, the conscious. Cf. *idem*.

of every generation.¹ Tradition is that aspect of the super-organic environment which shapes the life of generations and is the strongest obstacle to individual initiative. Still, even the firmest tradition gives to the individual a certain degree of liberty and itself undergoes considerable unnoticed changes. The relative stability of social tradition maintains unity in culture and in social organization and is of the same importance to society that organic heredity is to an animal species in maintaining unity in type.

Traditional forms, however, change through the accumulation of individual variations by means of imitation. "Thus, within the boundaries of tradition individual invention has certain liberties; changes are introduced into traditional forms by collective and individual initiative."² However, not every innovation is imitated. The new idea may not become sufficiently known, or it may not fill a felt need or want in life. On the other hand, an innovation is at times received not because there is any positive need for it, but simply because there are no forces opposing it.³ Cultural tradition then, with its imitative repetition, is the principal phenomenon of the super-organic environment. Opposed to it is individual initiative with its innovating inventions, which can have their roots only in individual life, in an innate capacity for independence and creativeness. Outer conditions either curb or develop this ability; but they can never create it.

Summing up this section in which are presented Kareyev's

¹ Cf. *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Études*, p. 153.

² *Ibid.*, p. 505. Kareyev recognizes the similarity of his views to those of Tarde; he says: "When I became acquainted with the works of Tarde I recognized the similarity of our thinking." *Ibid.*, p. 508. Kareyev was, however, inclined towards the study of imitation by the works of Mikhalovsky, which fact he acknowledges appreciatively.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 440-441.

views on the nature of the historic process and the rôle of the individual in history, we see: (1) that the historic process has two aspects, the pragmatic and the cultural. These two are not parallel currents but are continually crossing each other and are reciprocally conditioned by continuous interaction. In the pragmatic process of history the agents are human individuals; in the cultural process they are cultural forms. (2) The rôle of the individual is not to be understood by the opposition: the *hero* versus the *mob*. All individuals play both an active and a passive part; they are not equal, they have a wide range of differences. (3) Individual activity and cultural evolution are in continuous interaction, but they stand in various relations to each other, presenting proportions to which a graded scale is applicable. Finally, the individuating principle manifests itself with particular force in a small group, whereas cultural tradition is spread by the masses or by the majority.¹ From the nature of the historic process Kareyev believes that deductions may be arrived at upon which a scientific theory of progress may be erected.

IV. *The Sociological Problem of Progress*

(1) ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF PROGRESS

Sociology strives to attain to a purely objective knowledge of social evolution. Hence its deductions as to a possible future are based not upon subjective wishes but upon facts independent of individual bias. In the idea of progress it becomes necessary to distinguish between objective-scientific and subjective-ethical aspects. Some schools of sociology have tried to eliminate the subjective-ethical aspect as unscientific, but it is found nevertheless in the theories of even

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 626.

the extreme objectivists.¹ According to Kareyev the idea of progress is but a certain subjective concept of evolution, it is psychological and ethical and is without metaphysical presuppositions. He says: "The social ideal must be compatible not only with ethical, judicial, economic and political notions, but it must also be psychologically and sociologically possible, its realization must be probable and it must be viewed as the necessary resultant of the whole process of social evolution."² The practical significance of the sociological idea of progress would appear in an evolutionary formula, which should present both the goal and the means of progress. A theory of progress must have both deontological and nomological component elements, and these again must stand in such a coördinated relation to each that the theory will not expose the knowledge of the end without the knowledge of the means. The goal without the means becomes a mere ideology. And the means without the goal are without purpose. He believes that a goal of progress cannot be constructed without a subjective aspect. He says:

Each condition in life is of a many-sided complexity, whose elements in part favor and in part obstruct progress; the same thing may exert different influences in various stages of its progress. Therefore a subjective discrimination becomes necessary. A formula of progress must present merely the general tendency and not particular means of progress, for such will necessarily differ in various cases, under various conditions. In taking a broad view, such as would cover the complete de-

¹ Kareyev claims that an optimistic attitude on the part of a materialistic evolutionist is not warranted by the actual data and that it is introduced by the subjective opinion of the investigator. Cf. *Introduction to Sociology*, 3rd ed., p. 369.

² *Ibid.*, p. 383.

velopment of personality and everything that aids it, the sociologist will avoid one-sided views. These in part account for the diversity of views on progress.¹

It also becomes necessary to determine in what this development consists and under what conditions it is possible. Then also it becomes necessary to make clear those particular processes which develop in man an ideal individuality; and again what outward conditions are necessary for the purpose. Finally, having investigated the laws which make these processes possible, and having refused to accept abstract ideas, one may develop a completely scientific theory of progress. A formula of progress cannot be arrived at by the *a posteriori* method alone. Induction and a purely objective method may give a formula of evolution but not one of progress. The investigator has to approach his problem *a priori* in harmony with an ideal of human life.²

(2) WHAT IS PROGRESS, AND WHAT IS A PROGRESSIVE
PROCESS?

Kareyev has written a good deal on these questions. In his various works are found descriptions and definitions of progress and of the progressive process of history in the sociological sense. The gist of these descriptions and definitions follows:

¹ Kareyev gives five reasons for the existence of great diversity in the formulas of progress. "(1) Over-emphasized subjectivism creates a one-sided formula; (2) the desire to deduce a formula directly from the facts presented makes it only applicable to the organic aspect; (3) this latter condition hinders the bringing together of the separate formulas under a common denominator; (4) insufficient acquaintance with the laws of nature, of mind and of society results in a disregard of important aspects of progress; (4) finally, the striving towards simplicity makes formulas too narrow." *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 208.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 202.

"Progress is nothing else than the interpretation of the meaning of life by postulating higher and higher goals, and the attainment of these ends by the aid of a growing culture and a social organization which makes possible an increasing reaction upon nature."¹ Enlarging upon this view of progress he says elsewhere in the same book. "Progress is such an evolution as on the whole corresponds to our ideal. A true philosophy of progress must be a synthesis,—of faith in the possibility of progress, with the knowledge of the laws of evolution."² Therefore progress is that which gives man new means in the struggle for existence. The struggle is viewed, however, not as a contest with one's neighbor but as a conflict with environing nature. By increasing his knowledge of technical inventions for the attainment of the means of life man ennobles the struggle for existence. Such knowledge manifests itself in sympathy, altruism, conscience and the sense of justice. These counteract individual struggles among men; they create in social organization forms of social life, and regulations of social relations and coöperation, that make individual struggle unnecessary and harmful. Such progress, however, is only possible when psychically developed individuals have entered into spiritual relations and have become units in a society.³ Thus by progress is meant either the perfection of the individual in his psychic relations, or the improvement of material relations among members of society, or a gradual rise of social forces that are favorable to the development of the individual and to his control and exploitation of nature. In this manner progress has its intellectual, moral, social and economic phases.

¹ *Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Études*, p. 206.

² *Ibid.*, p. 351.

³ Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 95.

Synthetizing these various phases, Kareyev gives us the following formula of progress: "Progress, on the one hand, is the gradual elevation of the standard of human development accompanied by conditions which make it possible for a larger and larger number to attain this standard; on the other hand, it is the most just division of labor among mankind."¹ In this sense the prototype of progress appears to be individual psychic development "which is not only an objective fact of observation but also a subjective fact of consciousness."² Thus, in its narrower sense, progress does not consist in organic evolution accomplished by means of organic heredity, but in superorganic evolution ever changing through criticism and through the creativeness of the human mind and perpetuating itself in tradition.³ The interchange of thoughts, feelings and traditions is the first and principal condition of mental progress. The union of individuals for the attainment of general ends creates social solidarity and organization. It eliminates individual struggle from within the aggregate and through coöperation it makes individual moral and mental development possible.⁴ Kareyev emphasizes the psychic aspect of progress because he believes that man's ideals and spiritual interests far outweigh his material interests. He differs from any philosophers who may be said to teach that man thinks in order to eat. In Kareyev's theory man eats in order to think.

The development of spiritual interests in man is, however, unthinkable apart from political forms that emancipate

¹ Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. iii, p. 214.

² *Ibid.*, p. 215.

³ Cf. for more detailed discussion of super-organic evolution, sec. iii, *supra*, pp. 189 *et seq.*

⁴ Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 223.

the individual from subordination to the aggregate and transform him into a free member of society. So the development of moral convictions in man is unthinkable without a coincident progress of justice, which protects the individual from arbitrary force that would make him subject to law alone. So the abolition of the physical or animal struggle for existence is unthinkable without economic institutions that can emancipate the individual from the cruder forms of exploitation and transform him into a coöperating member of society, himself conscious of social solidarity. These separate processes of political, moral, social and economic development are integral parts of the complex process of social progress, and mutually they condition each other.

This general concept of progress Kareyev divides into five particular concepts. He says:

Mental progress is educating the capacity for realizing spiritual interests and improving our views of the life of the world. Moral progress is educating the power to act according to conviction and to improve the principles of ethics. Political progress is the development of freedom and the betterment of the state. Judicial progress is the development of equality and the betterment of the institutions of law and justice. Economic progress is the development of solidarity and the betterment of ways of obtaining the means of existence.¹

Kareyev realizes that all these aspects of progress may develop simultaneously and concurrently only under peculiarly favorable conditions. But clearly, it is because such conditions have not existed heretofore, that progress has been so unstable. He adds, however, that "progress is a process which gradually improves itself, i. e. it gradually

¹ Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 239.

creates new means for its own stability, which man has the power to realize." ¹

In the actual history of society, progress and regress have been realized principally in crises. "We call progressive that crisis which breaks up regressive evolution; and we call regressive that crisis which breaks up progressive evolution." ² Throughout history nature has made no leaps in the evolution of society from the animal stage to ideal society, from occasional aggregations of savage to well organized civilized nations. There have been, however, certain transitional stages between the beginnings of social aggregation and modern society. These our author classifies in the following manner: ³

(1) Primitive societies of savage tribes are characterized by the rule of force, by antagonism, by the struggle for existence, by particularism and individualism. This is the stage of anarchy;

(2) Societies, which maintain the rule of crude force, of antagonism and the struggle for existence, but which are already centralized, although by force, and differentiated through the appearance of caste and by economic exploitation. This is the stage of the union of despotism with anarchy.

(3) Societies wherein the rule of crude force is diminishing, where antagonism and the struggle for existence are growing less fierce. These are more disciplined; authority is acknowledged in them and subjection to it is more conscious. This is the stage of the weakening of despotism and anarchy;

(4) Societies in which crude force, antagonism and the

¹ Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 241.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 244.

struggle for existence are still more suppressed; wherein the individual is gradually being liberated from the control of his environment, and wherein society is being freed from the rule of caste. In these, societies voluntary subjection to authority and a civil consciousness are on the increase. This is the stage of the coördination of freedom and of order.

(5) Ideal societies would be characterized by complete solidarity, by the rule of law and by coöperation, by individuation and by equality. This would be the stage of the rule of truth and justice.

In these transitional stages a gradual decrease of animal characteristics is noticeable. Stages one, two and three approach the conditions of an organism and are in danger of entering upon an evolution without reformatations and without those progressive crises which would advance them to the higher stages that are both more stable and more fit for progress. "A new humanity," says Kareyev, "seems to strive towards cultural cosmopolitanism in spite of the nationalistic trend of recent decades."¹

3. THE GENERAL LAW OF PROGRESS

"The general law of historic progress," according to Kareyev, "can be nothing else than the expression of the possible way of human progress."² The goal of progress is the development of individuality, and in this sense progress consists "in the self-liberation of personality through the recasting of cultural ideas and social forms of institutions in the direction of a set goal."³ But since it is the general tendency of the super-organic environment to repress individual initiative a conflict seems to be inevitable.

¹ Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 252.

² *Ibid.*, p. 256.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

Progress therefore can be achieved only through a compromise between the individual and the social interests, and by remaking super-organic environment to meet the needs of the individual. "History," says our author, "consists in the evolution of the super-organic environment which is a product of the non-rational activity of man. The remaking of this environment by critical thought is the only definitely progressive factor of history."¹ In designating the law of progress as a compromise of opposites, Kareyev approaches the Hegelian idea, especially when he says:

Thesis is the self-conditioning of the individual in the face of social and cultural forms; antithesis is the subjection of the individual's self to ideas and institutions of super-organic environment; synthesis is the subjection of the super-organic environment to the individual, and the self-conditioning of the individual with the aid of culture and social organization.²

Progress, then, is possible only when conscious activity outbalances the unconscious; when purposefulness displaces arbitrariness. Progress is based upon critical thought and not upon some hap-hazard activity of mind. Arriving at his final conclusion as to progress and as to its general law, Kareyev says:

progress is a forward movement through the development of opposites, and such is the formula of social progress. In order that something may progress it is necessary to deny what has preceded it. In social progress we may differentiate two evolutions: The evolution of organizations, consisting in their in-

¹ Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 270.

² *Idem*. Kareyev claims not to apply the Hegelian formula to the actual process of history as did Hegel, whom Kareyev thinks mistaken in this. Kareyev adopts merely a rational construction of an abstract formula of progress.

tegration and differentiation; and the evolution of the individual. These two are antagonistic developments. Organization strives to transform itself into an organism which absorbs the individual, the individual on the contrary strives for freedom. Viewing social progress from this aspect we may give it this formula; first stage: freedom of the individual from social control; second stage: negation of freedom through the rise and development of institutions which tend to transform society into an organism; third stage: negation of social control by means of adapting institutions to individual self-direction.¹

The process we already have indicated, and it is analogous to intellectual progress in the formation of the individual's opinion of the universe. In the first stage weak logic is controlled by a strong imagination, since imagination develops much faster than logic. During the second stage imaginary concepts still predominate over critical thought. In the third stage critical thought gradually becomes strong enough to secure control of the imagination. Concretely we see the helpless individual of primitive society struggling to survive by the aid of an imperfect social organization which soon, however, becomes stronger than himself and begins to control him rigidly, until by the aid of coöperation the individual, in his turn, recasts society more in harmony with individual interests.

The law of the compromise of opposites shows itself also in the political, judicial and economic aspects of social organization. In politics liberty first approaches anarchy, then there is a negation of liberty by the development of despotic control, and finally there comes a negation of despotism by the establishment of order through liberty.

In law, by reason of its close relation with morals, progress is analogous to the progress of ethics. First there is

¹ Cf. *Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History*, vol. ii, p. 293.

equality of all because law is non-existent; then law is established upon non-equality; finally, equality is re-established upon law.

In economic relations there is first uniform solidarity because of the severity of the struggle for existence. Then there is caste solidarity for the purpose of exploiting the weaker classes and using them as tools. Finally, there is an increasing general solidarity and the gradual cessation of the exploitation of the many by the few.¹ This briefly sums up Kareyev's idea of social progress in its various phases. Here is the goal of his sociological theorizing.

V. Conclusion: Kareyev and the Subjectivist School of Russian Sociologists

With Kareyev we may close our analysis of the subjectivist school of Russian sociologists. The four authors studied represent the whole range of ideas advanced and developed by this school.¹ If we ask what there is in common in the works of the four writers analyzed, we may answer that they all adhere to the principles of the positivistic and empiricist philosophy which they believe to be compatible with the subjective-teleological ideas introduced by them into sociology. Lavrov is the extremist. He has introduced a socially evolved, categorical imperative. All have adopted Comte's classification of the sciences, except, however, that they regard psychology and ethics as transi-

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 244, 245 and 293.

² Other authors of this school who may be mentioned are Ivanov Rasumik, who analyzed the historical rôle of the individual as pictured in Russian literature and the rôle of the intellectual class in general as a factor in social progress, and whose principal works are: "History of Russian Social Thought," "The Meaning of Life," "What is the Makhaevchina"; and S. N. Bulgakov, a converted Marxist, who advocated the subjectivist point of view in his articles in *Questions of Philosophy and Psychology*, 1896, and in the *New World*, 1897.

tional and relatively independent sciences, lying between biology and sociology. Although they have written much on sociological method they have not gotten far beyond what was said upon this subject by John Stuart Mill. All of our writers reject in principle the deductions of the biologic-organic school of sociology, and of the impersonal mechanistic view of the dialectic school of economic determinists. They all agree that the dynamic of the social process is a complex of psychical, biological, physical and economic forces. They emphasize, however, the psycho-social activities and the work of the critically-minded individual as determining factors in progress within organized society.

Mikhailovsky should be recognized as the most original among Russian sociologists. He alone of this school developed an independent system. Lavrov, Youzhakov and Kareyev were principally synthetizers, emphasizing one or another of the various aspects of sociology and occasionally introducing a new idea. To Kareyev belongs the honor of being the most thorough and extensive scholar, but to Lavrov must be conceded priority in originating that trend of thought and method which the Russian subjectivist school of sociologists claims as peculiarly its own. Whether these writers succeeded in elaborating a complete organic synthesis of sociological theories may be questioned. It is our impression, however, that they did make a good start in this necessary work which at present is being carried on by many sociologists both in Europe and in America. The theoretical contribution of Russian sociology should, however, not eclipse the fact that first and foremost the subjectivist school of Russian sociology was a rationalizing effort to give intellectual bearing to the social-political movements of a people aspiring to found a democracy. This fact gives it a definite stamp, and makes it peculiarly and above all a truly national Russian Sociology.

PART III
MISCELLANEOUS SCHOOLS AND TRENDS
OF RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE OBJECTIVIST SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGICAL CRITICISM (THE ORTHODOX MARXISTS PLEKHANOV AND LVOV)

THE popularity of the subjectivist school with its populist propaganda and with its hope of a special, non-capitalistic, social-economic evolution of Russia was diminished by the introduction of the Marxian philosophy of social evolution. Russian Marxism both possessed a sociological theory and made a practical appeal. The latter was directed to the rapidly increasing city proletariat, whereas the former was seized upon by the intellectual classes and by them exploited for an attack upon the subjectivist sociology which in the eighties had reached the zenith of its popularity. Hegel, Feuerbach and the English and French materialists had prepared the Russian mind for the philosophy of Marx. The readiness to embrace the Marxian creed is the more easily understood when we remember that the desire of the Russian intellectuals was to cast off the yoke of autocracy and to emancipate the individual. Marx's social philosophy showed that changes in the forms of production are followed by an inevitable change of social and political institutions.¹ The Marxian or Objectivist Sociologists were divided into two factions. The orthodox, who were championed by the "father" of Russian Marxism, Plekhanov, and his pupils and friends² and the

¹ Cf. Plekhanov, *History of Russian Social Thought*, Petrograd, 1914, vol. i, p. 129.

² Of these we may mention Lenin, Ulianov, Patressov, and Maslov. They voiced their opinions principally in the socialist monthly, "The Contemporary World," and in other publications.

heterodox Neo-Marxists and Revisionists, of whom Struve and Tugan Baronofsky are the principal exponents.

I. *Plekhanov's Marxist Sociology*

Plekhanov¹ is not only the first but also the foremost of the Orthodox Marxist School in Russia. His principal sociological work is *On the question of the development of the Monistic Conception of History*; it is inscribed to Mikhailovsky and Kareyev as the surviving champions of the subjectivist school and its avowed purpose is to controvert their views by developing the Marxian monistic conception of history and social evolution. A brief analysis of Plekhanov's theory of social evolution follows:

1. Plekhanov's critique of the non-Marxian subjective sociologists and Russian populists.
2. Plekhanov's philosophical and methodological presuppositions.
3. Plekhanov's theory of history or of social evolution.

I. PLEKHANOV'S CRITIQUE OF THE NON-MARXIAN SUBJECTIVE SOCIOLOGISTS AND RUSSIAN POPULISTS

Plekhanov who, to begin with, was an ardent Russian populist, became in the early eighties after his conversion to Marxism, just as ardent and militant an advocate of this new political and social creed. His attacks were directed against the leaders of the Russian populist movement and he ridi-

¹ Georgy Valentinovitch Plekhanov (1857-) is one of Russia's famous revolutionists; he founded the Marxian wing of Russian Social Democracy. In 1880 he was forced to leave his native land, nor has he been allowed to return thither. Being considered legally an undesirable citizen, he was compelled to write under various pseudonyms as N. Beltov, Volgin, Valentinov, etc. He enjoys an international reputation as Russia's most scholarly Marxist. His writings cover the various phases of the Russian socialist and revolutionary movement and are written for propaganda or for polemical purposes.

culed as utopian their hope for a special non-capitalistic social evolution of the Russian people.¹ Plekhanov classed the Russian populist leaders among the French and English utopian socialists of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The populist movement received its intellectual bearings from subjectivist sociology, especially that of Lavrov and Mikhlovsky,² and, therefore, Plekhanov pours out his wrath fiercely against this school in a manner which, to a foreign observer, seems hardly warranted but which, nevertheless, proves how intensely nationalistic these Russian sociologists were. Thus the "objectivism" of the Marxist school proves to be highly colored by passionate subjectivism which actually discredits its claim as a truly scientific theory.³ Plekhanov's attack upon the subjectivist school is directed first upon its "subjective" method which

¹ This hope even Marx had cherished at the time of the Russian transition period which began with the emancipation of the serfs. He expressed his opinion in this regard in a letter to the editor of the "Otechestvennyy Zapiski". This letter was later used by Mikhlovsky and other populists as an argument against the Russian Marxists. Plekhanov explains away Marx's wording in that letter which he claims was written not as an argument but as a letter of consolation, intended for the purpose of quieting the troubled young Mikhlovsky, who worried over the inevitable doom of the Russian commune. "It was necessary," says Plekhanov, "to show the young Russian author that dialectical materialism does not condemn any nation to anything, that it does not show a general and 'inevitable' way for all people and at any given time; but that the development of any given society always depends upon the coördination of the inner social forces, and therefore it is necessary for every serious man to study the existing coördination, for only such study can show what is determined or indetermined for a given society." *On the Question of the Development of the Monistic Conception of History*, 4th ed., p. 218.

² *Vide supra*, pp. 39-40.

³ This intense polemical spirit shows itself in all of Plekhanov's sociological writings and especially in his book, *A Critique of Our Critics*, Petrograd, 1906.

he identifies with the idealists' presupposition that ideas of individuals shape environment and history and not that environment conditions and determines man's ideas.¹

Secondly, Plekhanov attacks the subjectivists' idea that society is the product of the interaction of social forces or factors. "What is 'a social-historical factor'?" he asks. His answer is that

"a social-historical factor" is an abstraction, the conception of it arising by means of abstraction and because of this abstracting process, the different aspects of the social integer take on the appearance of particular categories, and the different phenomena and expression of activity of the social man, as morals, law, economic forms, etc., are transformed in our mind into particular forces, as if they were advancing and conditioning this activity, which is its final or ultimate cause.²

Therefore interaction of the factors explains nothing; it only leads one into a vicious circle which reduces itself to the formula: that environment creates man and man creates environment. Or, in other words, "the development of human nature interprets itself through its collective needs, and on the other hand the development of collective needs interprets itself through the development of human nature."³ In order to free oneself from the subjectivistic eclecticism and to escape the vicious circle in which it has continually been moving, Plekhanov says that

¹ *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic Conception of History*, p. 26. Plekhanov thinks that even Comte did not emerge from this vicious circle, but that, despite all his positivistic pretences, he only "chewed over" the ideas of St. Simon, and the ideas of the anonymous author of "De la physiologie appliquée a l'amélioration des institutions sociales." Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 54-56.

² Cf. *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic Conception of History*, p. 9.

³ *A Critique of Our Critics*, p. 311.

we must find that historical factor which created both the characteristics of a given people and its form of government, the factor that created the very possibility of their interaction. If we find such factor, we shall have the correct point of view sought for, and then without any difficulty we shall solve the disturbing contradiction.¹

As the reader may readily surmise, Marxism is the "point of view" that will furnish the key to the mysteries of the universe!²

The role of the exceptional individual as a factor of progress was emphasized by the subjectivist school.³ This view Plekhanov attacks as an antiquated utopian doctrine, which cannot successfully be maintained against the criticism of dialectical materialism. "The peculiarities of reason of a given time can be understood only in relation to the peculiarities of reason of the preceding epoch."⁴ At its best, therefore, the genius surpasses his contemporaries only in that sense, that "*he earlier than they grasps the meaning of new generating social relations.*"⁵ This, Plekhanov believes, justifies him in seeing in the genius nothing but a product of his environment. And since the dialectic process of evolution has no set goal, everything being in the process of change, formulas of progress have no meaning whatsoever.⁶

¹ Cf. *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic*, etc., p. 11. Cf. also p. 166.

² *Vide infra*, p. 213 et seq.

³ *Vide supra*, p. 202.

⁴ *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic*, etc., p. 173.

⁵ *Idem.* Italics are Plekhanov's.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 87.

2. PLEKHANOV'S PHILOSOPHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

Plekhanov describes himself as a *dialectic and monistic Materialist*. He believes that there can be but two types of philosophy: the idealistic and materialistic. He says: "All those philosophers in whose view the prime factor is matter belong to the camp of materialists; but all those who consider this factor spirit, are idealists."¹ Epistemologically he holds to Engel's naive, pragmatic realism expressed in the old prosaic epigram: "The proof of the pudding is the eating thereof." The criterion of truth is not subjective but social. It "lies not in me, but in the relations existing outside of me,"² says Plekhanov. Hence "*true*" are the opinions which correctly represent these relations; "*wrong*" are those opinions which misrepresent them. "True" is that theory of natural science which correctly grasps the mutual relations of the phenomena of nature; "*true*" is that historical description which correctly depicts the social relations of the epoch under description."³ Our author reviews the history of materialism in the eighteenth century and places the blame for its failure to maintain itself in the face of the revival of German idealism upon its conclusion that man is the product of environment, and that the changes of environment are the product of man. In this manner they were entrapped in the same vicious circle from which the older schools of philosophers in vain tried to escape. This perplexity was solved by Hegel's great contribution of the dialectic method, which, when freed from its idealistic accretions, enriched the older materialism and made of it the philosophy of the new age. Plekhanov, who

¹ Cf. *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic*, etc., p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 178.

³ *Idem*. Italics are Plekhanov's.

anticipates the accusation of Hegelianism, defends the great teacher and ranks his contribution, as it appears in Marx, with that of Copernicus, of Darwin, and of the other immortals.¹ Dialectics is the principle of all life. "Every motion is a dialectical process and a living contradiction; and since in the interpretation of every phenomenon of nature in the last instance it becomes necessary to appeal to motion, so we must agree with Hegel who said, that *dialectics is the soul of scientific knowledge.*"² The most important aspect of the dialectic process is that it affirms "the transition of quantity into quality."³ If everything moves, everything changes, "*every phenomenon sooner or later is inevitably transformed into its own opposite by the activity of those very forces which condition its existence.*"⁴ Thus, if every phenomenon negates itself, no institution can be of absolute or of permanent value; everything is good in its place and in its time, that is to say, relatively good. "Dialectical thinking excludes every Utopia, and, in fact, any formula of progress with a set goal. Social forms do constantly change, by reason of "the higher development of their content."⁵ Thus does Plekhanov express his mysteries of Hegel, who furnished the key to unlock the mysteries of the universe and to rid humanity of every utopian view of society.

The idealistic dialecticians, however, failed to exploit their new method properly, and by identifying the dialectic process with logical thinking they returned to the old view which explained everything by human nature, "since thinking is one of the aspects of human nature."⁶

Plekhanov explains that the earlier idealists remained in

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 176.

² *Ibid.*, p. 62. Italics are Plekhanov's.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64. Italics are Plekhanov's.

⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

the dark as to the true nature of social relations. It remained therefore for the young Hegelians Feuerbach and the Bauer Brothers, and especially for Marx and Engels to emancipate dialectics from its subjective idealism and to apply it to an objective materialism,¹ which viewed human nature and social relations as an ever-changing product of the historic process entirely independent of any individual's ideals or wishes.²

Plekhanov is in philosophy and method an Hegelian who, following Marx, inverted Hegel's idealism into materialism. To Hegel objective history was but the reflection of the absolute which he arrived at from subjective process. To the dialectic materialist the real is but the objective world and process, of which the subjective is but the reflex. "For us," says Plekhanov, "the absolute idea is but the abstraction of motion, by which is called forth all coördination and condition of matter."³ Upon this philosophy and by means of the dialectic method Marx and Engels developed their history of social evolution which Plekhanov attempts to defend and to develop as a sociological theory.⁴

3. PLEKHANOV'S THEORY OF HISTORY OR OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Plekhanov attempts to be the Russian *alter ego* of Marx.

¹ "At the basis of our dialectics lies the materialistic conception of nature. . . . It would fall were this the fate of materialism. And inversely: without dialectics . . . a materialistic theory of knowledge is impossible." Plekhanov in his introduction to his Russian translation of Engel's *Feuerbach*, 1st ed., Geneva, 1895, p. xxv.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 108.

³ Introduction to Engel's *Feuerbach*, p. xxvi.

⁴ Plekhanov believes that dialectics are inevitable to sociology. He says: "In order to understand the important rôle of dialectics in *Sociology*, it is enough to remember in what way *Socialism* out of an *utopia* was transformed into a *science*." *Ibid.*, p. xxviii.

He aims to interpret Marx so as to suppress the popular subjectivist school of Russian sociology. Marx's theory of social evolution he expresses as follows: "In order to exist, man must support his organism, which support he obtains by utilizing natural environment. This dependence presupposes a certain reaction of man upon nature, but while reacting upon natural environment man's nature also changes."¹ Our author differentiates environment into geographic environment or the conditions of place, and into historic environment or the conditions of time. "Geographic environment acts upon a given people, but it does so through the medium of social relations, which take either one or another form as they hasten or retard the growth of productive forces in possession of that given people."² Man is differentiated from the animal because his ancestors learned the use of tools. Implements of labor are equal to new organs and react upon the anatomical structure of the tool-using individual. "Quantitative differences are passing into qualitative differences."³ History takes a new trend of development. It is the era of the perfecting of his artificial organs, of the growth of productive forces. As the perfecting of the tool begins to play a determining part in man's existence, "social life itself begins to change in accordance with the development of the productive forces."⁴ The tools of production are analogous not so much to new organs of the individual man as to those of the social man. Therefore every definite change in the manner of production is inevitably followed by a change

¹ *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic*, etc., p. 108.

² *History of Russian Social Thought*, Petrograd, 1914, vol. i, p. 1.

³ *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic*, etc., p. 109. Cf. also p. 147.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

in social structure. The role of geographic environment is all-important in this transitional period. Says Plekhanov:

It was because of peculiar characteristics of geographic environment, that our anthropomorphic ancestors rose to those heights of mental development which were necessary for their transition into tool-making animals. And, again, only some peculiarities of that same environment could give favorable opportunity for the use and for the continuous perfecting of this new achievement—the making of tools.¹

The ability to make tools is constant with man, but the application of this ability in practice is continually changing. "At any given time the criterion of this ability is conditioned by the criterion of the already attained development of productive forces."² Thus the further development of any given people at any given time depends upon the degree of development to which it has already attained. For example, the slave system of the Greek Republics made a practical use of Archimedes' inventions impossible.³ Plekhanov does not deny to intellect the power of invention, but he believes that the economic background alone can explain why intellect acts in some one certain manner and not differently.

Every ideal and social institution — whether it be the family, the state, property, or law,—every institution changes with any alteration in the process of production.⁴ Changes are at first quantitative and finally become qualitative. Qualitative changes present in themselves revolution-

¹ *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic*, etc., p. 114.

² *Ibid.*, p. 115.

³ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 118.

⁴ In defending this theory, Plekhanov attempts to prove his case by anthropological data. All changes in social institutions, the beginnings of art, even the play of children, are to him but the reflex of economic conditions. *Cf. A Critique of Our Critics*, last two chapters, especially pp. 383 *et seq.*

ary phenomena, i. e. the change is not gradual, but one which has come by leaps and bounds after relatively long periods of apparent quiet.¹

According to Plekhanov these changes though often masquerading as ethical and religious movements, have an economic cause. "The *psychology* of society adapts itself to its *economy*. Upon a given *economic basis* there inevitably develops a corresponding *ideological superstructure*."² This Plekhanov maintains is a monistic process: economics and psychology are but two aspects of one and the same thing. He says:

Every new step in the development of the productive energies, forces a people in their every day life into new relationships which do not correspond to the passing form of production. These new and never heretofore existing relations reflect themselves in the psychology of the people, and change it. But in what direction? Some members of society defend the old order, these are the static people. Others, to many of whom the old order is not profitable, want the new. Their psychology changes in the direction of those *relations of production which in time will be substituted for the old economic order*. . . . Once this revolution is accomplished a complete correlation of the psychology of society with that of economics is established. On the soil of the new economy flourishes the new psychology, and for a time the relation remains undisturbed; it even continues to perfect itself. But little by little new differences show themselves: the psychology of the progressive class again outlives the old relations of production. Not ceasing to adapt itself to the economic background, it, however, again begins to adapt itself to the new scheme of production, which is the seed of the economics of the future.³

¹ Cf. *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic*, etc., p. 147.

² *Ibid.*, p. 152. Italics are Plekhanov's.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153. Italics are Plekhanov's.

The simplicity of this psychology is offset and complicated by the historical environment of every social aggregate. The historical environment of any one group is never entirely like that of other groups. This heterogeneity of historical environment, plus the economic differences existing within the group, intensifies the class struggle which expresses itself through political and industrial organizations. The class struggle he regards as the realistic expression of abstract, dialectical materialism. Historically, it shows itself first in the disintegration of primitive communism, leading to inequality and to the rise of classes with different and often with conflicting interests. These classes are in and among themselves engaged in a continuous, hidden or open, struggle which reflects itself in their ideologies.¹ Summarizing Plekhanov's theory of social evolution² we see that, like all other animals, our pre-human ancestors were in the beginning in complete subjection to nature. Their development was brought about unconsciously through adaptation to environment and by means of natural selection. During this period we find no signs of self-consciousness and therefore no freedom; it is the reign of physical necessity. Somehow man began to differentiate from the rest of the animal world into a tool-making animal. Tools are artificial organs directed towards the subjection of environment to man's own interest. So gradually nature is more or less subdued to the conscious will of man. The degree of the development of the productive forces conditions the extent of man's control over nature. These productive forces, in turn, are conditioned by the characteristics of geographic environment. In other words, nature furnishes man with the means for its own subjection. Man's struggle with nature is therefore

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 166.

² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 192, and 197-200.

a social one. The degree and nature of man's sociability is conditioned by the extent of the development of the productive forces which also condition the development of the structure of society. Geographic environment determines the rise of productive forces; hence it is antecedent to the development of the social structure. Once, however, certain social relations have come into being, their further development proceeds according to their own inner laws, the energy of which may hasten or retard the development of productive forces which, in their turn, condition the historical development of mankind. Geographic environment acts now upon man through the medium of historic environment and greatly changes his direct relation to nature; which varies at every stage of the development of the productive forces. The development of social environment according to its own laws, does not mean that the nature of such development depends upon the will and consciousness of the people. Whereas in the first stages of social evolution geographic environment dominated man, he is ruled now by a new slavery created by himself while utilizing his physical environment. This new slavery is *economic necessity*, which increases directly with the growth of the productive forces, and is accompanied by an ever-increasing complexity of social relations. This new social process tends completely to escape social control, the producer appearing to be the slave of his own product.¹ The logic of development of the productive and social relations leads man to realize the causes of his economic enslavement. Once conscious that the cause of his enslavement by his own product is brought about by the anarchy of production, the producer organizes his product, and in this manner subjects it to his own will. Here then ends the kingdom of necessity; freedom is sovereign,

¹ Plekhanov illustrates this by the "anarchy" of capitalistic production.

liberty itself has become a necessity. The prologue of human history has been played, the individual has been set free and history proper begins. Thus the dialectic process shows how man shall come into his own. His future is bright, and furnishes no excuse for the pessimism towards which many disappointed idealists drift.

These in brief, are Plekhanov's conclusions. His theory, by reason of its abstractness, may be a satisfactory hypothesis for a philosopher of history, but it does not satisfy a modern sociologist who is more interested in the proximate causes or antecedents of social phenomena than in their ultimate, all-determining causes. Plekhanov's criticism of the subjectivist school is little more than a criticism of philosophical presuppositions and is not directed against its sociological superstructure, much of which was arrived at by an inductive study of actually existing social facts. Plekhanov's dialectic-monistic materialism, founded upon the Hegelian philosophy, is an *a priori* metaphysical presupposition and may be charged with dogmatism. The monistic attitude towards the universe is not dictated by experience of reality; it is, rather, that emotionalism which characterized the mystic philosophy of Heraclites.

Plekhanov's charges of dualism and eclecticism, therefore, do not disturb the positivist sociologist who deals with facts and not with *a priori* presuppositions. Plekhanov ignores nearly everything accomplished by sociology from the days of Comte, and limits his criticism to the sociological thinking that preceded the rise of positivist sociology. So he over-emphasizes dialectics at the expense of the many achievements of science in biology and psychology.

Plekhanov, however, has been of real service to the Russian social-political movement. His consistent application of the dialectical logic has saved him from the confusion and despair into which other factions in the Russian

revolution have been thrown, but we cannot credit him with having contributed anything of lasting value to sociology.

II. Lvov's Marxist Sociology

Few of Plekhanov's pupils and followers have contributed anything of importance. Lvov's attempt to formulate a law of social evolution on Marxist lines may be mentioned.¹ Lvov thinks Marx the Darwin of sociology. As Darwin discovered the law of the origin and evolution of species, so Marx discovered the fact which interprets the origin of the various species of society.² This fact is the *collective labor of mankind*. Lvov discriminates it from the "division of labor" which is incoördinate and one-sided. He says: "Collective labor presupposes the combination of forces as well as their division."³ So at the basis of social life lies the fact of coöperation, which moves towards measurement and apportionment of the proceeds of labor and therefore yields a formulation of the concept of value. The laws of political economy are therefore basic. Upon them rest the quantitative phenomena of society which alone can make sociology an exact science. This quantitative element, according to Lvov, can be introduced solely in two ways: by means of the anthropologic-statistical methods and by means of a concept of value. And although the anthropologic-statistical method can be applied to other than economic phenomena they all depend upon economic need and therefore must be regarded as its superstructure and must be studied as such by sociology.⁴

These conclusions are like those of Plekhanov; the criticism applied to Plekhanov's monism is applicable to the dependent theories of Lvov.⁵

¹ In a book, *The Social Law*, Petrograd, 1899.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 153.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 155-157.

⁵ Cf. *supra*, p. 218.

CHAPTER II

THE NEO-MARXISTS STRUVE AND TUGAN-BARONOVSKY

I. *The Theories of Peter Struve*

THE widespread popularity of Marxism in Russia in the nineties waned rapidly during the first decade of the new century. The heresy in the orthodox school was caused by the revisionist movement among the German social democrats, and was also an outcome of the failure of the Russian Revolution.

Peter Struve, whose life and work are closely associated with the Marxian movement and the Russian Revolution, may be called the "Father" of the Neo-Marxists and Revisionists of Russia. His writings fall into three periods: the Orthodox Marxist period, that of the transition from Marxism to Revisionism, and that in which he rejects Marxian dialectic materialism and returns to idealism and sociological subjectivism.¹

A brief analysis of Struve's sociological criticism of the Marxian social philosophy follows:

Like Plekhanov, Struve is opposed to the populist and subjectivist sociologists who desire a special economic non-

¹ These three stages of development of Struve's ideas are most easily distinguished in the following writings: (1) "Critical Notes on the Questions of the Economic Development of Russia," Petrograd, 1894. (2) "Die Marxsche Theorie der Socialen Entwicklung," in *Archiv für Sozialgesetzgebung und Statistik*, 14 Band, Berlin, 1899. (3) "Ideas and Politics in Contemporary Russia," Moscow, 1906, and "The Intelligence and Revolution," in Vekhy, Moscow, 1908, and other works.

capitalistic evolution of Russian society and who think the individual the important factor in progress.¹ Struve depends largely upon Simmel and Riehl's sociological and psychological generalizations, which he attempts to utilize in support of the Marxian sociological presuppositions.

Struve believes that the exceptional individual may be disregarded as a factor in social evolution inasmuch as he is but the product of the social group. "The individual," he says, "is but a form-expression whose content is ascertained by investigating the social group."² The group is the sum of the various interactions among individuals which are expressed objectively in custom, laws, character, morality and religious conceptions.³ The struggle between groups or classes is the inception of social evolution and the starting point for the sociologist.⁴ Apart from his group the individual is nil, and so his ideas, apart from group facts, are of no importance as factors in social evolution. Struve says: "The idealists who moon over the preservation of the past are, in a sociological sense, a negligible quantity."⁵ Discarding the individual, and ideas, as factors, the way is prepared for the Marxian social philosophy.

Struve also rejects the notion that the state has any creative power; he sees in it but an organization for purposes of order, controlled by the ruling classes and limiting its activities to promoting their interests.⁶ These interests are principally economic; social classes express economic distinctions within a given social environment, and therefore the social progress of Russia does not depend upon the exceptional

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 212 et seq.

² *Critical Notes on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia*, 1st ed., p. 40.

³ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 33.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁶ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 72.

individual or upon the maintenance of the peasant commune. It depends upon the increase and a more equal distribution of economic surplus, obtainable only through the medium of capitalistic production. He says: "Capitalism . . . socializes not only the product but also the producer. It turns man into a truly social being through binding up his individual existence by a thousand threads with the whole of the social organism."¹

Production on the large scale, requiring, as it does, many consumers, prepares the way for social reform, and organizes the masses by teaching them consciously to relate themselves to the conditions of their existence. Then the psychosocial results of economic progress become, in their turn, new factors in the whole stream of economic and social progress. Capitalism, from the subjective ethical point of view, may appear a dread institution, with purposes of exploitation, but viewed objectively it would seem to be an important means of increasing the productive forces of society. "Hence," concludes Struve, "capitalism is not merely an evil but is also a powerful agent of cultural progress; it is not merely a destructive factor but is also a creative force."²

This in brief is Struve's Marxian sociological creed, some years later discarded as untenable.

The introduction of Revisionist doctrines, characterized the second period of Struve's writings. His reaction to Neo-Marxian ideas may be found in his "Die Marxsche Theorie der Sozialen Entwicklung."³ In this essay Struve sums up the Marxian theories of social evolution. These

¹ *Critical Notes on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia*, 1st ed., p. 106.

² *Ibid.*, p. 287.

³ In *Archiv für Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, 14 Band, Berlin, 1899. This article called forth a heated controversy among the Russian Marxists whom Plekhanov answered at length in his *Critique of Our Critics*.

are: (1) The theory of socialization and concentration of production, and the theory of anarchy of production in capitalistic society. (2) The theory of increasing misery, and the theory of expropriation of small capitalists through the great capitalists. (3) The theory of a socialistic mission through an ever-increasing proletariat created by capitalistic development. The proletariat, although kept in squalor, attains at the same time a social and political solidarity which enables it to overthrow the capitalistic system and to establish in its place the socialistic regime.¹ Struve observes that Marx based these theories upon conditions existing during the forties of the last century; that the tendencies of capitalistic production then existing have since changed, and that at present, for example, there are no signs of any increase in the anarchy of production nor of any increase in the misery of the proletariat. In fact, none of the fundamental Marxian doctrines, as enumerated above, is borne out by actual conditions in the present state of society. Therefore Marxism has become a socialistic Utopia, and a pseudo science, having for its premises not facts but the Hegelian dialectical logic.

Struve criticizes the dialectical logic of Hegel and Marx. His conclusion is that social evolution proceeds not by cataclysmical leaps of antagonistic opposites but rather by a gradual compromise and reform. Accordingly, the Marxian doctrine of revolutionary progress cannot be maintained in the face of historical facts.² The transition of quantity

¹ Cf. p. 600. More detailed criticism of Marxian ideas has since been offered by Edward Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism*, London, 1909, and especially by Vladimir Simkhovitch, *Marxism versus Socialism*, New York, 1913.

² "Soziale siege werden viel häufiger durch schrittweise Abschwächung der Widerstände als durch revolutionäre Aufhebung potenziertter Gegensätze errungen." *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung*, etc., vol. 14, 1899, p. 674.

into quality, which is the principle of dialectical progress, Struve rejects. The process by logical categories breaks down when epistemologically analyzed. He undertakes the analysis, with the aid of Schuppe and Kane.¹ Struve concludes that dialectics must not be taken for the principle of evolution; that it is nothing but a method of logic tending towards an ontology.² Therefore social evolution and dialectics have nothing in common; they merely confuse real issues with abstract far-fetched mental concepts.

Thus step by step Struve abandoned the Marxian position. From a revolutionist he changed into a reformer. The experience of the Russian revolution strengthened his new theoretic convictions, and at present he is again recasting his theory of society in order to harmonize it with his political and social practices.³ His more recent writings reveal him as an idealist, almost a mystic. He belongs to the subjectivist school of sociology.⁴ Emphasizing the importance of the individual in social evolution he agrees with Tolstoi that the political perfecting of society depends upon the education of the individual.⁵ He goes so far as to place the blame for the failure of the Russian Revolution upon the

¹ We regret that space does not permit our reproducing Struve's interesting analysis. A spirited reply was made by Plekhanov in his *Critique of Our Critics*.

² "Die 'Dialektik' ist eine auf einem bestimmten metaphysischen Prinzip—nämlich auf der Identität von Denken und Sein—auf-gebaute logische Methode. Die 'Dialektik' macht somit die Logik zur Ontologie." *Archiv für sociale Gesetzgebung*, etc., vol. 14, 1899, p. 687.

³ Since the Russian Revolution (1906), Struve, like many other Marxists, abandoned the socialist party for the Liberal-Constitutional-Democratic or "Cadet" party.

⁴ By this we do not mean that Struve upholds the old populist hope of a non-capitalistic evolution of Russia. This doctrine is generally abandoned by all the neo-populists.

⁵ Cf. P. Struve, *Ideas and Politics in Contemporary Russia*, Moscow, 1906, p. 10.

"intellectuals'" lack of faith in God, and he exhorts the leaders of Russian society to adopt higher ideals and to improve their morals.¹ Here we see the once leading Marxist turning toward liberalism and mysticism.

II. *The Theories of Tugan-Baranovsky*

Among the objectivist Neo-Marxian sociologists Tugan-Baranovsky² appears to be the most scholarly and the most superior to partisan passions. He realizes the vagueness and the onesidedness of the Marxian system of social evolution and attempts to improve upon it. He professes to adhere to the materialistic conception of history and accepts as his psychological presupposition the voluntaristic psychology. He says: "The will to live directs the development of consciousness and not the contrary,—not that consciousness directs the will to live."³ The practical interests of life determine what outer stimuli the organism shall respond to. "Therefore, from the biological point of view, consciousness is nothing else than the regulator of the movements of the organism. It is directed, in its turn, by the will to live."⁴ He believes that this voluntaristic psychology which was in vogue in the nineteenth century, was adopted by Marx in his interpretation of social evolution. Marx, however, subjected all interests in life to one, that is, to the all-determining economic interest, responsible for the class struggle and for consequent changes in the structure and

¹ Cf. P. Struve, "The Intelligence and Revolution," in *Vekhy*, Moscow, 1908.

² Tugan-Baranovsky, one of the younger professors of Political Economy at Petrograd, is the author of a number of works on Economic Theory and History. His principal sociological work is *The Theoretical Basis of Marxism*, Petrograd, 1905. German Edition, Dunker and Humblat, Leipzig, 1905.

³ *The Theoretical Basis of Marxism*, 1st ed., p. 26.

⁴ *Idem*.

function of society. Tugan-Baranovsky analyses the materialistic conception of history under three heads: (1) Man's needs or interests, as the dynamic force of social evolution, (2) Economics and the social life, and (3) The social classes and the class struggle. This order will be followed in the brief analyses of his views herewith given:

*I. Man's Needs or Interests as the Dynamic Forces of
Social Evolution*

According to Marx, all human interests are economic. Production is the one great dynamic force of social evolution. Anything aiding in the process of production is a productive force. This, observes Tugan-Baronovsky, is too indiscriminate. He says: "What in this sense would not be a productive force? Religion, morals, science, the state, law, and many other things undoubtedly have a considerable influence upon social production and hence would have to be recognized as productive forces."¹ This vagueness of the concept of productive forces endangers the integrity of the whole materialistic interpretation of history. He therefore decides to analyse all existing categories of human interest and to estimate their relative importance. He says: "Since society is composed of separate individuals each of whom strives to satisfy his needs, therefore social life and activity can have no other purpose than the satisfaction of the different needs of the separate individuals composing society."²

These needs Tugan-Baranovsky resolves into five principal groups:

- (1) physiological needs for the immediate support of life and of the sense of pleasure;
- (2) sexual needs;

¹ *The Theoretical Basis of Marxism*, 1st ed., p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

- (3) sympathetic instincts and needs;
- (4) ego-altruistic needs;
- (5) needs not founded upon practical interests.

(1) Needs of the first group are the psychological basis of the individual's life and are common to man and animals. As the satisfaction of needs for the preservation of life produces a sense of pleasure, it stimulates increased consumption. Pleasure, however, is not always necessary for self-preservation. On the contrary, pleasure in excess actually harms the organism. The production of the necessities of life, although prior to the development of such institutions as politics, religion, etc., is strongly influenced by them. For example, clothing was at first used not so much for the preservation of life as for decorative purposes. The possession of clothing had great influence also in gaining control in politics and religion. Tugan-Baranovsky thinks that such an important economic institution as the domestication of animals had its origin in the love of play with animals and in the pleasure of their companionship. Thus other motives besides those of material necessities had their influence in economic development.¹

Only a people freed from overwhelming fear of starvation can take part in the development of civilization. A certain degree of productive labor is a necessary pre-condition of civilization, and a determining factor of social life. When, however, there is no ultimate danger of starvation, interests awaken in man which influence economic production.²

(2) Next to hunger the sexual needs command the greatest attention. But Tugan-Baranovsky does not account sexual love an important social factor. He says: "It is a mistake to see in love a social factor equal to 'hunger.'" ³

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 32.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

He thinks that the various forms of the family are determined by economic conditions. Thus, for example, the matriarchal family is attributable to the working of the land by the woman while the men roam abroad as hunters or as shepherds.

The criticism may here be offered that Tugan-Baranovsky, if substantially right in his criticism of Morgan's theory of the family, overlooks the important rôle that sexual differences have played in determining the economic activities of the sexes, and therefore also the resulting family organization. The fact that the woman as mother was compelled to live a relatively settled life made the working of the soil by her near the campfire to be expected. And Tugan-Baranovsky fails to mention the metronymic family, which was common in primitive society and greatly differed from the matriarchal family if, indeed, the latter ever existed.

(3) Tugan-Baranovsky holds that sympathetic feelings in human nature are as old as the race. Their source lies in parental love and in filial love, especially in the mother. Care of the infant develops altruistic feelings. The question arises whether these should be regarded as an important social force. This question is answered in the negative because "sympathetic feelings are only strong in relatively small groups of people."¹

Those persons who belong to the same social class, as a general rule, sympathize with one another more than do those belonging to different classes. In this manner there arises a class feeling which enters into close relationship with egotistic and ego-altruistic feelings; and such class feeling then appears as one of the most powerful dynamic factors in history.

(4) The ego-altruistic feelings, the psychology of which

¹ *The Theoretical Basis of Marxism*, 1st ed., p. 38.

was made clear by Spencer, underly all class feeling. The sense of solidarity is a complex feeling composed of various elements with a predominance of the egotistic and the ego-altruistic. It may be observed among social classes and it also dominates national feelings. The ambition for power and honor, with the sense of self-preservation and the thirst for pleasure, are the principal motives of human behavior. "The struggle for power," says Tugan-Baranovsky, "has in the history of mankind the same importance as the struggle for existence."¹ Political and social history would look entirely different had ego-altruistic feelings not existed among men.

(5) Practical interests although powerful in the life of man do not exhaust its content. He attaches importance to non-practical interests. The most general and simple of these he says is play, which to him is a pleasurable discharge of surplus energy and is as common among animals as among men.² Our author believes that art had its origin in play, but that science, on the contrary, was at first the product of necessity, for the maintenance of life, and that only after having transformed practical life did it become an end in itself. Religion, he thinks the highest among human interests. Unlike other Marxists he sees in religion more than a means for practical selfish ends; there are many religious natures to whom religion is an end in itself, with the Deity as the highest good. He concludes that "Religion always was, and remains up to the present time, one of the most powerful of historical forces."³

We see that Tugan-Baranovsky deviates from the Marxist view in recognizing other human interests along with the economic interests as important social forces in a continuous interaction within the social group.

¹ *The Theoretical Basis of Marxism*, 1st ed., p. 42.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

His theory of interests reminds one of the sociology of Ratzenhoffer, Labriola, and Small. It is possible that he received suggestions from them, although his classification of interests differs from theirs.

II. *Economics and the Social Life*

Man as a social being lives in a twofold environment, one spiritual, one material. The spiritual environment is produced by the social interaction of man upon man, but the association is possible only through the medium of a material environment. So the spiritual and the material are inseparable. Economy is simultaneously a material and a social process. Man changes his material environment; this is the material aspect of economics. But at the same time man changes himself and other persons; this is the social aspect of economics. Reasoning in this manner Tugan-Baranovsky looks upon the production and exchange of goods as belonging primarily to the material aspect of economy, while the distribution of goods presents essentially social aspects.¹

He asks whether the complexity and the kaleidoscopic variation of psychic motives make a materialistic conception of history impossible? His answer is that the materialistic system, after some reconstruction, may again become a useful tool of scientific investigation.²

The fallacy of Marxian historical materialism, he believes, lies primarily in a wrong conception of economics, which by the Marxists is interpreted to include everything pertaining to the preservation of life, including food, clothing, and shelter. Tugan-Baranovsky defines economics as "The coördination of human activity directed upon the outer world,—having for its end the creation of a material

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 9 and 10.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 53.

environment necessary for the satisfaction of human needs.”¹ Economic activity is always a means and never an end in itself; it is always directed upon the material, outer environment, conditioning our existence. The economic struggle is with most people not a struggle for existence merely, but is rather for achievement, for power, for pleasure. Each phase of human interest, however, even the religious, has its economic aspects; for example, whole villages in Russia live by the painting of sacred images. Whatever province of social activity is under observation, we perceive that it is correlated with an economic activity. This, then, gives economics its central position in life. Says Tugan-Baranovsky:

Lines of social activity, of the most varied kind, emerge like radii from the economic center. And the center is the only point of contact of all radii, touching each other only at the center. Thus, also, social economy is the only common ground, and it binds together all branches of social activity. Everything that happens at the center is reflected in all the radii. Therefore, any considerable change in social economy calls for corresponding changes along all lines of social labor.²

Himself commenting upon this illustration, he warns his readers not to make the mistake of considering social life as concomitant with economics, “for only at its starting point is the radius covered by the central ground; after that it radiates further and further away from it.”³ The continuous deviation of social activity from the economic base and a shifting of the center of gravity from the lower physiological needs to the higher spiritual interests, are the essence of social progress. As humanity advances so the social importance of the economic aspect correspondingly

¹ *The Theoretical Basis of Marxism*, 1st ed., p. 54.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

³ *Idem.*

diminishes.¹ In this process the individual is gradually becoming emancipated from the control of environment, and although society will always remain in a degree bound by economic determinism, yet increasingly it directs social evolution in an artificial, teleological process. This view, as is well known, is held by Lester Ward, while a gradual emancipation from the direct control of man's economic needs is also emphasized by Simon Patten. In this aspect of his theory of society Tugan-Baranovsky appears much more closely related to certain American sociologists than to Marx.

III. *Social Classes and the Class Struggle*

Monistic Marxism views the class struggle as a constant factor in the evolution of productive forces. Our author wants to determine whether there is an organic unity of these forces of social evolution, and whether the class struggle is of determining importance in history.

Like the concept "productive forces," the concept "class" has been vaguely formulated by Marx. Tugan-Baranovsky thinks that Marx looked upon class phenomena through Hegelian spectacles, observing two phases of the development of social classes. At first the rising class appears as a class only when viewed in relation to other classes, and not as a class in itself (*für sich*). In the second phase of development it becomes a class in itself; this is its stage of maturity.² Satisfied that the principal differentiating factor in the formation of classes is an economic one, Tugan-Baranovsky defines a social class "as a social group, the members of which find themselves in a like economic position towards an appropriation by one group of the surplus labor of another group, and who therefore have common economic interests and common antagonists."³

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 60 and 68.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

If social classes were to be discriminated only upon an economic basis the intellectual class would not be a class in itself, because professional people in reality serve both the rich and the poor; therefore the intellectuals are a special group without any definite class characteristics.¹ In the light of this definition history in one of its aspects may be regarded as Marx views it, as a class struggle. Still history can not mean this only, since actual revolutionary struggles are relatively rare phenomena. However, when they do occur they are of determining importance. "In this sense," Tugan-Baranovsky concludes, "history is the history of class struggle, namely: the history of the gradual development of classes, of the appearance of class consciousness which leads to class struggle and social revolution."²

With this general formulation of the importance of class struggle, our author makes a closer analysis of the motives that result in class struggle.

Tugan-Baranovsky disputed the Marxian theory that physical need is the all-determining impulse toward economic, social and political activity. Self-preservation is supplemented by other motives; more people strive for wealth as a road to power, than for power as a road to wealth. More wars are waged for glory or power than for wealth. Therefore even wars should not be thought of as merely a form of class struggle. There are two forms of group struggle (1) the struggle of classes within a political unit, a struggle predominantly economic although the lust for power is also present; and (2) the struggle among political or national units, which is to a great extent provoked by the desire for power and glory. The economic and the political powers, however, are intricately related and mutually dependent.³

¹ *The Theoretical Basis of Marxism*, p. 20.

² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 76 and 77.

To interpret the higher realms of human interest, including science, philosophy, art, morals and religion, the theory of class interests is evidently inadequate. "Class interests," says Tugan-Baranovsky, "are not a criterion of goodness, of truth or of beauty. Human history is something infinitely higher than a mere struggle by social groups for the means of life."¹ Thus Tugan-Baranovsky rejects the attempts of Feuerbach, and Marx and Engels to reduce ethics, art and religion to a utilitarian level. If that could be done the class struggle could not be viewed as determining, nor as coördinate with the economic basis of history, which is related² to every social activity. He believes that those Marxists who try to reduce the higher realm to a utilitarian economic level, in order to preserve the monistic integrity of their system, are proceeding from false premises and will find themselves contradicted by the real facts of history. Social groups struggle not only for the means of life, but also for power; and even this struggle does not exhaust the content of history, since it does not cover the higher realms of human activity. Class struggle is limited to the realms of economic interests. Furthermore, since the economic interest is not the only human interest, the antagonism of the economic classes does not lead to antagonism within the whole social life. "Therefore," concludes our author, "the doctrine of the class struggle is a false application of generalizations true within a partial sphere of phenomena, but not true of the whole province of human history."³

Tugan-Baranovsky's analysis of the Marxian sociology, and the formulation of his own theories, do away with the

¹ *The Theoretical Basis of Marxism*, p. 82.

² *Cf. infra*, p. 231.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

materialistic monism for which the Russian Marxists, especially Plekhanov, fought so valiantly yet so hopelessly. Although Tugan-Baranovsky calls himself a materialistic objectivist, his conclusions differ little from the generalizations of the subjectivist school. They all concede an economic determinism in the earlier stages of social evolution, and only when an economic surplus is in store see society progressing teleologically, under the direction of exceptional individuals.

Tugan-Baranovsky does not discuss the rôle of the individual, and therefore we do not know his attitude towards one important doctrine of the subjectivists, but in his other generalizations he differs from them but little.

CHAPTER III

RUSSIAN ANARCHIST AND REVOLUTIONIST SOCIOLOGY

(THE THEORIES OF KROPOTKIN AND CHERNOV)

I. Kropotkin's Anarchical Sociology

Akin to the subjective sociology are the sociological theories of the Russian "philosophical anarchists". The earliest of the Russian anarchist theorizers was Bakunin, who, although not without influence upon the development of the more recent anarchist writers, was chiefly important as one of the precursors of the subjectivist sociology, and his views were therefore discussed in the setting of his time.

Related to Bakunin's principles of anarchy are the theories of Russia's most scholarly anarchist, Kropotkin.¹

A trained scientific man, he seeks to give to anarchism a scientific basis and an established sociological bearing. Philosophically Kropotkin is a positivist and an empiri-

¹Prince Peter Alexseyevitch Kropotkin (1842—) is well known through his autobiographical sketches, "The Memoirs of a Revolutionist." Although educated as an aristocrat and at one time an officer in the Russian army, in 1872 he joined the Revolutionists. He was arrested in 1874 and escaped in 1876; since when he has lived in Western Europe. He is known as scientist, historian and agitator. His sociological theories are found in his "Mutual Aid", "Conquest of Bread," and in numerous pamphlets and magazine articles.

Kropotkin, although for many years resident in Western Europe, still stands in close and vital relation to Russian thought and ideals. He reflects some of the ideas of Lavrov, Chernishevsky, and Mihalovsky and agrees in general with the populists as to the possibility of a Russian peasant commune of the future.

cist. To him "natural law" is nothing more than a certain relation among phenomena which we dimly see, and each "law" takes a temporary character of causality. "This," he explains, "is to say: if such a phenomenon is produced under such conditions, such another phenomenon will follow. No law is placed outside phenomena: each phenomenon governs that which follows it . . . not law."¹

A social phenomenon demands no other conception of law than any other phenomenon, therefore the methods of social science are the same as the methods of natural science.

Anarchism, which our author defines as "the no-government system of socialism",² he believes is to come about as a result of the trend of all social evolution. All history is but a continuous struggle "between the coöperating standardized group and the self-asserting group of individuals."³

This evolutionary struggle is at times slow and calm, but at other times violent. "Revolution is only an es-

¹ *Anarchism: its Philosophy and Ideal*, San Francisco Free Society Library no. 8, 1898, p. 6.

² *Anarchist Communism: its basis and principles*, third ed. London, 1897, p. 1. Elaborating this definition he says: "In common with all socialists the anarchists hold that the private ownership of land, capital and machinery has had its time; that it is condemned to disappear; and that all requisites for production must and will become the common property of society and be managed in common by the producers of wealth. And in common with the most advanced representatives of political radicalism, they maintain that the ideal of the political organization of society is a condition of things where the functions of government are reduced to a minimum and where the individual recovers his full liberty of initiative and action for satisfying by means of free groups and federations . . . freely constituted . . . all the infinitely varied needs of the human being."

³ *Mutual Aid*, p. 295. Cf. also *The State: Its Historic Role*, London, 1898, p. 42.

sential part of evolution : in nature no evolution is accomplished without revolutions. Periods of very slow changes are succeeded by periods of violent changes. Revolutions are as necessary for evolution as are the slow changes which prepare them and succeed them.”¹

Kropotkin views everything as being in a state of moving equilibrium. Harmony, however, is usually but a temporary adjustment, established among all forces acting upon a given spot.

Let but one of those forces be hampered in its action for some time, and harmony disappears. Force will accumulate its effect ; it must come to light, it must exercise its action, and if other forces hinder its manifestation it will not be annihilated by that, but will end by upsetting the present adjustment, by destroying harmony, in order to find a new form of equilibrium.²

Accordingly, the revolutions of history are to be viewed in the light of necessary adaptations ; anarchistic society is approaching, and must break down the obstacles to its realization.

Kropotkin regards society as “ a grand total, organized to produce the greatest possible result of well-being with the smallest expenditure of human strength.”³

It is “ an aggregation of organisms trying to find out the best ways of combining the wants of the individual with those of coöperation for the welfare of the species.”⁴

Society is not an artificial product ; it is older than

¹ *Revolutionary Studies*, London, 1892, p. 9.

² *Anarchism : its Philosophy and Ideal*, p. 6. Cf. *Les temps nouveaux*, Paris, 1894, p. 12-13.

³ *Revolutionary Studies*, p. 24.

⁴ *Anarchist Communism : its Basis and Principles*, p. 4.

the human species, and our author takes great pains to trace its origin to its earliest sources, and he also attempts to determine what are the dynamic forces that have created it, and that are bidding it advance towards the ideal of anarchism.

According to Kropotkin all social aggregates, whether animal or human, are held together by the *sense of sympathetic oneness of each individual with each and with all*. Man is appealed to and is guided in his acts, not merely by love, which is always personal, or at best tribal, but by the *perception of his oneness with each human being*.¹

This sense of oneness or solidarity may be at the stage of instinct, as among animals; or it may have become the sense of justice which ultimately brings the human being to regard the rights of every other individual as equal to his own. Each individual is a unit who is independent, it is true, but who can survive and progress better by federating himself with other units and by practicing mutual aid. Our author sees traces of this principle throughout the whole universe. He says: "With the astronomer we perceive that solar systems are the work of infinitely small bodies; that the power which was supposed to govern the system is itself but the result of the collisions among those infinitely tiny clusters of matter; that the harmony of stellar systems is harmony only because it is an adaptation, a resultant of all these numberless movements uniting, completing, equilibrating, one another."²

The principle of federation, already perceptible in the inorganic world, is in a greater degree apparent in life. Science to-day takes for its unit not the species but the individual.

¹ *Mutual Aid*, p. 300. Italics are mine. Cf. also p. xiii, xiv.

² *Anarchism: its Philosophy and Ideal*, p. 4.

A species will be what the individuals are, each undergoing numberless influences from the surroundings in which they live, and to which they correspond each in his own way; and when the physiologist speaks now of the life of a plant or of an animal he sees rather an agglomeration, a colony of millions of separate individuals, than a personality one and indivisible . . . The individual is quite a world of federations, a whole universe in himself.¹

Even each microscopic cell is "a world of autonomous organisms, each of which lives its own life, looks for its well-being for itself and attains it by grouping and associating itself with others."²

In such manner man is nothing but a resultant, an always changeable one, of all his divers faculties, of all his autonomous tendencies, of brain cells and nerve centers. All are related so closely to one another that each reacts on all of the others, but each leads its own life without being subordinated to a central organ—the soul.³

Thus, first the sense of oneness or of solidarity of the individual with his species, and secondly a federated co-operation through mutual aid rather than individual conflicts, have been, in Kropotkin's view, chief factors in creating society. If it were not for this association "the most advanced being upon earth would still be one of those tiny specks swimming in the water, and scarcely perceptible under a microscope. Or would even these exist? For are not the earliest aggregations of cellules themselves an instance of association in the struggle?"⁴

In "Mutual Aid", Kropotkin adduces many illustra-

¹ *Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal*, p. 5.

² *Idem*.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

⁴ Kropotkin, *Anarchist Morality*, San Francisco Free Society Library No. 4, 1898, p. 12.

tions of the principle, viewed as the causal factor of evolution; and he concludes that in animal and in human society only those who have practiced mutual aid have survived, and are prepared for further progress, while inner struggles within the species are concomitant with retrogressive development. The periods when institutions have been based on mutual aid have made the greatest progress in arts, industry, and science.¹

Mutual aid tends towards communism. Communistic organization cannot be the product of a minority, nor can it be imposed from above. "It must be the work of all, a natural growth, a product of the constructive genius of the great mass."²

Communism must be free from centralized control. "It cannot exist without creating a continuing contract among all, for the thousands and thousands of common transactions; it cannot exist without creating local life, independent in the smallest units."³ Communism is therefore most favorable for individual development and freedom. Communistic individualism is not a war of each against all, it is an opportunity for a "full expansion of man's faculties, the superior development of whatever is original in him, the greatest fruitfulness of intelligence, feeling and will."⁴

Kropotkin believes that in social evolution the communistic tendency is present; and that in every civili-

¹ *Mutual Aid*, p. 296. It may be noticed here that Kropotkin does not disregard struggle as a factor in evolution, but he emphasizes the group struggle. Besides he thinks that Darwinism has been over-emphasized and by his theory of "mutual aid" he wishes to add an important factor overlooked by Darwinian evolutionists. Cf. his introduction to *Mutual Aid*.

² *Anarchism: its Philosophy and Ideal*, p. 20.

³ *Idem.*

⁴ *Idem.*

zation social disintegration and decay have followed the centralized state.

The communistic tendency of social evolution expresses itself in two ways.

First, there is a tendency towards integrating labor for the production of all riches in common, so as finally to render it impossible to discriminate the part of the common product attributable to the single individual.¹ All wealth is a social product of many generations; "nearly every new machine is a synthesis, a result of thousands of partial inventions."²

Secondly, there is "a tendency towards the fullest freedom of the individual in the prosecution of all aims, beneficial both to himself and to society at large."³

The ideal of the anarchist is therefore but "a mere summing up of what he considers to be the next plan of evolution."⁴

Kropotkin studies history to trace the development of tendencies and to determine in what form of organization the communistic ideal has been established.

The first form of social organization was tribal, and the communal ties were *kinship and the worship of common ancestors*.⁵

The savage identifies his interests with those of his tribe. He is no individualist. His law is the custom of the group to which he adheres, and is to him a matter of habit and usage. "Without social feeling and usages, life in common would have been absolutely impossible."⁶

¹ *Anarchist Communism: its basis and principles*, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴ *Idem*.

⁵ Cf. *The State: Its Historic Role*, p. 8. Also *Mutual Aid*, ch. iii.

⁶ "Law and Authority," *San Francisco Free Society Library*, no. 1, 1898, p. 8.

Kropotkin believes that only customary law should be tolerated by society. All modern law he condemns as being "born of violence and superstition, and established in the interests of consumer, priest and rich exploiter; it must be utterly destroyed on the day when the people shall desire to break its chains."¹

Tribal ties were broken and peoples were disaggregated when climatic changes drove them to migration and into conflict. At this time the paternal family sprang up, with the kidnapping of women from neighboring tribes or taking them as spoils of war. The kinship ties, once broken, were succeeded by a new common principle, namely, the *communal possession of land*. "The possession in common of a certain territory, of certain valleys, plains or mountains, became the basis of a new agreement. Ancient gods had lost all meaning; and the local gods of a valley, river or forest, gave the religious consecration to the new agglomeration, substituting themselves for the gods of the tribe."²

The village commune conducted its social affairs by its own customs, which become law: "the plenary council of all chiefs of families—men and women — was judge, the only judge in civil and criminal societies."³

All other social needs were met by voluntary societies, as fraternities or guilds.

The free city, known in ancient civilization and developed at its best during the middle ages, takes its origin in a combination of the village community with the numerous fraternities and guilds that were constituted outside territorial unions. "It was a federation of these

¹ "Law and Authority." *op. cit.*, p. 12.

² *The State: its Historic Role*, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 9. Cf. *Mutual Aid*, ch. iv.

two kinds of unions, developed under the protection of the fortified enclosure and the turrets of the city.”¹

“In these cities,—under the shelter of their liberties acquired through the impulse of free agreement and free initiative,—a whole new civilization grew up and attained to such expansion, that the like has not since been seen.”²

Kropotkin is convinced that federation, the free commune and a free city are the culminating forms of social organization, and that the policy of centralization pursued by the state is a dangerous menace and a sure sign of decay.

The Greek clan, with a large initiative which was left to the individual and the group by means of the federal principle, gave to mankind the two greatest periods of history—the ancient Greek city and the Mediaeval city periods; while the ruin of the above institutions during the State periods of history, which followed, corresponded in both cases to a rapid decay.³

In the communal institutions of the ancient and the mediaeval periods there was struggle for the attainment and the maintenance of the liberty of the individual, for the principle of federation, for the right to unite and to act. Mutual aid gave them the victory. And when these federal institutions did collapse, it was because of their failure to widen the area of their mutual aid and of federation. Kropotkin enumerates three specific reasons for the decay of the mediaeval free city: (1) the burgers held in subjection the “inhabitants” i. e., the strangers and new comers and also the peasant; (2) they turned to trading at the expense of tilling the soil, thus creating

¹ *The State: its Historic Role*, p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³ *Mutual Aid*, p. 297.

a plutocracy in their community; and (3) they adopted the hierarchical teaching of Rome, the one power.¹

These conditions gave an opportunity for the development of the modern state. Against it Kropotkin is bitter. He sees in it nothing but "an institution developed in the history of human societies to hinder union among men, to obstruct the development of local initiative, to crush existing liberties and to prevent their restoration."²

The state cannot tolerate customary law; it demands personal and direct submission, it requires equality ni servitude, "it cannot allow the state within the state."³

Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Palestine, Greece, Rome started to their destruction when they adopted the institution of the political state.

On the ruins of the Roman empire, tribes,—Celtic, Germanic, Slavonian and Scandinavian,—began civilization anew. Slowly the primitive tribe elaborated its institutions and reached the village commune. It remained at that stage until the twelfth century. Then there arose the republican cities which produced the glorious expansion of the human mind, attested by the monuments of architecture, by the noble development of the arts, by the discoveries that laid the basis for the natural sciences. But then came the state . . . Will it again produce death?—of course it will, unless we reconstitute society on a libertarian and anti-state basis.⁴

Kropotkin believes that to construct society upon an anti-state basis it is necessary to have "solidarity and equality of all."⁵

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 215-221.

² *The State: its Historic Role*, p. 39.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁵ *Revolutionary Studies*, p. 22.

This can be attained by the activity of an enlightened minority, who by education and by directing revolutions can free humanity from its bondage, and can permit it to continue its natural development.

Initiative, free individual initiative, and the possibility of each making use of that force at the time of a popular uprising, that is what has always made the irresistible power of revolutions. If revolutions have accomplished something in the past, that is entirely due to men and women of initiative, *to the obscure persons springing out of the crowd not fearing to assume, face to face with their brethren and the future, the responsibility of acts considered madly rash by the timid.*¹

Since the masses follow the precedents of the past it is difficult to discover the men of initiative in everyday life. "But they arise in numbers in revolutionary times and it is they, in reality, who do the enduring work of revolutions."²

This, in brief outline, is the sociological foundation of Kropotkin's system of anarchy. It contains doubtless many ingenious and true ideas. He credits Adam Smith with suggesting to him the principle of mutual aid and the consciousness of sympathetic solidarity, which gave rise to society, and which he believes were its greatest dynamic forces throughout the process of social evolution.³

It seems strange, however, that Kropotkin, who is a careful scientist,⁴ and who arrives at the conclusion that

¹ *Revolutionary Studies*, p. 28. Italics are Kropotkin's.

² *Idem.*

³ Kropotkin says that he received these suggestions when reading Adam Smith's "Theory of the Moral Sentiments." He says, "Adam Smith's only failure was that he did not understand that this same feeling of sympathy, in its habitual stage, exists amongst animals as well as amongst men." Kropotkin, *Anarchist Morality*, p. 11.

⁴ Cf. for example his inductive study of "Fields, Factories, and Work-

human progress is real and that it consists in social solidarity with complete freedom of individual initiative,¹ should be so impatient with our present civilization and so bitter against it. If humanity is progressing at all, it is progressing slowly, and in spite of the anarchist's impatience it will continue to progress only slowly. Kropotkin places himself in a dilemma when he asserts that the state is the rule of an arbitrary minority,² while affirming also that "revolutions are made by minorities."³

If this be true, as no doubt it is, it means nothing more than that heretofore, almost every society has been ruled by a powerful minority. In tribal communism, in the free city, and in modern political democracies—everywhere—society exhibits the feudal relation of the "benefit" and the "commendation." This has recently been made clear by Professor Giddings, in his theory of "protocracy," in which he traces the psychological origin of the state. He says: "A more vigorous and complex common reaction, and a livelier consciousness of kind manifested by some individuals than by others, make the dynamic men a ruling group, which converts society into the state."⁴

Every dynamic person attracts others who serve him

shops," new, revised, and enlarged edition, New York, 1913, where he arrives at the conclusion that we are entering upon a period of industrial and agricultural decentralization.

¹ "The greatest intensity of life is to be found in the greatest socialness, in the most complete identification of oneself with others . . . never at any epoch, historical or geological, have individual interests been in opposition to those of society. From all time they have remained identical, and those who have best understood this have always enjoyed the completest life." Kropotkin, *Anarchist Morality*, p. 23.

² Cf. *The State*, p. 22.

³ *Revolutionary Studies*, p. 5.

⁴ Franklin H. Giddings, *Sociology Outline*, 1914, p. 4.

for the protection and benefits which he grants them. This is the psychology of the feudal relationship existing in every stratum of society and of the state. Revolutions will always be a failure if they are expected to introduce the millennium. At its best a revolution only makes room for another minority, but one less arbitrary and less exploiting, whose conduct is better usually only because of fear of being thrown over by a succeeding revolution or by a popular election.

In the last analysis the realization of a pure democracy, such as Kropotkin calls for, is an ethical problem. It presupposes the willingness of the naturally stronger to yield his power voluntarily for the benefit of the naturally weaker. This our author feels but he does not clearly realize. If he did, he would not proclaim force as the means of attaining complete democracy, or ideal anarchy, as he prefers to call it. As long as men react differently in feeling, thinking and action there will be leaders and followers, and governors and governed.

Kropotkin's idea of non-centralized federated society is not so remote from reality as our author may himself believe it to be. The United States of America, the Swiss Federal Republic, and other states, are exemplifying it to a degree that proves its actual practicability. The suggestion in "Mutual Aid" that the more we coöperate the more rapidly shall we approach the goal of democratic perfection is of great importance. On the other hand, Kropotkin's scientifically unfounded radicalism is but another example illustrative of the sad conditions arising from the struggle of Russian democracy with its arbitrary autocracy. It is these conditions that have made Russian sociology peculiarly "Russian" and Kropotkin's sociology is no exception.

II. Chernov's Revolutionary Sociology

Midway between the Marxist sociologists and the Communist anarchists we must place the Russian Social Revolutionists. Chernov¹ attempts to work out the philosophical and sociological bearings of the social revolutionist movement. He starts from the Russian subjectivists, Lavrov and Mikhailovsky, and attempts to synthesize them with the Marxist economic ideas. In its epistemological aspect he utilizes the empirical criticism of Avenarius, of Mach, and especially of Riehl, whereas his sociological theories are strongly influenced by Simmel and Ward. He aims to develop an active, dynamic sociology which he calls "the scientific equivalent of practical revolutionary socialism."²

I. Chernov's Philosophical and Methodological Presuppositions

The Marxian dialectics could not avail for Chernov's revolutionary socialism of direct action. He therefore seeks not only to explode the "Marxian Myth, but also to state the concepts of a synthetic social revolutionary philosophy of life uniting a theoretical realism with an existing, active practical idealism."³

Materialism and idealism he believes are being fused, "as in the organic life of man is found the mechanical action of the brain with the conscious work of thought and feeling."⁴

¹Victor Mikhailovitch Chernov (1873—) is one of the principal organizers of the more recent revolutionary movements. He has been jailed many times, and has spent three years in exile. Famous as propagandist and editor, he has contributed appreciably to the theoretical and sociological studies of revolutionary theories. Cf. *supra*, pt. I, Ch. i.

²*Philosophical and Sociological Etudes*, Moscow, 1907, p. 379.

⁴*Ibid*, p. 3.

³*Ibid*, p. 296.

Chernov attempts to disprove the old fallacy of "cause" and "effect" as independent agents. Experience knows nothing but antecedents and sequences. We know "no relation of an active agent to a passive reaction, but simply a relation of a fact to the whole."¹

The "functional" view, so successfully developed in the study of mechanics, biology and psychology, should be utilized also in sociology.²

Social phenomena being too complex, induction is not adequate, therefore deduction may legitimately be employed.

Chernov, starting with Lavrov and Mikhalovsky, adopts and develops their theory of the "Subjective Method" in sociology. He asserts that a sociological investigation as compared with one in the realm of natural science, has this peculiar feature, that it requires "adding to the objectively constructed combinations, further constructions out of materials from the inner, subjective, psychological world."³

Without this addition he believes it impossible to understand sociological phenomena. In the science of man and human society, where the investigating subject makes himself also the object of the investigation, both subjective and objective psychological phenomena must be recognized and harmoniously united. The method for the study of this combination of objective and subjective phenomena he calls the "subjective method."⁴

With this subjectivism in mind Chernov differentiates the problems of sociology. The first problem is the investigation of values and their re-evaluation for the purpose of deriving a formula of progress. To be

¹ *Philosophical and Sociological Études*, p. 302.

² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 307-309.

³ *Idem.*

⁴ *Idem.*

strictly scientific, the formula "must be founded primarily upon the psychology of interest."¹

It will furnish also "a theory of normal, healthy, harmonious satisfaction of interests."²

Such is the subjective-psychological aspect of sociology as distinguished from arbitrary subjectivism.

Chernov lays down three rules which, when applied in harmony with all other requirements of logic and scientific methodology, "will raise the inevitable human subjectivism to a scientifically regulated means of thinking, that is, to a subjective (or subjective teleological) method of thinking."³

Chernov's three rules are as follows: "(1) Utilize elements which constitute the inner subjective world of the investigator in order to construe out of them,—on the basis of similarities to subjective phenomena or of differences from them,—the subjective psychological world of other persons. (2) Construct rationally an ideal of normal social life, which shall present the highest unity of all active tendencies and interests of the human mind; the concrete content of the ideal being conditioned by scientific knowledge of the relation between the subjective requirements of man and the objective means of satisfaction. (3) Utilize this ideal as a criterion for (a) the classification of social phenomena according to the degree of their importance, and (b) the evaluation of phenomena and their division into progressive or regressive, normal or pathological, healthy or ailing. The ideal appears here as the formula of progress."⁴

To Chernov the second great problem of sociology is the study of social forms,—economic, judicial and polit-

¹ *Philosophical and Sociological Études*, Moscow, 1907, p. 214.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

ical institutions and forms, and of their relation to the healthy normal development of the individual.¹

Chernov does no more than outline these problems of sociology. He proceeds next to make a critical analysis of men's various views upon the social process, and finally he presents his own view.

II. *Chernov's Theory of the Social Process*

Chernov thinks it a futile task to search for a *primum agens* of social changes. The historical process is not the result of any one force. He asserts that sociologists who have attempted to reduce the social process to the influence of economics, or of law or ideologies have failed, and have been guilty of forging statements or presentations to fit the theory. Such were the Comtian and Hegelian schools which postulated the intellectualistic view. Marx, Engels and their following swung the pendulum the other way, rejecting ideologies and attempting to explain all historical changes by means of man's material and economic interests. Reaction to a one-sided monism brought in the eclectic attempts of more recent sociologists who have wished to establish a synthetic theory of the interaction of social factors. Yet, after all, the "interaction" is but a convenient formula, pretending to solve everything, while in fact giving no exact, clear, or determinate view of the nature or the mechanism of social development.²

To such vagueness our author prefers an honest confession of "we do not know."³

There are no separate intellectual, economic, or judicial processes. There are only social processes, which have those aspects. They may be discriminated, separated for

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 214.

² *Ibid.*, p. 275.

³ *Idem.*

purposes of abstraction, but in fact they are inextricably interrelated. So every economic relation embraces both law and physical relations. "When our attention is directed upon the formal aspect of human relations, we have before us a coördination of forms of law, or judicial structure; but when it is directed upon the objective realistic aspect we have production, exchange and distribution of material products, in a word, the material culture of society. Finally, there is the inner, subjective aspect, which gives us status of education, mental association, literature, and the moral norm; in brief, the social ideology, or psychology. In this manner, from three different points of view, there are opened up to us three aspects of social development,—the formal or normal, the objective-realistic or material, and the subjective or psychological."¹

This view of the social process Chernov likes to call the "historical monistic," or "the realistic conception of history."²

This historic monism is not one-sided; "it is an all-sided, synthetic monism."³

Economics, law, and ideologies cannot be the "cause" of the historic process, since they are themselves the products of it. Therefore the principles whereby the historic process may ultimately be interpreted, can be found only in elements that precede history."⁴

The prehistoric elements are natural environment and man; the natural environment as the objective factor and man as a unique biological type that developed peculiar characteristics through the struggle for existence

¹ *Philosophical and Sociological Études*, Moscow, 1907, p. 279; cf. also pp. 368-369.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 278 and 371.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

in prehistoric times. These are the origins from which the sociologist and the historian must start. "In the interaction of natural environment with the quantitative and qualitative growth of man may be found the origin of the social process."¹

Man, then, is not a passive element exposed to the actions of nature.

Man is not at all a *tabula rasa*, upon which outer objective conditions and forces may freely write anything that they may desire. Man is also a complete power of nature, presenting in himself one of the highest complex combinations of the elementary forces of nature; like every other force he possesses his own definite inner laws of self-activity, and he manifests a definite coördination of active tendencies.²

So Chernov sees in man himself the major dynamic force of history. Interacting with natural environment, he creates an artificial environment or culture, so-called. In this secondary environment various cultural types are formed. Differences depend, on the one hand, upon the concrete differences of natural environment, and on the other hand, upon the different racial peculiarities of people or tribe. Institutions and ideologies, in their turn, are "equally productive."³

These various social forces are produced by man under the direct or indirect influences of natural environment. They should not be placed one over against the other. None of them is an ultimate cause of the other. They are each and all but aspects of the same social process, presenting in themselves the content of the realistic conception of history.

Such in brief is Chernov's dynamic and monistic theory

¹ *Philosophical and Sociological Études*, Moscow, 1907.

² *Ibid.*, p. 364.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

of society. It is "functional psychology" applied to social life. Feelings and the will appear in this process as the dynamic forces, and the intellect as the directive force.

With all the other Russian subjectivists Chernov strives to defend the strong individual and, at the same time, to protect social solidarity from disintegration. He realizes that the relation of these two elements in society can be made satisfactory only through a proper conception of ethics. We cannot discuss exhaustively the ethical aspect of Chernov's monism. He wishes on the one hand to get away from the utilitarian point of view, and, on the other hand, to do away with the "categorical imperative" of abstract Kantian metaphysics. Like Lavrov he attempts to arrive at a social and realistic imperative as a guide to the individual in his relation to society. He says :

An ideal can and must be the supreme criterion of all human values. Only its commands can in the rôle of the supreme imperative withstand the voice of separate instincts, affections and interests, because it is the highest unit of all ; everything else in relation to it is of a lower order and has no right to existence as an independent entity, self-sufficient, and equal. And this is why man who has developed up to the critical scientifically-disciplined mind can evaluate social phenomena only from the view point of an ideal.¹

To determine the highest ideal is the task of sociology. The ideal must be one to satisfy all the normal instincts and interests of man.

While Chernov at the task of determining the ideal, does not wholly divest his work of old utilitarian maxims, his effort to establish ethics upon a sociological basis is

¹ *Philosophical and Sociological Études*, Moscow, 1907, p. 213.

commendable, and is in harmony with the general modern trend of the science of morals.

In evaluating Chernov's sociological work we find that it shows an advance over that of the older subjectivists. Its theories have a sounder philosophical (epistemological) basis and they are brought into line with modern functional psychology. But Chernov's sociological theories are scarcely more than general outlines, and it would be well were they more fully developed. Slight as are his services to sociology at large, Chernov's efforts to give the Russian revolutionary socialists a positive dynamic sociology have been more successful. He guarantees success to the efforts of enterprising individuals, by freeing his sociology from dialectical materialism, which denies the importance of the individual in the social process. Chernov's sociology, however, has the qualities of the earlier subjectivists. Although closely related to the thinking of many foreign sociologists it is first and foremost "Russian Sociology," and as such it has a limited value for sociology at large.

CHAPTER IV

THE JURISTIC AND THE HISTORICAL-GENETIC SCHOOLS OF RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF KORKUNOV AND KOVALEVSKY

I. The Contributions of Korkunov and Kovalevsky

Independent of the current social-political movements which have so strongly influenced other schools of Russian sociology, stand the Juristic and the Historico-genetic schools. They began their work early in the seventies and still are yielding valuable contributions. The representatives of this branch of Russian sociology are without exception scholars from the great Russian Universities of Moscow and Petrograd. Their interest in sociology was aroused through their efforts to find a positive and scientifically sound basis for the theory of law and politics, which heretofore had taken its premises from the axioms of metaphysics.

Already Sergeyevitch,¹ in his doctor's dissertation, "*Problem of the Political Sciences*" (1871), had sought by the aid of Comte, as authority, to rid the theory of politics of dogmatic presuppositions and to establish its premises upon facts inductively obtained by sociology from a study of the forms of organized society.

This earlier attempt was further developed by Mu-

¹ Vasily Ivanovitch Sergeyevitch, Professor of Law in the Petrograd University (1872-1899). Author of many books and articles on law and politics. He was one of the first to make a study of the ancient Russian popular assembly, the *Vecha*.

romtzev¹ who, realizing the isolated position of law among the other social sciences, demanded that law should be studied in close relation to all other aspects of social life. He wanted to have the historic-comparative studies of ancient and modern institutions utilized for this purpose, and also the history of the development of the theory of law. He makes a rigorous distinction between "law" in its judicial and in its scientific sense. The former stands for a principle, which, whatever may be its origin, is by no means the same thing as a scientific relation or law. Social laws are not necessarily identical with existing moral and judicial norms. Muromtzev did not live to develop fully the sociological aspects of his theory of law, but his suggestions were taken up by others, and among these Korkunov is the most important.

Korkunov² influenced by Muromtzev, developed a theory of law based upon sociological premises. To get the true sources of law and to establish its proper functioning in society Korkunov attempted to make, with the aid of sociology, a study of the social conditions of legal development, including the nature of society, the character of law considered as the social order, the forms of social groupings, and the conception of the state. In reviewing these topics we will first analyze his concept of the *nature of society*.

Society is to Korkunov neither a mechanism nor an organism. "Doubtless," he says, "the general laws which

¹Sergey Andreyevitch Muromtzev, Professor of Civil Law at the University of Moskow, expressed his progressive views on the theory of law in his *Outlines of a General Theory of Civil Law* (1879), and in his *Outlines of Sociology* which remained unfinished.

²Nikolas Mikhailovitch Korkunov, Professor of Law in the Petrograd University since 1879. He is the author of many works. His *General Theory of Law* and the *Social Meaning of Law* are the most important.

govern the organic and the inorganic world apply equally to the phenomena of social life."¹

The principal characteristic of the inorganic world is the unimportance of its past. It is determined by present conditions. The organic world, on the contrary, and also the social world, are determined by both the present and the past. Standing ever beside the present, the past always plays an important part in social affairs. Each generation has a certain influence upon the development of the social life of future generations. "Our inheritance from our fathers is of overwhelming importance."²

Thus society, according to Korkunov, is controlled by these three elements, "1st, the present conditions under which it acts; 2nd, its past; 3rd, the ideal drawn from the past."³

These three factors in their correlation present social phenomena, which are complex and peculiarly different from all others. Their peculiarities result principally from the moral and psychical ties which bind individuals into social groups.

Ability to produce ideals is the characteristic sign of all social phenomena, and we must conclude that it exists in direct proportion to the development of the social life. The weaker the social bonds of a people, the weaker is that people's intellectual development and the greater its carelessness of the future.⁴

Another conclusion which Korkunov draws from his theory that power to create a social ideal is in proportion to the social life already achieved, relates to the future development of social life. Conditions favoring the de-

¹ *General Theory of Laws*, English translation by W. G. Hastings. Boston 1909, p. 289.

² *Idem*.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

⁴ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 294.

velopment of the psychic life of the individual are equally favorable to the life of the aggregate. Where the development of individual thought is stifled, the growth of the social ideal becomes impossible.¹ He cites the Messianic hope of the Jews as an example of an idea that binds a people to the preservation of its national unity under historical conditions otherwise unfavorable. It is a corollary of these truths that if social relations are determined by the degree of development of the ideal formed by individuals, in actual social life conditions of existence are modifiable according to the ideal held by the society, and false notions may have a great influence upon social development.²

Since no limits can be assigned to social ideals, and since change of ideas can bring about significant changes in social life, no limit can be set to social growth.³ Viewing the nature of society as on the whole psychic, Korkunov attempts to establish the relation of society to the individual. His problem is to give an answer to the question whether there is anything like individual independence, or whether the individual is a mere subject of the general law of causation and cannot exist in opposition to society. He says: "From the point of view of modern psychology can the existence of an individual consciousness be explained in such a way as to set this consciousness over against the rest of the universe? Again, can a certain independence of the individual's part in his relations with society be established?"⁴ These psychological problems are conditioned by the significance given to ideas of causation and finality. "If we admit, just once, the existence of an objective end for

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 293

² Cf. *idem.*

³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 296.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

which the universe was created and which has guided its progress through the ages since, everything in the world, and by consequence the individual also, is inevitably reduced to the condition of a means."¹

Korkunov holds that in proving the proposition it is impossible to go beyond oneself.

Whatever are the ends towards which the individual compels himself to strive, they exist only in him, in his consciousness. They are ends which he conceives and whose elements he finds in his own head. From this point of view, the individual is objectively neither a means nor an end. Subjectively, it may be said that he is his own end, in the sense that every end which he conceives is a product of his own consciousness, of his own intelligence.²

The individual, although conscious of himself as an end, is nevertheless not an independent being in the sense in which the mechanistic sociologists so regard him. On the other hand, he is not a subordinate part of an organism as he is viewed by the organic sociologists. The psychological theory to which Korkunov adheres does not deny that the individual to a large degree is the product of society. But "He is never a simple product of it, never the simple reflection of the principles which set in motion a given collectivity. Every individual is the product of the simultaneous influence of several societies, and in each man can be seen combinations of distinct traits from many social influences."³

As the individual never completely identifies himself with society he remains a distinct and an independent principle, tending to transform society little by little, and in this manner he contributes to the progress of social life.

¹ *General Theory of Laws*, p. 318.

² *Ibid.*, p. 319.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

"From our point of view," concludes Korkunov, "social development is the resultant of all the conscious tendencies and efforts of individuals, (the active element), which are reacted upon, also (and this is the passive element), by an order of things which is the result of a long historic evolution."¹

So the individual is not only a part of his social environment, subjecting himself to its control, but also is a dynamic force changing and directing the social life.

Having arrived at this conclusion as to the nature of society and its relation to the individual, Korkunov attempts to formulate the principles of the relation of law to the social order. The activity of the various elements of society which are in psychic unity, must have an exterior coördinating and controlling principle. "The factor which institutes and controls this coördination in society is no other than law."²

Viewing society psychologically, we cannot regard law "as simply an order imposed by society upon individuals who are only passive beings. The final basis of law is the individual consciousness. It is there that the ideas as to the means to be employed for the delimitation of conflicting interests take their origin; and consequently thence arise all ideas as to juridical norms."³

The conception of right therefore has been a subjective idea, and only gradually has taken on the form of custom, juridical practice and, finally, of legislation (which differentiates law as an objective factor). Therefore, also, the actual course of life never coincides precisely with legal abstractions. Laws, gradually formed, are not determined merely by the subjective qualities of the in-

¹ *General Theory of Laws*, p. 322.

² *Ibid.*, p. 323.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

dividual but by his environment as well. Besides making it possible for co-existing individuals to enjoy a degree of liberty, laws constitute one of the important conditions of human progress. Law protects minorities and fixes bounds for all new, striving interests, the predominance of which would quickly ruin weaker ones, and deprive society of conditions indispensable to its own development. Without law the future would be sacrificed to exigencies of the present.¹

Human groupings may be voluntary, like stock companies, and clubs, or involuntary, like the family, and especially the state. Both kinds must have a sense of solidarity holding them together. "In some societies this results from the collective life, instead of producing the collectivity, as in the family and the state, for example; while in others it is the basis and not the result of the grouping."²

Among the various forms of social organization Korkunov analyzes the state as the chief institution in the development of law. He defines the state as a "social body asserting for itself independent, recognized, coercive, governmental control over a free people."³

Korkunov attributes to the state an exclusive right of coercion, which he believes to be of great importance for the whole social life. It reduces acts of violence and so makes economy of force. The constraint of the state is not arbitrary, it is "disciplined by law. It is penetrated with ethical principles."⁴

Governmental authority does not need to be the personification of any one's will. It is a "force arising out of the citizen's consciousness of his dependence on the state."⁵

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 327.

² *Ibid.*, p. 328.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

The state functions through its organs, which may be unipersonal or collective in form; its organs carry out in their organization the principle of division of labor.

Korkunov's contribution does not amount to the development of an independent sociological system. He borrowed many of his ideas from sociologists like Spencer, Fouillée, Kareyev, Gumpłowicz and others. His importance to social science is that he succeeded in developing a system of law from sociological presuppositions. That the theory of law needs more positivist elements than it has possessed heretofore is conceded by many eminent jurists, who have shown appreciation of Korkunov's efforts and have given his work a wide circulation by translating it into a number of modern languages.

II. The historical-genetic sociology of Kovalevsky

The most important among the historical-genetic sociologists is Kovalevsky.¹

Already in his initial work "The Historic-comparative Method in Jurisprudence and a Manual for the Study of the History of Law" (1880)—he expresses his opinion upon the inadequacy of the philosophical approach to the study of social institutions and recommends the historical-comparative method. Influenced by Maine, Tylor, McLenan, Morgan, Spencer and others, Kovalevsky developed his studies of the genesis of institutions in what he calls "Genetic Sociology." Besides the historical aspect of sociology he also devoted himself to the study of sociological methodology and to the various

¹ Maxim Maximovitch Kovalevsky, Professor of Law at the University of Moscow (1877-1887): having been removed from this position he continued lecturing in various European universities and writing on the genesis of institutions. In 1908 he became Professor of Sociology at the Neurological Institute in Petrograd.

theories of society. We will briefly sum up his ideas of the methodological and the historical-genetic aspects of sociology.

The Methodological Aspect of Kovalevsky's Sociology

In general, Kovalevsky follows Comte in his classification of the sciences and in defining sociology as "the science of order and progress in human societies." He thinks, however, that this definition has been better worded by Professor Elwood as the science of the organization and evolution of society."¹

This definition contains the two principal aspects of sociology which Comte called "Social Statics" and "Social Dynamics." This double aspect safeguards sociology from limitation to a mere philosophy of history, which at its best embraces only the dynamic aspect of sociology.

This is true also of ethics and of psychology. When, for example, De Roberty attempts to reduce sociology to social ethics, he does not cover the whole province of sociology. Besides the moral considerations which are important for the progress of society, there are other aspects of the social process, such as the biological and the economic, which stand apart from ethics. Therefore, sociology is the only social science that can take for its business the discovery of all these causes and their interaction.²

A part of this is true also of psychology. Kovalevsky disagrees with Tarde that the field of sociology is fully covered by psychology. It is true that much in society can be explained by what Tarde calls "interpsychology," or the theory of the interaction of one mind upon another. But the inadequacy of this collective or social

¹ Kovalevsky : *Sociology*, vol., i, p. 6.

² Cf. *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 14.

psychology to interpret all of the social process brings it under sociology as a branch of the latter science.¹

So also biology. In so far as it covers the social life of animals it may be utilized by sociology to interpret the genesis of social institutions.²

The concrete social sciences, such as ethnography, statistics, political economy, politics etc., all supply sociology with material for its genetic studies, but in their turn these sciences must base their generalizations upon sociological laws, which present a synthetic whole of the process and progress of human societies.³

This is especially true of the genesis of law, of political institutions and of political economy. Sociology alone can supply the jurist with sure guiding principles for determining various stages in the evolution of law, and so emancipate jurisprudence from its traditional metaphysical premises.⁴

To sum up: "The concrete social sciences," says Kovalevsky, "although furnishing sociology with materials for its synthesis, must at the same time base their empirical generalizations upon those general laws of coexistence and development which sociology, as a science of the order and progress of human society, is called upon to establish."⁵

Kovalevsky after a careful study of the various systems of sociology⁶ arrives at the conclusion that there is no one all-determining social factor. He says: "Sociology will gain measurably, if the effort to find a first cause is eliminated from its immediate problems and if it

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 26.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 28.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 30.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 62.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁶ Cf. his work *Contemporary Sociologists*, St. Petersburg 1905, and is *Sociology*, vol. i, part ii.

limits itself in accordance with the complexity of social phenomena to showing the simultaneous and parallel action and reaction of many causes."¹

He is impatient with sociologists who show a monistic bias and who are continually seeking some all-determining factor of the social process. He says:

We deal not with factors but with facts, each of which, in one way or another, is bound up with a mass of others; is conditioned by them and in turn conditions them. To talk about a factor i. e. about a central fact, which determines after itself all others, is to me the same as to talk about those drops of the waters of a river which, by their movement, condition its current.²

Abandoning the idea of the all-determining factor, Kovalevsky recommends the historical-comparative synthetizing method as best adapted for sociological research. In this manner Kovalevsky leads up to the study of "genetic sociology" to which he devotes most of the space in his "Sociology."

*The Historical-genetic Aspect of Kovalevsky's Sociology*³

Kovalevsky finds this branch of sociology of special interest to Russians because of the extraordinarily rich ethnographic material possessed by them, which in spite of generations of research has by no means been adequately treated. He divides his material into the ethnographic—with special attention to the survivals of the metronymic family, of exogamy, of animism, etc.—

¹ *Contemporary Sociology*, p. xiv.

² *Ibid.*, p. viii.

³ Kovalevsky's "Genetic Sociology" is the substance of the second volume of his "Sociology." We reviewed this work in the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xix, no. 3, pp. 386-398; and reproduce here the substance of that article.

and the historical-legendary, containing a large mass of folklore. Employing the historical comparative method, he is careful not to overestimate anything, but to draw his conclusions from premises which admit of being checked up by comparison. Thus he hopes to be able to point out how all aspects of the social life are psychically related to one another and how by their interaction they result in various social institutions. His argument that it is impossible to establish a criterion of primitiveness from ethnography, since it does not put us face to face with the primitive conditions of mankind, leads him to an hypothesis of primitive man, which is formed by way of successive conclusions not only from ethnography but also from animal life. This leads to analysis of the social and family life of animals, which thereupon is considered as the starting point of the human family and the human horde or herd. In these chapters the much-debated topics of the metronymic family and sexual taboos are thoroughly discussed. The author favors the view which ascribes priority to the metronymic order. He also thinks that the most primitive sex taboo was limited to the mother, as can be also observed among anthropoid apes. The tribe has not grown from the family; it is rather a human herd which grew through the integrating influences of taboo, of exogamy, and of the elimination of blood vengeance within the group. Exogamy originated as a means of stopping the bloody feuds and quarrels for the possession of women, so protecting the tribe against annihilation. Gradually, with the transition into an agricultural state of life and the increase of property, which he thinks had its beginning in the fear of magical contagion, the regulative functions of the group differentiated into simple forms of government, which in their turn hastened the decay of tribal forms of organization. Agri-

culture and private property made slavery possible and profitable. The latter institution encourages raids and conquests, which coerce the weaker tribes to confederate or to be absorbed by their enemies. War and conquest give opportunity for leadership. The successful leader gradually rises above his tribesmen in wealth and power and is able to dictate to them and to subordinate them. This situation prepares the way for feudalism. Along with these developments of property and government, and in its psychical aspect intrinsically related to them, there goes on the development of religion. According to Kovalevsky religion has its roots in an animistic conception of nature, in fear of departed ancestors, and in dreams. Fetichism, totemism, animal and plant cults and finally the worship of the cosmic forces of nature, are the earlier forms of expression in religion. Briefly this is the gist of "Genetic Sociology."

Although the foregoing arguments are more or less familiar, they are richly illustrated by old and new ethnographic material, some of which was gathered by Kovalevsky personally in his expeditions among the barbarian and savage tribes of the Russian Empire. His interpretation of exogamy is original and finds support in a later independent research by W. M. Strong, described in an article on "The Origin of Exogamy," *Sociological Review* v, no. 4. His view of the origin of religion is a little out of date, being based on the animistic hypothesis of Tylor. This, fact however, does not diminish the value of his illustrative material, which would lend itself as well to the recent interpretations of Miss Jane Harrison (in *Themis*), or of Émile Durkheim (in *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*).

Kovalevsky, who still continues his genetic studies, has given us in his "Sociology" some valuable contribu-

tions. He is one among the few writers in Russian sociology who have pursued research apart from any partisan movement. His works, therefore, being less "Russian" are of greater value to sociology at large. The whole juristic and historical-genetical school should be recognized as one of the first groups of scholars that have sought to rid the study of law and of politics of their metaphysical premises and to establish them upon a scientifically sound sociological basis.

CHAPTER V

THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGISTS

(DE ROBERTY AND NOVICOV)

The Sociological Theories of De Roberty

MORE or less removed from the social-political problems of the Russian people are the sociological theories of Yakov Novicov and Eugene De Roberty. Having emigrated to France, they wrote in French under the influence of French thought and life. De Roberty published his first work on sociology (1881) simultaneously in Russian and in French. The book was much more favorably received on the banks of the Seine than on those of the Neva, and De Roberty remained in France until recent years when he returned to Petrograd and joined Kovalevsky as a lecturer on sociology in the newly established Psycho-Neurological Institute of Petrograd and co-operated in editing the newly established yearly series of sociological books. This re-introduction of De Roberty's sociological ideas into Russia may have some influence upon the future development of Russian sociological thought and therefore it is proper to give his theories a brief analytical survey.

De Roberty began his writing on sociology as an orthodox positivist. His first work, "Sociology" purposes only to interpret the positivist sociology, especially in its methodological aspects, including the place of sociology within the classification of the sciences, the nature of sociology, and its method.

Comte had given to the sciences an abstract classification. Each abstract science was to have its corresponding concrete science; which, however, he failed to provide for sociology. De Roberty explains that such classifications are made only for the sake of symmetry and are not required by logical necessity. Sociology "is founded upon various abstract sciences; it does not present signs of logical or subjective necessity; it proceeds entirely from an objective necessity."¹

Sociology is an abstract science and therefore fundamental, since the concrete sciences are always derived from the abstract.

Each of the Comtian sciences has its peculiar province. That of sociology embraces the laws of the social life in relation to its environment.

One would imprint upon sociology a particular absurdity if one tried to assign to it anything else but the study of the relations of "socialité" with the other "propriétés" of matter; or, to speak more plainly, if one tried to study society, after having subtracted the physical conditions of our globe and the biological conditions of its inhabitants.²

Psychology is closely related to sociology. It may be regarded as "a prolongation of sociology and is like a study which does not know how to become a constituted science until sociology shall have attained its complete development."³

De Roberty hopes to improve on Comte's method in sociology by applying to the study of social phenomena the descriptive method. "What is missing in the social sciences is a natural history of society, a description of social phenomena as analytic as possible."⁴

¹ De Roberty, *La Sociologie* ii ed., Paris 1886, p. 38.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

From his generally Comtian views De Roberty moved on to a more independent position which he calls "hyperpositivism", from which he attempts to reduce sociology to a system of social ethics.

He outlines his "hyperpositivism" in twelve points. In an abbreviated form the gist of his teaching follows. Hyperpositivism consists:

- 1) In a thorough separation of object from method, between two ideological species of which one precedes, engenders and fashions the other in its image;

- 2) In introducing, according to the empiric law of the three states, the theoretic law of correlation between the sciences and philosophy, and its correlative law of the three types—or unilateral directions—of metaphysics (materialism, sensualism, idealism);

- 3) In demonstrating the law of identity of contrary abstractions when raised to the n^{th} power (*la loi de l'identité des contraires surabstraits*); this is an equation in the world of ideas equivalent to the great law of the conservation of energy;

- 4) In reducing the transcendent to experience, the unknowable to the knowable, deity to entity;

- 5) In reducing finality to causality;

- 6) In conceiving reality as an essentially homogeneous unit, be it in the elements which necessarily transform one thing into another, or be it in the laws which govern infinite evolution;

- 7) In distinguishing between abstract and concrete knowledge, and basing the distinction upon a theory of knowledge which would complete the hierarchy of sciences established by Comte:

- 8) In formulating and defending the bio-sociological hypothesis in sociology;

9) In conceiving of psychology as a concrete science of the mind made up of biological and sociological laws ;

10) In conceiving of sociology as an abstract science in the world of superorganic facts, a science the essential phenomena of which are identical with the phenomena of the moral world as studied by ethics ;

11) In formulating and defending the important theory which gives the order of the four great factors of superorganic evolution ; these are : science, philosophy (including religion), art and work ; it also specifies the principle social values, and finally indicates the conditions which sociology (or any other science) must fulfill before passing from an empiric to a theoretic state ;

12) In formulating and defending an hypothesis which, departing from the present, is destined to serve the future abstract science of the super-organic world.

The ideas formulated in these twelve theses reappear in a modified form in De Roberty's "nouveau programme de sociologie".¹ Here he gives under three captions :

1. A fundamental hypothesis of the nature of the superorganic ;

2. A scientific method ;

3. A general law of evolution.²

In summing up De Roberty's more recent sociological ideas we observe the following ; There is an unbroken continuity of development from the organic and physiological to the super-organic, which is also the social. The psychological and the social or moral life have the same source. He says : "The same current of energy divides itself into two branches, of which one mani-

¹ Paris, 1904.

² Cf. *Nouveau programme de sociologie*, p. 6.

feats itself as physiological action and returns almost immediately to its first source, and the other, having become ideation, tends to express itself as social or ideological action.”¹

Thus superorganic or social life begins with ideation and becomes increasingly complex and is more and more bound to the ideological environment and more and more shaped by the actions of the group.²

Having deduced the super-organic life from its biological sources, De Roberty next develops his psychology from the former. Collective psychism is solidarity. Solidarity exercises a great influence upon the psychical development of the individual; it shapes the individual after itself and transforms him into a part of the group, Morality and sociality are identical. “But sociality is in some way the progressive rationalization of life, of the great organic dominion, and in this manner of the entire universe.”³

Society is a permanent and natural composition of all selves, whether present or future selves, with all others, —as they are found in a certain organic and geographic environment.⁴

Society will always remain an abstract reality, a corollary of which fact is that it is not the biological, but the social, individual who is the concrete unit of society. The individual is the end and not the beginning of the social process. He does not create the group. The group creates him. The dynamic of the social process is psychical. It consists of feelings and ambitions. Altruism is the principal cause of social activity. Also

¹ *Le psychisme sociale*, p. 107-108.

² *Ibid.*, p. 106.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁴ *Cf. Constitution de l'éthique*, p. 132.

there are customs which produce many psychic phenomena; opposite to these are innovations.¹

In this progress is a necessary development; it is always a development of altruism, of sociality; it is a transition from the organic to the super-organic, a striving towards an ideal.²

Super-organic evolution arising from biological sources is realized in a relatively small number of species among which it takes two characteristic forms: with some, as, for example, in animal societies, it remains instinctive and stationary; but with others, as in human societies, it continually increases in consciousness and becomes more and more fit for adaptation and development.

The evolution of the super-organic passes through three stages: the bio-individual consciousness, the group or collective consciousness, and the social-individual consciousness. The first is a biological fact and the last is a social fact.³

The dynamics of the social realm are ideas; "Les idées mènent le monde",⁴ says De Roberty. Objectively viewed the social, or super-organic process, has four phases; "Science, philosophy, art and work are the four great stages in the scale of super-organic facts."⁵

These four are also the factors of the law of historical development which in their subjective or rational, teleological sequence are in reversed order and appear as work, art, philosophy and science.⁶

As the world is moved by ideas, material progress will

¹ Cf. *Le psychisme sociale*, p. 162 et seq.

² Cf. *Les fondements de l'éthique*, p. 153 et seq.

³ Cf. *Constitution de l'éthique*, p. 73-74.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁶ Cf. *Nouveau programme de sociologie*, p. 188 et seq.

naturally not precede moral progress. However, both kinds of progress are closely related, only the material depends upon the spiritual.

Finality is characteristic of the social process and this necessitates for sociology the tasks of emphasizing the teleological point of view and of justifying the interpretation of the social process by the dynamic activity of ideas. This theory also harmonizes finality and causality.¹

De Roberty attempted to divorce sociology from the Darwinian principles by his hypothesis of social psychism, in which neither to biological nor to environmental facts are to be ascribed any determining influences. Exceptional men being products of the group, are likewise not to be considered as determining factors. Social progress is brought about by a non-personal psychism expressing itself through the ideas of science, philosophy, art and work which are the products of no individual in particular but which have been created by social contact and by innumerable psychic interactions. De Roberty in his effort to free himself from the extreme views advanced by biological and environmental sociology, swings the pendulum far out into the opposite direction, which is as extreme as what he wishes to avoid.

II. THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF NOVICOV.

Novicov is even less known to his own people than is De Roberty, although in sentiment he harmonizes in many respects with his Russian colleagues, being an anti-Darwinian pacifist and federationist, traits we have observed among both Slavophiles and Westernists. As an uncompromising enemy of all forms of despotism he frequently attacks the political institutions of Russia, and this may be the principal reason why his books were but

¹ Cf. *Constitution de l'éthique*, p. 56 et seq.

little if at all circulated in his native country, since the Russian censor would naturally have to bar them out. It is however likely that as the freedom of the press increases in Russia, his French works will be translated into Russian and exert an influence upon Russian sociological thought. It may therefore be not out of place to give here a brief analysis of his sociological theories.

Novicov may be called an anti-Darwinian-pacifist and a bio-sociological theorizer. He proceeds from the presupposition that there is but one set of laws, which controls all phenomena, whether inorganic, organic or social. These universal laws are laws of conflict or struggle and of association or cooperation; they manifest themselves in various ways, according to the nature of the phenomena. In general, he defines struggle thus: "Material atoms having been grouped around a center, free themselves from it and combine with a new center."¹

Universal struggle varies greatly in its particular manifestations. The social struggle is not identical with the biological, and for this reason Novicov continually attacks Darwinism as applied to social phenomena.²

He believes that much mischief was done by failing to distinguish between biological and social struggles, and between struggles within the same class or species and struggles between classes or species. He therefore makes this classification:

"I. Struggles between individuals of differing species and struggles between individuals of the same species.

"II. Struggles between individuals capable of association and struggles between those incapable of association.

¹ *La Justice et l'expansion de la vie*, quoted from the authorized German translation of Alfred H. Fried, Berlin, 1907, p. 259.

² Cf. especially Novicov's work: *La critique du Darwinism sociale*, Paris 1910.

"III. Struggles among individuals with high intellectual characteristics and struggles among individuals with only embryonic intellectual faculties."¹

The normal social struggle manifests itself through invention, which is followed by competition with the old, and by discussion. "The natural forms of the struggle are the psychical phenomena of invention and of discussion; but the struggles among men themselves are only a fraction of those struggles which our species is forced to wage against its external enemies."²

Novicov makes a detailed analysis of the struggles among human societies,³ and among individuals in their various phases, as the physiological, economic, political and intellectual, which have for their ends respectively the attainment of nourishment, of riches, the satisfaction of selfish aims, and intellectual interests. These ends may be attained either in a slow and irrational way, through brute force, or in a quick and rational way, through justice.⁴

Although, according to Novicov, society is a direct continuation of a biological organism subject to the law of selection,⁵ yet he believes that justice can accomplish a more complete selection than force.

Justice is the social mode of the evolution of (human) species

¹ *La Justice et l'expansion de la vie*, German translation, p. 264.

² *Ibid.*, p. 352.

³ Cf. his work *Les luttes entre sociétés humaines*, Paris, 1893.

⁴ Cf. his "tableau de la lutte pour l'existence," in *Les luttes entre sociétés humaines*, p. 402, also *ibid.* p. 462.

⁵ He says: "One may say in general that the biological development which had begun with the unicellular animal and proceeded up to man, will as well continue in society"; *La Justice et l'expansion de la vie*, German translation, p. 153, and "since biological methods are perpetuated in society, one may assert *a priori* that the phenomena of positive and negative selection are found there as well". *Ibid.*, p. 150.

which biologically goes on through the survival of the fittest. Through the establishment of justice the assent of the fittest is quickly obtained and in opposition to it the destruction of the less fit is also accomplished through the triumph of justice.¹

Therefore justice becomes almost a synonym for all social achievements and virtues. He says: "Expansion of life, happiness, association, order, organization, health, safety, liberty, equality, material well being, civilization and world-wide justice, are from a certain point of view identical concepts."²

Society is an association of associations.³

Association is the second universal law which cannot be disregarded with impunity, "Through the mechanism of association every individual injures himself who injures his neighbors, in other words he puts himself into a pathological state."⁴

Therefore "every action which leads to association is normal, and every action which leads to disassociation is pathological."⁵

Wars are unjustifiable in human societies. They create conditions of disassociation or anarchy. In animal societies bloody struggles are normal, but to man are given resources to prevent those occasions which create wars among animals. "Man can multiply his resources to an almost unlimited extent through agriculture and the raising of cattle, while animals cannot do this man can limit the growth of population to suit himself, while the animal cannot do this."⁶

Knowledge is the key to a harmonious development of association and therefore to human happiness. "Love

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 354.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 272-273.

of struggle, crimes, passions and the imperfections of our nature are not by any means the real and true hindrances to human happiness; the true and only hindrance is ignorance."¹

Novicov teaches that a widely disseminated education which would range over the whole hierarchy of Comte's classification of the sciences would insure the abolition of poverty. The improvement of man's nurture not nature is the principal problem. "Social happiness will never come as a result of the betterment of human nature."²

It has to come by improving social and political institutions. Novicov is a thoroughgoing utilitarian. He believes that "social welfare is not based upon altruism but upon egotism."³

If man can once grasp the idea that to act according to justice is most profitable for his own welfare he will do what is right, compelled by motives of sheer selfishness. This idea of the profitableness of justice our author believes will in time eliminate not only struggle between individuals but also among classes, races, nations, and and so enable man to reach the goal of social happiness which Novicov views as a worldwide federation of peoples.⁴

Novicov believes that throughout the history of social evolution such motives have been at work; that the growing consciousness of the profitableness of an association of associations and not bloody struggle, as the Darwinian sociologists assert, has created the state. Of course he cannot deny that innumerable wars have been waged in the making of states, but these have been rather pathological phenomena proceeding from man's ignorance of the true sources of happiness.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 394.

² *Ibid.*, p. 389.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 385 *et seq.*

Briefly outlined, then, the development of the state, according to Novicov, proceeds thus: Man having originated from an inferior animal starts forth as a nomad. In the days of horde, clan and tribe the limits of human association could not be determined by territory, but were fixed by bonds of blood relation and by individual relations. After man settled down he began to build dwellings and to till the soil. By and by divisions of labor and exchange appeared, and production increased and differentiated. Institutions of all kinds were created, and the social bond became a territorial one. The first form of territorial grouping is the city. Communications with neighboring cities make a code of laws necessary. Communities so unified become the state. Riches and leisure are obtained, and needs of the intellect arise. Art and literature flourish. With the latter begins the problem of language. A favored dialect becomes universal,—becomes a so-called national language. Step by step with social progress there is progress in other lines, in art, in science and in philosophy, and the state has reached the phase of nationality. When this has been established, the intellectual bond, together with the territorial bond, unifies men as members of the same nation. Powerful relations may thus exist between citizens of different states, provided that they belong to the same nationality. Later on, neighboring nationalities may join, and so are formed cultural groups, as in the Europe of to-day. The last phase will be attained when finally a still larger association shall have unified the whole of humanity.¹

We have briefly presented the principal points of Novicov's sociological theories. In criticising them it

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 308-319.

may be said that they present two extremes. The first is an unwarranted biological analogy crudely applied to society. For example Novicov says :

Economic production is a direct continuation of the physiological process. Some cells of certain animals produce hair which protects the animal from cold. If man through the united effort of his intelligence and his limbs makes for himself a dress or a coat which protects him against adversities of the season he simply continues the physiological process of the wool-producing cells.¹

This kind of analogy is not only absurd but, worst of all, it explains nothing. Man wears cloth for various other reasons than simply to protect himself against the cold. To what cells of the sheep, therefore, shall we ascribe the clothing worn in the hot season?

Secondly, Novicov goes to extremes in his utilitarian ethics. He overlooks the fact that most persons, even those who have been educated in the whole hierarchy of Comte's classification of the sciences, have interests greatly diversified, and often different from those of the group in which they live. Therefore, if they conform to the ways of the group they do not feel that they are benefiting themselves, but rather that they are doing an altruistic act. Take, for example, a southern gentleman who achieved and enjoyed his culture at the expense of slavery; he may well have realized that the institution of slavery was harmful to society and therefore in the long run would be harmful to his progeny. He may have realized all this and yet, if like Washington he freed his slaves, it was a self-sacrificing act. Like cases are presented by the liquor traffic to-day and by much of the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

anti-social big business. Ultimately every anti-social deed will avenge itself upon the race. In this we agree with Novicov, but we must call to mind that most men who let themselves be guided by their self-interest live not for ultimate but rather for proximate ends. To quote a word from Novicov's illustrious kinsman Alexander Herzen: "The goal of each generation is itself." "We live not for the purpose of entertaining others; we live for ourselves."¹

And this was said by a thorough-going positivist who was well at home in the whole hierarchy of the sciences. But perhaps Herzen was a pathological case!

¹ Cf. *supra* sec. on Herzen.

CHAPTER VI

RETROSPECT AND FUTURE OF RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY

IN estimating Russian Sociology two questions may be asked. First, what has it achieved for the Russian people in the solution of their economic, social and political problems. This question is important since, as we have learned, most of Russian sociology was written as stimulated by the needs of the time. The second question is, What contributions have Russian sociologists made which are valuable to sociology as a science?

In answering the first question we may say that the Russian theorists have had a good deal of influence in shaping the policies of the time, although it is questionable whether they have ever arrived at any real solution of Russia's tremendous problems. The Slavophiles who controlled the reform policies which were to give independence to the Russian serfs, decided upon the maintenance of the much-idealised peasant land-commune. They desired the perpetuation of this ancient institution to bar from Russia the big capitalism with its proletarianization of the masses. In this policy the Slavophiles were supported by the populists who, however, agitated for still more radical measures. The peasant land-commune, as we have learned, was unable to bar capitalism from Russia but it retarded its development for about half a century, so giving Russia an opportunity to benefit by the experience of Western Europe.

The Subjectivist School, which is the most important one among Russian sociologists, may be credited with having exploded some of the false Slavophile notions as to the innate goodness and perfection of the common people,

and of the Russian political and ecclesiastical institutions. It also modified among the intellectual class some of the fanatical radicalism which preached the creative revolutionary ability of the common people. It recognized the necessity of social control and above all, of education, but at the same time it was aware of the danger of over-standardization and emphasized the creative function of the critically-intellectual individual. Along with this subjective matter it recognized the imperative necessity of economic surplus, and the possibility of wealth increase through applied science and the division of labor. Recognizing and evaluating all of the important aspects of society, it viewed the preservation and the complete development of individuality as the most important task, in fact as the very end of society. The representatives of the subjectivist school were leaders of the opposition, and therefore their influence in bringing about changes in affairs of state and in social reform were indirect; nevertheless, they were highly important.

The Marxist sociologists, who were converted populists, turned their attention to the city proletariat and organized it into an important political force, spurring by their rivalry the radical populists into new activity.

In general, one may conclude that with the exception of the nationalist trend, Russian sociology has been the theoretical aspect of the dynamic-progressive forces of the Russian people.

The following analytical table will give a brief résumé of Russian sociology as it has concerned itself with the economic, social and political problems of the Russian people. It embraces the whole range of Russian Sociology, with exception of the juristic and historical-genetic schools, and the contributions of the Franco-Russians. The column showing the profession of the authors and

their official positions bears out the statement that Russian sociology is not the work of professional scholars, but rather of leaders of public opinion. The columns indicating their principal problems make clear what they regarded as most important for the welfare of their people.

Have Russian sociologists contributed anything of value to sociology at large? To say that they have not, would be unfair. Much of what is in vogue among sociologists to-day has been worked at by Russian sociologists. They were among the first to try to rid sociology of Darwinism and Spencerianism and to seek to establish it upon a psychological basis. But when all this is conceded to them we must also say that most of their good ideas have remained foreign to sociologists generally, and have since been wrought out independently by West European and American sociologists in a much more systematic way than by the earlier and unknown Russians.

Of course, there are contributions made by such men as Kropotkin,¹ Kovalevsky,² Korkunov,³ and others, that have now become the common possession of Western European and American students of social science.

Also there is much ingenious sociological thought still buried in Russian periodical literature, or poorly edited in the collected works of many authors.

The principal defect in much of Russian sociology is its tractarian nature, which depreciates its value to sociology as a science.

What are the prospects of Russian sociology for the future? Reasoning on the basis of the past, one may say that it depends greatly upon the attitude which the

¹ His "mutual aid" theory.

² His studies of Russian primitive institutions.

³ Sociological theory of law.

ruling classes take towards the more progressive opposition. The present world war has established something in the nature of a truce among the various conflicting movements of thought in Russia. It offers opportunity for a future policy of peaceful compromise. Will the parties in power embrace the opportunity? If they do, a way for a normal evolution of Russia will be established and Russian sociology will probably reflect the situation. If Russian autocracy, however, continues its old policies of suppression of public opinion, sociology will also keep its revolutionary character. Russian sociology in the past was moulded by the economic, social and political problems of the time, and the tendency is not likely to cease so soon in Russia.

Not all of Russian sociology, however, has been of the propagandist kind. What, we may ask, is therefore being done by Russians to contribute to sociology as a science? Here we notice a deadlock not peculiar to the Russians alone. The philosophical and the psychological approach to sociology, and the development of systems has nearly reached the stage of the vicious circle.

The circle can be broken only by introducing new methods. Of these there are two which are now being developed. The historical-genetic is generalizing principally from ethnographic materials. This method is being used by Kovalevsky and his pupils, who have rendered valuable service, and there is still unexplored material in the Russian empire to continue the work. Another method is the inductive-statistical, and in this very little has been done in Russia, because there is but little reliable data on hand, and secondly the tedious work which the statistical method demands does not appeal to the present sort of Russian students of sociology. Therefore, we may hardly expect that much if anything will be accomplished by them along this line of work for the present.

APPENDIX I

THE TEACHING OF SOCIOLOGY IN RUSSIA

SOCIOLOGY as a university study is still in its infancy in Russia. This, however, does not mean that sociology has not been or is not studied in Russia. On the contrary, it was and is very popular within the progressive circles of the Russian intellectual class. The Russian reformers hoped to receive from sociology a key for the solution of their perplexing economic, social and political problems, and therefore diligently pursued it.

In the universities sociology was introduced first by professors of law and politics in an effort to re-construct those sciences and to establish them upon a positivist basis by the aid of sociology.¹

It was also taken up by various philosophers of history, especially by Professor Karyev, who hoped by the aid of sociology to rid the philosophy of history of its metaphysical premises.

As an independent study, however, sociology was only recently placed in the curriculum of the newly (1908) founded Psycho-neurological Institute of Petrograd with Maxim Kovalevsky and Eugene De Roberty (died 1914) in charge of the Department. This inadequate presentation of sociology in the Russian universities is principally attributable to the authorities' ignorance of the nature of this science, and to a traditional prejudice against introducing anything new into the university curriculum.

¹ Cf. *supra* pt. iii, chapter iv.

APPENDIX II.

SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE IN RUSSIA.

ALTHOUGH there are but few Russian university chairs from which sociology is taught, Russian scholars have created a large sociological literature. Almost all of the principal sociological works may be had in Russian, as those of Comte, Buckle, Spencer, Lilienfeld, Ward, Giddings, Gumplovitz, Durkheim, De Greef, Lacombe, Le Bon, Worms, Kidd and many others. The various works by Russian authors, we need not mention here. We have learned to know them in the pages of this book.¹

Much of the current sociological thought appears in the Russian periodical literature. There are, however, no specifically sociological periodicals as yet in Russia. In the past many articles on sociology appeared in the following monthly periodicals, which we give in their chronological order.

Sovryemennik, St. Petersburg, 1836-66 ;

Otechestvennyya Zapiski, St. Petersburg, 1846-84 ;

Sovryemennoye Obozrenye, St. Petersburg, 1868 ;

Znaniye, St. Petersburg, 1870-77 ;

Dyelo, St. Petersburg, 1874-87 ;

Svyet, St. Petersburg, 1877-79 ;

Mysl, St. Petersburg, 1880-82 ;

Severny Vestnik, St. Petersburg, 1885-97 ;

Russkoye Bogotstvo, St. Petersburg, 1880-1918 ;

Mir Bozhi, St. Petersburg, 1892-1906 ;

Novoye Slovo, St. Petersburg, 1894-1897 ;

Of the monthlies now in existence the *Russkaya Mysl*, Moscow and Petrograd, *The Russkiya Zapiski*, Petrograd, and

¹ Cf., Bibliography for Russian Sociology.

the *Zavyety*, Petrograd, are voicing the traditions of the subjectivist school. The *Sovremenny Mir*, Petrograd, and the *Vestnik Evropy*, Petrograd are the organs of the objectivist school. Besides these the scientific journals *Voprosy Filosofii i Psichologee*, Moscow, and the *Vyestrik Psichologee*, Petrograd, discuss sociological problems. In recent years (since 1913) Kovalevsky and De Roberty began the issue of year books on *New Ideas in Sociology* which are to be to Russia what Durkheim's annual publications are to France.

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